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.. The mood and temper of the public with regard 
to the punishment of crjme and criminal-S. is one 
of the most unfailing tests of the civilization 
of any countcy. A ca~, cD:.spassionate recogni-
tion.-ef- tl:le ··Fights of 'thee accused, and even of 
the convicted, cr~al"against the State; a 
constant heart-searching. by all charged with 
the duty of• punishment; a desire and eagerness 
to rehabilitate in tJ:ie world of industcy those 
who have paid their aue in the hard coinage of 
punishment; tireless efforts towards the dis-
cover,r of curative and regenerative processes; 
unfailing faith that there is a treasure, if 
you could only f:ind it, in-the heart of every 
man -- these are the symbols,. which, in the 
treatment of crjme artd. crii!dnal, mark and 
measure the stored-up strength of a nation, 
and are sign andrproof of the 1i ving virtue 
in it. 
- Sir Winston Churchill 
The quality of religio~s teach:ing and experience 
may ••• be judged by the attitude it produces 
toward the prisoner. 
- J.. Arthur Hoyles 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose 
The lack of theological concern with penal justice is 
remarkable considering the fact that the heart of the Gospel is 
forgiveness and the redemption of the lost. Dr. Miriam Van Waters 
declares that 
an institution for rehabilitation is a primary 
place for the trial of faith in action. It is a 
challenge to Christians in the center of their 
belief in the power of redemption.l 
Yet Christian theologians have failed~ for the most part~ to con-
sider these institutions for rehabilitation fit subjects for 
systematic consideration. They have sought to formulate the 
Christian attitude toward war~ race, economic inequality~ politics~ 
~ex and marriage~ but so far have paid little attention to the 
Christian attitude toward crime and the criminal.2 The purpose of 
1. Van Waters, Art.(l950)~·195. 
· • 
11 If any people in the world ought to be interested in 
criminals~ then Christians sho~ld have such an interest •••• 
it was ••• for sinners that Christ died •••• ~gl no other 
person is so conspicuously marked as sinner as is the con-
victed criminal. If we have a gospel for anyone~ it is for 
him. 11 DeWolf, Art. (1953) ~ lSS. 
2. Seven basic books on Christian ethics, for example, reflect 
this lack of consideration, and these may be fairly said to 
represent th~ general tenor of contemporary Protestant theo-
logical thought. There is no mention of penal justice in 
the earliest of Walter Rauschenbusch's important books on 
the social gospel, Christianity and the Social Crisis, pub-
lished in 1907, and in his later Christianizing the Social 
Order, published in 1912, Dr. Rauschenbusch makes two refer-
ences to prison labor as instances of unjust labor practice 
(pp. 195, 2S3) and then deals with the whole problem of penal 
1. 
this study is to examine the Christian attitude toward penal 
justice exemplified in the history of theology and in the works of 
certain contemporary theologians in an effort to discover the 
' necessary components of a Christian philosophy of penal justice. 
i. Definition of Primary Terms 
A definition of primary terms will help clarify the title: 
Prolegomena to a Christian Philosophy of Penal Justice. 
The word prolegomena shows that the study is meant to be only 
an introduction to the important interrelationship between theology 
and penology. Since the scope of the study will be discussed in 
more detail below, it is sufficient to state here that all the 
study aims to do is to make some preliminary observations about a 
subject matter that is by nature interdisciplinary and which will 
therefore require that separate studies be made in the various 
related fields before any definitive conclusions can be reached. 
Because this study is being undertaken by a student of 
justice in one paragraph (on pp. 466-467). Reinhold Niebuhr 
spends less than two pages (pp. 110-111) discussing criminal 
justice and one (p. 196) considering the question of capital 
punishment in his Interpretation of Christian Ethics, published 
in 1935. Emil Brunner devotes four pages (pp. 474-478) to 
penal justice in The Divine Imperative, published in this 
country in 1937, and Albert G. Knudson also devotes only four 
pages to the subject (pp. 218-222) in The Principles of Chris-
tian Ethics, published in 1943. Dr. Knudson says that penal 
justice 11 calls for brief consideration, after which we shall 
take up the more pressing problem of war 11 (p. 219). John C. 
Bennett does not mention penal justice in his Christian Ethics 
and Social Policy, published in 1946; nor does Paul Ramsey in 
his Basic Christian Ethics, published in 1950. Thus, out of 
more than 2500 pages only about fourteen are concerned with 
this particular aspect of Christian ethics. 
theology it will attempt to present a Christian philosophy of 
penal justice; t~at is, a philosophyl based on the Biblical 
I 
teachings which found their highest expression in Christ. It 
must be philosophical rather than simply theological, however~ 
because the penal system w.i.:th which it is concerned contains other 
than Christian as well as Christian theory and practice. In this 
case philosophy is taken to be a more inclusive word than theology 
-- one which admits the validity of 11secular11 as w·ell as nsacred" 
lmow1edge. 
Finally, the phrase penal justice is meant to include not 
only the just punishment of crime but also the broader aspects of 
the possible causes of criminal behavior and cures of criminals 
because these must be taken into accmmt in any just considera-
tion of punishment. 
It is the contention of this stuqy that, although divine 
justice is altogether relevarrt to this subject as the source and 
judge of all human concepts of justice, penal justice as men 
know it is necessarily an imperfect human institution because God 
alone can fully define sin, determine guilt., and redeem the guilty 
one. Yet surely God demands that men be as just as possible within 
the limits .. of' their human knowledge. 
ii. Principal Works Used 
Although the bibliography inclu<iles books from many fields 
1. Philosophy is used here to mean "a system of principles for 
guidance in practical affairs"· The American College 
Dictionary, Nevi York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. 
3· 
from which related material has been~alin, the books which for.m 
the basis of this work are primarily theological. 
(1). Theolggical Works Dealing Specifically w.i.th Penal Justice 
The paucity of theological material dealing ppecifically with 
penal justice seems not only to justify further work in this area, 
but to demand it. Besides occasional articles,1 the contemporary 
treatments of this problem are lind. ~ed to half a dozen. Norman L. 
Robinson's Christian Justice (1922) is more evangelical than 
. 
scientific, as are J. Arthur Hoyles 1 two books, The Treatment of 
the Young Delinquent (1952) and Religion in Prison (1955), but the 
latter two contain much valuable historical material. W. c. de 
Pauley contends in his Punishment HlElan and Divine (1925) that · 
the retributive element is the pivot of the theory 
of punishment in Christian ethics interpreted as 
it must be by the philosophy of the Christian 
religion.2 
The rest of these wri. ters would take serious exception to de 
P auley1 s contention. Sir ~val ter Mo berlyJs approach in his 
Riddell Memorial lectures on Responsibility would be more 
generally acceptable. Sir Walter attempts to discover a dis-
tinctive Christian view of penal justice somewhere between the 
strict legalism of the jurist and the easy amoralism of the 
1. Amlhng these the most notewortpy are L. H. De't'lolf' s study of 
4 
"The Church in the Prevention and Treatment of Crimert, H. Van Oyen' s 
consideration. of "Justice Human and Divine", and M. Van Waters• 
discussion of penal justice in "Christian Social Reform". 
2 .. dePauley, PHD, 139. (Standard abbreviations for each book are noted 
in the bibliography. Book titles are usuaJ.ly abbreviated by using 
the first letter of the three most important words in the title. 
When there is only one word the first three letters are usedJ 
psychologist. He shows what the Christian point of view has :in 
common with each of these concepts but how in significant respects 
it transcends them both. A small book by the late Archbishop of 
Canterbury, William Temple, completes the list. It is the 
published text of his lecture on The Ethics of Penal Action 
delivered :in honor of ~he late Sir Clarke Hall whose Christian 
convictions led hfm to work with great effectiveness to provide 
special treatment for young offenders.1 
It will be noted that all but one of these books were 
"tr-1I'itten :in England. The fact of the matter is that the church 
in England has taken a more active part in solving the problems 
of penal justice than it has :in the United States. Through a 
fo~1ard looking program of cooperation between the church and 
the government, Great Britain has reduced its prison population 
2 to one-half o:f 1"lhat it was twenty years ago. The same cannot 
be said for the United states. After the series of prison riots 
in this country in 1953 the National Council of Churches estab-
lished a special commission to study the problems of penology 
from a Christian point of view, but the commission has not yet 
published an official report.3 However, three current church-
related studies. hold real promise of furthering the church Is 
1. This lecture, delivered in 1934, was the first in a series 
of annual lectures sponsored by the Clarke Hall Fellowship 
in England. The purpose of this organization is to promote 
juvenile courts and probation. 
2. Macintosh., Art. (1940), 70-71: 
3. A letter from Robert R. Hannum dated December ll, 1956, 
indicates that a pro'gress report on two years t work of the 
commission "1dll soon be available to interested persons 11 • 
s· 
interest in penal justice. For the past six years students in a 
Seminar on Changing Social Attitudes under the direction of Dr. 
Allan Knight Chalmers of the School of Theology at Boston 
University have worked with churchmen from sixty to seventy 
Protestant churches to rehabilitate almost one hundred for.mer 
prisoners.1 Two years ago a grant was received by Harvard Uni-
versity 11to explore the ways in l'lhich the church may be more ef-
fective in dealing with the problems of juvenile delinqueney 11 • 
Since then Dr. Richard V. McCann has been directing a Seminar on 
Juvenile Delinquency at the Divinity Schools of Harvard and 
Andover Newton.2 For the past year Dr. 1. Harold DeWolf has been 
directing a Seminar in Justice, Divine and Human at the School of 
Theology at Boston University.3 It is ver,y likely that the theo-
logical students involved in these seminars will carey a fresh 
interest in penal justice to the members of their future parish~s. 
The world church has raised the question of penal justice 
only once, at the Stockholm Conference of the World Council of 
Churches in 1925.4 More recently the study Department of the 
·world Council ekmfued The Church and the Problem of Justice5 
but no specific reference was made to penal justice at that time. 
1. For details of their work see The Christian Science Monitor, 
Boston, Mass., Oct. 31, 1956, p. 12. 
2. For details of the work of the seminar see McCann, Art. (1956). 
3. No report of this seminar is yet available. 
4. The t1.ro articles covering this discussion may be found :in 
Bell, TSC, 279-311. 
5. For a report on their deliberations see The T.re~sa Conference 
on the Biblical Doctrine of Law and Justice (tr. D. Barton); 
Geneva, &v.i.tzerland: Study Department, 1nJorld Council of 
Churches, 1951. 
5 
A number of religious leaders were among the 560 delegates from 
66 different countries who met together·in Geneva in the fall of 
1955 for the first United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders;1 however, they have issued 
no special report on the religious implications of this con-
ference. 
ii. Theological Works Dealing "With Justice in General 
Considerably more work is being done in the closely related 
field of Christian justice in general. Several of the major 
contemporary theologians -- John c. Bennett, Emil Brunner, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, and Paul Tillich, for example -- have devoted 
considerable thought to the possible relationship between justice 
and love in a Christian culture. All these, especially Dr. 
Brunner, make some references to penal justice as a specific 
example of their more general theme, but they are by no means 
primarily concerned 'With it. Two lesser theologians, Konrad 
Braun and Canon o. c. Quick, have written very helpful treatments 
of Christian justice in general, and Samuel stump£, an American 
,. student of Brunner, is currently working on a 11theology of law", 
but in each case the relevance to penal justice in particular 
is only by implication. The t1ro recent Ph.D. disse1.;tations which 
are most relevant to this present study are Pieter De Jongts 
Divine and Human Forgiveness and Henry Kolber s A Study of the 
1. For a summary of the proceedings of this Congress see Cavan 
and Cavan, Art.(l955) and Rogers, Art.(l955). 
Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation and Its Relevance to Social 
and Political l?roblems. However, Mr. De Jong devotes only five 
of his 2Sl,. pages to the problem of forgiveness in penal justice 
and Mr. Kolbe does not mention penal justice at a11.1 
What is true in the contemporary picture is even more true 
in the history of Christian thought. Here any reference to a 
Christian philosophy of penal justice is made only by implication 
in doctrinal discussions of the justice of God, the sinfulness 
of man, the nature of the atonement, and the pQssibility o£ 
future punishment. All these topics, in contemporary theology 
as well as in the history of doctrine, have been relevant to 
this study. 
(3). Philosophical Works of Special Interest 
Two philosophical treatments of the ethics of penal justice 
have been of vaJ.ue, especially in the final portion of this study: 
A. C. Ewing's The Morality of Punishment, 1929, and Heinrich 
Oppenheimer's The Rationale of Punishment, 1913.; The authors of 
both books reach the conclusion that the chief function of punish-
ment is to educate morally, whether it be the cr:iminal in question 
or the law-abiding citizens whose concepts of right and wrong are 
shaped in large part by the penal code of the state. 
1. In his Riddell Memorial lectures (RES, 3) Sir Walter l~oberly 
refers to a 11thesis presented for a research degreen entitled 
Modern Prison Reform in the Light of the Christian Doctrine 
of Redemption. This would have been altogether relevant to 
this present study but it was not available in this country. 
2. Problem 
When the l:awyer asked Jesus, 1'Who is my neighbor?11 Jesus 
told him a parable about the neighborly way in which a passerby 
treated a bruised and beaten man whom he found 1~ in a ditch •1 
Suppose the good Samaritan had arrived a few hours earlier, 'when 
the band of robbers were just walking away from the scene of 
their crime. How should he have treated those neighbors? Or do 
robbers not belong under the categor,y of neighbor? In a very 
real sense these two questions lie at the heart of this study: 
Is the robber (or· any criminal) in any way the neighbor of the 
. 
Christian, and, if he is, 'What is the nature of a Christian 
response and responsibility to this neighbor? 
i. lack of Concern 
For the most part Christians have tended to treat the 
criminal as the priest and Levite treated the half-de~d man in 
the ditch in the parable of the Good Samaritan; they have 
simply 11passed by on the other side11 • When they have been 
forced to confront the 11publicans, sinners, and harlots 11 of 
their own society, they have tended to deal with them as the 
Pharisees did: with self-righteous indignation. So Tillich 
claims that 
the Church "VJOuld be more the Church of Christ 
than it is now ••• i:f it joined Jesus and not 
1. Luke 10:29-37. 
g~ 
Simon :in its encounter 1-r.i.th those who are 
rightly judged unacceptable.l 
Yet to a la:J.."ge degree the church· 11 jo:ins Simon", and consequently 
the atfitude of the average churchgoer may be less "Christi~m" in 
this respect than that of a contemporar.y penologist vmo claims no 
religious basis for his beliefs whatsoever.2 
In her 'Work on Crime :in Modern Society Dr. Mabel Elliott 
po:ints out that a necessary study of crime from a religious per-
spective and an equally necessary analysis of the :impact of 
religion·in rehabilitating the offender have never been made, not 
only because many research persons are 11def:ini tely antr-religious 
in their approach to the· crime problem11 , but also> because too 
much Christian theology is s:i..mpll nthe substance of things hoped 
for" :instead of a concern for redemptive action in the present 
social situation.3 
ii. Attitude of Revenge 
The four most generally accepted reasons for the :imposition 
of punishment are protection of society, deterrence of further 
1. Tillich, TNB, 14, referring to Luke 7:36-47. 
2. Hoyles, TYD, 178. An illustration of this fact was cited by 
the chaplain of the Massachusetts state prison at Charlestown. 
He said that because it is a state law that no prisoner may 
be released, even when he has "done his t:i..me 11 , until there is 
someone on the outside who will guarantee him a place to live 
and work until he can f:ind his own place :in society again, 
one of the primary responsibilities of the chaplain is to find 
such places for those men who have no connections of their ow.n 
on the outside. It has been the experience of this chaplain, 
however, that church groups repeatedly refuse to sponsor such 
"ex-cons" who must then turn to some secular agency for help. 
(From a personal :interview with the Reverend Howard P. Kellett.) 
3. Elliott, CMS, 835. 
10 
l'Jrong-doing, rehabilitation, and retribution. These four reasons 
will be examined in detail 'later in the study •1 What needs to be 
stated here, however, is that of these four reasons the last is 
by far the most popular so far as the great majority of the public 
is concerned.2 Penologists are fairly well agreed that 11retribu-
tion toward their criminal brothers is still a profound response 
in the souls of menu,3 that ttthe spirit of revenge colors our 
penal administration from arrest to discharge", 4 and that ttthis 
perverse emotional motivation of the average citizen cannot be 
too greatly emphasized11 .5 That such motivation has been remark-
ably ineffective in preventing crime is indicated by the fact that 
there is an increase of 4,500 convicts a year in state and federaJ. 
prisons, and that from sixty ~o seventy-five percent of these are 
recidivists.6 Yet according to ~ competent criminologists the 
ordinary citizen finds it difficult to change his revengeful at-
titude toward the criminal because 
the criminal ••• becomes the handy scape-goat upon 
which he can transfer his feeling of his own 
1. See below, p. 185f. 
2. Dr. Lindner goes so far as to suggest that the first three 
are simply .I?Sttionalizations to justify a profound human need 
for the last. They provide tta socially approved and ac-
ceptable way of working out our own aggressi vi ty, our own 
sadism". SVJM, 386. Cf. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 419. 
3. Campbell, .Art.(l954), 3; Radin, LAY, 76-77. 
4. Cantor, CCCJ, 225. 
5. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 435. Cf. Dienstein, AYG, 133. 
Miss Margery Fey points out that this attitude has been 
popular for a long while. She quotes Carlyle as saying: 
"Revenge, my friends! revenge, and the natural hatred of 
scoundrels and the ineradicable tendency to ••• pccy- them 
what they have merited ••• this is forevermore intrinsically 
a correct, and even a divine feeling in the mind of every 
manu. AOL, 181. · · 
6. !Dveland, .Art. (1956), 14-15. 
11 
tendency to sinfulness and thus by punishing the 
crim;i.nal [_deludi/ himself' into a :reeling o£ 
righteous indignation.1 
So much £or the ordinary citizen; mat about the Christian 
citizen? Is he any di££erent? He is, but not constructively so. 
Dr. Albert Morris claims that society has developed 11 a cult o£ 
£und.amentalism11 about crime which erects the greates·t. obstacle to 
its e££ective control by equating good intentions with e££ective 
achievements, assuming that belie£s repeated long enough become 
£acts, and encouraging the intellectual narcotic o£ uncritical 
£ai th. 2 He then goes on to say that in his opinion "many o£ the 
churches and their teachings are in varying degrees the chie£ 
bulwarks o£ this un£ortunate £undamentalism11 • 3 Dr. L. Harold 
DeWoil suggests that much o£ this 11un£ortunate £undamentalism11 -is 
due to 11 retarding11 influences o£ Puritanism which "stem from ideas 
Which, in the light of recent developments in theology, are seen 
to be o£ doubtful validi ty11 • 4 
Norman L. Robinson claims that the reason Christians have 
accomplished so little in· this area is that they oscillate in their 
moral judgments between 
an abstract retributive justice, untouched by 
Christian thinking ••• and. ••.• an ideal o£ redemptive 
1. Glueck, CCSP, 77; c£. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 421. 
2. Morris, CAC, 1 and 41. 
3. Morris, CAC, 41. 
4. From a mimeographed proposal made by Dr. DeiVoll for Penal 
Justice: A Research Project in Theological Ethics with 
Assistance £rom Law, Criminology, and Social Ethics, 1954, 
p. '2. De~Jolf, however, does not use the term 11 £undamentalism" 
in this connection. 
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lovingkindness, which rarely escapes from the 
1 realm of theology into the sphere of practice. 
Sir Wa:lter Moberly attributes this oscillation to the "ambi valence 11 
of the Christian position on the subject of cr:ime. On the one 
hand this position makes for leniency in its proclamation of the 
good tidings of forgiveness; on the other, it makes for severity 
2 
:in its rigorous stress on man • s accountability to God. Whatever 
. 
the reason for it, it does seem to be a fact that few Christians 
I 
have thought about the :implications of their faith for crime and 
the cr:iminal members of their society.3 
Some theologi~s suggest that "reformation in penology should 
stqrt from the cross of Christn4 since 
God knows "What we have not discovered -- namely, 
that this is the way to cure rebels and lawless men. 
We, with what we call our horse-sense, punish 
criminals, and cr:im.e goes on increasing,.' If we had 
a little more God-sense vTe should know ••• that the 
way of reconciliation and restoration is the way to 
deal with rebels and sinners.5 
If this is true -- and that remains to be seen -- the problem is 
how can churchmen implement in this particular field their Christian 
belief in the infinite mercy of God, the redeemability of man, and 
the necessity of a justice grounded in and guided by love? l'Jhat 
X. Robinson, CJ, 24. 
2. Moberly, RES, 25-27. Cf. Tillich, LPJ, 121. 
3. 11In principle, many morally earnest people have not seen a 
, clear alternative to the dilennna of choice between the moral 
·anarchy of complete ethical relativism and the belief in the 
justice of divine and human retribution.,_ There are alter.na-
tives suggested ira contemporary theology, but they have not 
been thought through in relation to the specific problems of 
divine and human law and order. 11 DeWolf, in the mimeographed 
proposal referred to above, pp. 6-7. 
4. DeJong, DHF, 280. 
5. Roberts, Art.(l943), 133. 
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. , 
practical suggesti0ns could the,y make to the administrators of 
penal justice; what attitudes tO"t'l'ard crime and the criminal should 
they seek to create in the hearts of their fellow Christians? 
' All these questions must be faced in this study if it is to 
examine all the implications of a Christian philosophy of penal 
justice. 
3. Method 
There are certain problems of scope and method which are 
peculiar to a prolegomena. In undertaking such a study one must 
decide how much material can be effectively considered and i'fuat 
" method will be most fruitful in examining this material. 
i. Scope of Work 
In most disserlations the problem is to narrow down,· but 
here the study must be broad enough to include all the releva.nt 
material, yet pointed enough to bring that material into sharp 
focus •. For this reason it seemed wise to impose three limita-
tions as to scope. The first limitation is theological. Protestant 
sourc~s have been used almost exclusively for theological thought 
after the Reformation because the thought of Protestant theologians 
has- been more open to basic restudy and rev:i.sion than that of Roman 
Catholic.theologians.1 
1. "While the Catholic Chur,ch, drawing on centuries of tradition 
possesses an impressive systematic theory of justice, Protestant 
Christianity has had none for some three hundred years pa~ •••• 
/Jhii/. is doubtless one of the main reasons why the Protestant 
Church is so unsure,of itself in questions of the social order ••• 
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TJ;J.e second limitation is geographical. Ex:cept for the 
historical ~eferences, the penal systems discus~ed here are those 
of the United states and preat Britain, because the practices of 
these two countries are more closely akin in many respects than 
they are to those of other countries around the world.1 Airy 
Christian principles of penal justice would naturally be world~ 
'tdde in their application, but for specific examples of actual 
practices it seems more practicable to l:i.mit the discussion to 
the more familiar ones.2 
The.third limitation is bibliographical. A comprehensive 
l 
bibliography would have had to include all the relevant b9oks in 
several fields: c:r::i.minology and penology, psychology and socio-
logy, law and ethics, as well as theology. Since this was not 
feasible, a selected bibliography has been chosen. .Although the 
books in this bibliography have been selected 'With care, no cla:im 
can be made that they are the most crucial that could have been 
chosen in any of the fields except theology, the particular field 
. 
in which the study has been undertaken. Even in this field on,J.y 
' . 
' 
those theologians whose teaching seems particularly pertinent to 
tlie issues in question will be cited. In other fields an attempt 
and why its statements on these subjects are so haphazard 
and improvised that they fail to carry conviction. n Brunner, 
JSO, 1. Of. Niebuhr, NDM, I~, 253, n,5. 
1. For a good brief comparison of world penal systems see Cavan 
and Cavan, Art.(l955). For a more comprehensive discussion 
see Hugueney, L., 'H. Donnedieu de Vabres, and Marc Ancel 
( eds. ) , Les Grandes , st "Emles P~nit entiaires Actuels; Paris : " 
L'Institut de Droit Compar de l'Universit de Paris, 1950. 
2. Rascoe Pound points out that Blackstone r s C0rmnentaries on 
the Laws of- England, published in 1765, provided the foun-
dation for American legal education. CJA, S2-S3. 
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has been made to include not only the most widely recognized 
authors, but also those who have had some i'irst-hand experience 
with criminals and penal procedure. This 1dll explain the in-
elusion in the bibliography of some 11popular11 treatments by 
prison wardens, prison psychologists, a warden's 1vife, and a 
journalist on crime. Perhaps the most valuable first-hand ac-
counts 1-rere a sociologist's report of his exp'erilneilt with adult 
education among a group of 11incorrigibles11 and a group of "yard 
menu in a southern prison,l and the diary of a·conscientious 
objector in \iorld tvar II 1mo was sentenced to a three-year term 
in a federal penitentiar,y.2 
ii. Plan of Work 
This study is being undertaken with the conviction that trthe 
issues of social reform ••• turn on issues of theology11 .3 It is 
an essay in systematic theology rather than in sociology or 
criminology. No attempt will be made to examine the penal sy£tenn7 
of this country in any detail. That has already been done 
exte~sively by competent students of the social sciences and by 
criminal lawyers. Instead, this study Will concentrate on the 
theological motivations behind penal practices in the past and 
at present, and on theological motivations for possible improve-
ments of those practices in the future. The method 'tvill be both 
historical.and analytical. 
1. McCleery, TSJ. 
2. Hassler, DSG. 
3. Beach and Niebuhr,. GE, 477. 
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The following plan 1dll be developed. In Chapter One the 
presuppositions of such a study will be examined: the nature of 
justice in general and of penal justice in particular, and the 
possible relationship betw·een justice and love in a Christian 
society. In Chapter Two some of the effects of penal practice on 
the history of Christian thought will be shown. In Chapter Three 
a comparable study will be made of some of the effects of Christian 
thought on the history of penal practice. Chapter Four will be 
devoted to an examination of the theological resources for 
formulating a Christian philosophy of penal justice. The theo-
logical basis of these resources 't'Jill be discussed as well as their 
relevance to penal practice. FinalJ.y, the practical aspects of the 
problem will be considered i11 Chapter Five in which the attempt 
will he made to formulate, at least tentatively, a Christian 
philosophy of penal justice. 
It must be kept in mind that this prel:ilninary -vrork is meant to 
be no more than an introduction to a critical area of theological 
and social concern. At every point it will be suggestive rather 
than conclusive. Its mam contribution mil be to point up the 
need for fUJ.""'ther study, preferably of an interdisciplinary nature, 
and to point out the places where further exploration is especially 
called for. 
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CHAPmR ONE 
An Examination of Presuppositions 
To begin with, t'\'ro sets of presuppositions must be examined. 
The first concerns the tw·o concepts of justice in which Christian 
culture took root; the second concerns the possible relationship 
between the divine and human orders in the development of. that 
culture. 
1. Two Concepts of Justice 
Two figures confront the Christian concerned w.i.th penal 
justice -- a statue, blindfolded and silent, holding a scales in 
one hand and a sword in the other, and a man, both hands nailed to 
a cross, asking forgiveness for those who nailed him there. It 
may be said in general.that these bro figures represent Graeco-Roman 
thought exemplified in the 1vritings of Plato, Aristotle, and some 
of the stoics, and the Hebrew prophetic viewpoint as it was finally 
expressed in the teaching of Jesus.1 Each figure represents a 
standard which the criminal has violated; each represents a way of 
dealing with the criminal. Each stands for a particular concept of 
1. The delimitation of each point of view must be kept in mind in 
the contrasts suggested below. One can hardly contrast Cit'aeco-
Roman thought Hin general" with Hebrew thought 11in generaltt 
since any gener~lizations about either type of thought as a 
whole '\'rould be misleading. Graeco-Roman thought is more varied 
than this particular study indicatep, and so is Hebrew thought. 
There is, for e.x.ample, far more support of retribution in Hebrew 
thought as a whole than is suggested in this chapter. (See 
below, p.S~ ). However, it seems valid to consider the blind-
folded goddess as an objectification of the thought of Plato, 
Aristotle, and some of the stoics, and the man on the cross as an 
objectification of the Hebrew prophetic viewpoint as it was 
fina.lzy expressed in the teaching of Jesus, and thus to contrast 
the two. 
18 
justice. To 'Which will the Christian give his final allegiance? 
Before that question can be answered the two concepts must. be 
elaborated and compared. The general concepts of justice will be 
considered first, and later the concepts of penal justice in 
particular. 
i. A Comparison of the Distinguishing Characteristics 
of the Graeco-Ro~1 and Hebrew Concepts of 
Justice in General 
The classical Greek concept of justice differs from the Hebrew 
prophetic concept in four respects: it is anthropocentric where 
the Biblical view is theocentric; it is metaphysical where the 
Biblical view is historical; it is impersonal and inevitable where 
the Biblical view is personal and unpredictable; and it is capable 
of reasonable comprehension -where the Biblical view can be grasped 
only by faith. 
(1). Anthropocentric - Theocentric 
Although both the classical Greeks and the ancient Hebrews 
believed that justice is grounded in the eternal nature of things, 1 
1. The Graeco-Roman point of view is represented by Plato: 
But perhaps it is laid up in heaven as a pattern 
for him 'Who wills to see, and seeing, to found a 
city within himself. Whether ffihe perfect citi/ 
exists anywhere or ever will exist, is no matter. 
His conduct will be an e:xpression of the laws of 
that city alone, and of no other; 
(Re;e., IX, 592) 
by Aristotle: 
There is a general ideal of just and unjust in ac-
cordance with nature, as all men in a manner divine, 
even if there is neither communication or agreement 
between them; 
(Rhet., I, 13) 
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the Greeks found this eternal nature manifested in the rational 
soul of man, whereas the Hebrews claimed only that it indica-t;.ed 
·t.he will of God. 
Plato conceived justice to be that state of perfect harmony 
in human beings or in human states when each part is performing its 
appointed duty under the guidance of reason.1 For Aristotle, too, 
the requirements of justice were based upon human nature and ex-
pressed in human society.2 He fom1d those acts to be just ~mich 
tend11to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the 
political societyu, and such acts are always reasonable.3 For the 
stoic philosophers justice was an expression both of human reason-
ableness and of a gregarious instinct among men. 4 "Whoever violated 
the human fraternity was considered not only unjust but also un-
natural. Justice, in other words, was 11an ideal order, a divide 
between the suitable and unsuitable, the proper and improper, which 
depends on human nature and its essential ends.n5 Every individual 
by Cicero: 
There is a true law -- namely right reason -- which is 
in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is 
unchangeable and eternal •••• It will not lay do'W!l one 
rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one 
rule today and another tomorrow. There will be one law, 
eternal and unchanging, binding at all times and upon 
all people. (De republica, III, 22) 
A Psalmist suggests the Hebrew· point of view: 
But the Lord sits enthroned forever, 
he has established his throne for judgment; 
and lie judges the world with righteousness; 
and judges the peoples with equity. 
(Psalm 9:7-8) 
1. Rep., IV, 428-444. 
2. Rhet., I, 13. 
3. Nic:' Eth., v, 1, 1129b. 
4. Marcus Aurelius, MED, VII, 9. 
5. Maritain, Art.(l952), 63. 
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has an inalienable right to realize his true stature as a human 
being; justice consists in respecting this right. 
Such an idea was all but unknown to the authors of the Old 
Testament. Here justice is to be found not in any self-realization 
of humanity, but in the will of God.1 In the Old Testament justice 
is an attribute of God r s nature by which He creates, 2 quickens, 3 
judges, 4 and redeems5 man and the world. 6 Human justice depends 
less on self-knowledge through human reason than on trust in, and 
faithfulness to, the just nature of God which is manifested 
particularly in human histor,r. 7 This suggests a second, and close-
ly related, distinction betw·een the two points of view. 
(2). Metaphysical -- Historical 
Aristotle could speak of justice abstractly as na certain 
kind of state", 8 and the stoics, as a general, a~d often impersonal, 
participation in the all-pervading spfritual principle of the uni-
verse;9 but such concepts would have been incomprehensible to the 
Hebrew prophets. There is very little that is abstract, general, 
or impersonal about their idea of justice. It is rooted in God's 
personal dealings with men in particular historical events. The God 
1. Snaith, DIOT, 93-97. 
2. Psalm 111:7. 
3. Psalm 119:40. 
4. Psalm 98:9; Isaiah 28:17. 
5. Isaiah 1:27; 30:18; Hosea 12:6. 
6. Isaiah 32:15-17. 
7. Ex:odus 22:30; Leviticus 11:44; 19:2. 
8. Nic. Eth., V, 1, 1130a. 
9. 'Epictetus, DIS, IV, 2. 
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of prophetic thought is· not an eternal idea (like Plato 1s Eternal 
Forms), an impassive goal (like .Aristotle1s Unmoved Mover), or a 
rational structure (like the Stoicsr logos or~), but the living 
God 'vho is lmown ultimately by what He does. 1 The Hebrew prophets 
w·ere not concerned 'With a general divine impingement upon human 
nature through a rational moral law, but only 'With the inescapable 
word of Yahweh ( dabhar) which was spoken to man in historic events 
(also dabhar). 2 Indeed, the prophetic "VJriters of the Old Testament 
believed that God confronts men particularly in specific moments of 
moral decision when a man is forced to choose between justice and 
injustice, life and death.3 In the first historic covenant between 
Yahweh and His people justice was demanded of man in response to 
his experience of God r s justice in action , and this pattern was 
i'ollowed throughout the remaining history: I am the Lord 'Who has 
already executed justice; therefore, be thou just.4 
The divine revelation in history was related to the 
divine demand •••• Yahweh's event was matched 'With 
Yahweh's word, and that word centered upon the 
people's answering responsibility.5 
God was not the end product of thought, but the great Subject 
motivating men to action. The just God took the initiative and 
1. Psalm 146:5-9. 
2. Muilenburg, .Art. (1952), 529. 
3. Deuteronomy 30:15-20. 
' .. 
11It is a strange fact that, in the Jewish system of juris-
prudence, the legal terms, crime and criminal law, are nO'-
where to be found •••• The absence of ffi"hese term.i/ is, doubt-
less, a reflection of the fundamental premise of Jewish 
jurisprudence, namely, that the revealed 'Will of God is the 
sole source of all Jewish leg:i.slation. 11 Goldin, HCLP, 11-12. 
4. Ex:odus 20:2-17. 
5; Muilenburg, Art. (1952), 530-531. 
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man discovered justice only in personal relationship with Him. 
This suggests the third general distinction between the classical 
Greek and the prophetic Hebrew concepts of justice. 
(3). Impersonal -- Personal 
As has already been sUggested, in classical Greek thought 
divinity was either reflected in or diffused through temporal 
nature as a rational principle, and the same reason -wJ:P.ch ordered 
the movement of the stars and the seasons ordered men r s just deal-
ings with one another. So Marcus Aurelius could say: "For there 
is both one Universe, made up of all thing;s, and one God immanent 
in all things, and one Substance, and one Law.n1 The governmenl:i of 
such a universe, including man, is by law·, and la"VT is by natut-e 
exact and predictable. The stoics believed that Phusis, the Law 
of Nature, is a great chain of causation by which all events 
--natural and human-- occur and are shaped to their ends.2 Every-
thing that happens happens according to intelligible cause and 
effect. Because la'ti is impersonal, the divine reason, the guiding 
principle of nature which was characterized as law, was also con-
sidered to be impersonal as well as inevitable. Aristotle took 
comfort in the disinterested sort of justice which was possible in 
such a scheme, a justice quite unconscious of personal distinc-
tions (a blindfolded justice). liThis is why we do not allow a~ 
1. MED, VII, 9. 
2. Murray, TSP, 40-41. 
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to_ rul~, but ration~ E:_r:inciple, ~ecause a man behaves thus in his 
• I 1 
own ~nterest and becomes a tyrant. 11 
The Hebrews, on the other hand, did not believe in government 
~ 
by ~echa.:D-sm, even in the natural world. The universe, they believed, 
is guided only by the personal supervision of the liv:ing God. It is 
I .2 
He 1vho shapes the seasons and cp.uses the rain to fall; even the 
stars come out each night only because He calls them out. 3 In the 
human sphere this supervision becomes personal relationship. The 
Biblical term for it is covenant, and, in the Bible, God is first 
and last a Bundesgott,4 the God who enters into covenantal relation-
... 
ship with the people of His choice. Throughout the formative years 
' 
of Judaism, and by their continuing reinterpretation of historic 
events, the prophets attempted to define ever more sharply the 
covenant relationship they believed to exist between God and Israel.5 
At first they thought in terms of master-servant, and claimed that 
I 
the servant would be punished if he did not fulfill the master r s 
righteous commands. 6 The servant, however, was not punished; perhaps 
becaus~ the covenant -was not based on law after all, but on love, as 
a marriage covenant between a man and his wife which can never be 
broken so long as one of the parties remains faithful. 7 Or was the 
1. Nic. Eth., V, 6, 1134a. 
2. Job 38:22-38. 
3·. Isaiah 40:26. 
4. Snaith, DIOT, 135, and Muilenburg, Art.(l952), 538. 
Genesis 9:8f.; 17:9f.; Exodus 20:lf.; II Kings 23:2f.; 
Jeremiah 31:3lf., etc~ 
5. later, in Deutero-Isaiah, Ruth, and Jonah, e.g., this covenant 
was seen to exist for ,the sake of the whole world. 
6. Leviticus 25:55. 
7. Hosea 1:2-3:5; Jeremiah 31:20. Snaith, DIOT, 142. 
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1 
relationship similar rather to that between father and son? As 
Israel's waywardness persisted, matched only by God1s persistent 
patience, the prophets reached the ultimate analogy of human love, 
that of a mother for her child. The realistic Hebrews knew that 
a mother can forgive even more than a father does. 2 
In all of this the prophets were seeking to define the nature 
of God's love, the power they found operative in human histor,r. 
For God's love, rather than any rational principle, is the basis 
of law and justice in the Old Testament. 
The entire domain of justice in Biblical thought 
is based on the redeeming reestablishment of 
communion, born of confidence that God in His 
justice will lead unfaithful man once more into 
the communion of the covenant.3 
The inevitable and impartial justice of Greek thought is far 
more easily understood by men than the God-motivated justice of 
prophetic thought. The one calls for the comprehension of a rational 
principle, while the other demands participation in relationship. 
The first is possible through reason alone; the second can be ac-
complished only by faith, i.e., response to the revealed dabhar. 
1. Jeremiah 31:9; Isaiah 63:16; Psalm 103:13. 
2. Isaiah 66:13. The analogy breaks down even here, however; 
God 1s love is still more faithful: 11Can a woman forget 
her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on . 
the son of her womb? Yea, these may forget, yet will not 
I forget thee. Behold, I have graven thee on the palm of 
my hands. 11 Isaiah 49:15-16. 
3. Van Oyen, Art.(l950), 355. 
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(4). Comprehended by Reason -- Grasped by Faith 
If the universe in aJ.l its parts is governed by the same 
rational principle, man simply has to learn that principle in 
' 
order to fit his individual actions into the just wey- of the 
world. Accord:ing to classical Greek thought this is altogether 
possible since the same reason that motivates the universe 
quickens man's mind. As a rational b'e:ing man p~icipates in the 
divine order of things and has natural inclinations to the actions 
and ends proper to it. 
Again a property of the Rational Soul is the love 
of our neighbour, and truthfulness, and modesty, 
and to prize nothing above itself -- a character-
istic also of Law. In this way then the Reason 
that is right reason and the Reason that is justice 
are one.l 
Man's problem is to govern all his actions in the light of reason, 
11to set in order his own j,nner life", as Plato put it, 2 until he 
has become one entireJ.y temperate and perfectly 
adjusted nature ••• calling that which preserves 
and co-operates with this harmonious condition, 
just and good action, and the knowledge which 
presides over it, wisdom.3 
Justice for the classical Greek ras a work of art, a work of sy.m-
met:cy, restraint, and, above all, harmony. The just man was 
inevitably the reasonable man who became one with the divine 
nature through the disciplined use of his reason. 
ColiiDlunion, n~t union, was the goal of the Hebrew· prophets. At 
. 
1. 1-furcus Aurelius, MED, XI, 1. 
2. Rep., IV, 444. 
3. Rep., IV, 444. 
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every point they violated the Aristotelian dictum Nothing too ~ 
in their passion for living relationship 11l'ith God. 
The election of Israel shows vnth particular 
clarity·how far the Biblical conception ••• is 
from the Aristotelian, for election as an act 
of God's Gerechtigkeit presupposes nothing at 
all on the human side; no particular national 
or racial qualities; no particularlY pious 
achi~vements; 1;10 human merits; but remains 
purelY a decision taken in the unfathomable 
't'r.i.ll of God. From the human point of view this 
Gerechtigkeit is the greatest injustice. There 
have been peoples greater, more valuable, more 
culturally productive than the Je1vs. This Ge-
rechtigkeit can be recognized onlY by humble 
obedience, boundless faith, unconditional sur-
render to the decision of God. Human insight 
is of no avail here.l 
According to Hebrew thought the basic principles of justice are 
not natural to man; they were not :Unpressed 'upon human nature 
in general at its creation, but are :cevealed to individual men 
through historical e:xperience. 2 Men know· these principles onlY 
as they respond by faith to the existential word of God.3 
To surmnarize the difference between the tw:> concepts of 
justice in general: that of classical Greece centers on man, on 
his participation in the rational nature of the universe through 
his native reason. He is by nature able to distinguish between 
right and 1.-IT'ong, justice and injustice, and to choose between 
them. The la1w governing human justice are <:1-S inevitable and 
predictable as the laws of nature for they are, in essence, one 
1. Schrey, BDJ, 3. 
2. Genesis 12:lf.; EXodus 3:2f.; I Samuel 3:4f.; Jeremiah 1:5f. 
3. Genesis 15:6; Habakkuk 2:4; Isaiah 26:2; etc. 
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law, a law· 1-mich ca11. be comprehended and fulfilled by one who 
hannonizes his life according to the dictates of reason. Ac-
cording to the Hebrew prophets, on the other hand, the source 
of justice is none other than the living God Himself, and the 
true nature of justice cannot be known apart from personal re-
lationship with this God who acts in history to reveal His just 
nature to man and to demand man r s justice in response. The pos-
sibilities of personal relationship are unpredictable, for love 
generally transcends and transfonns all rational standards of' 
justice as that life Which makes all things new,1 and yet actually 
more coherent. 
ii. A Comparison of the Distinguishing Characteristics of 
the Concepts of Penal Justice in Particular 
In the particular case of penal justice the distinctions are 
even more crucial between the concept represented by the blind-
folded goddess 1vith her scales and sword, and that represented by 
the man on the cross. For, the one stands for retributive, and 
the other, for redemptive justice.2 Retributive justice is con-
cerned primarily with just desert, the external act, a cash nexus, 
and readjustment. Redemptive justice is concerned primarily with 
human need, the underlying motive of the offense, relationship, and 
reclamation. 
1. Isaiah 42:5-9. 
2. It must also be noted, however, that the blind-folded goddess 
signifies an even-handed justice to be applied regardless of 
status, as well as mere retribution. .An effort to attain such 
even-handed justice is also evident in prophetic thought. See 
below, p. 9o 
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(1). Just Desert --Human Need 
It was Aristotle who defined justice for the western legal 
mind,1 and the foundation-stone of his definition is equality. He 
distinguished betrreen distributive justice, in which each one is 
2 given his due, and corrective justice in 'Which an attempt is made 
to equalize transactions between man and man, to reestablish the 
proportion violated by j_11.justice.3 In each case awards are made 
"according to merit"; like is given for like. 4 If a man violates 
the demands of righteousness he must be punished exactly according 
to the measure of his transgression. This principle has become the 
universally Valid basis of penal justice.5 The overall aim is to 
balance the scales of justice, and the state is empowered to do 
this (hence the sword in the goddess' other hand). 
In the light of Aristotle's definition of justice the prophetic 
conception, culminating in the teaching of Jesus, seems altogether 
unjust, for the God of the Old Testa.'IIlent and the Ne\IT is more con-
cerned with redemption than with retribution. 6 From Aristotle's 
1. HAt all events, Aristotle t s discussion is of the highest 
importance, because it succeeded in fixing, with a precision 
which had certainly not been achieved before, some fundamental 
concepts, which henceforth were held as almost definitive in 
this field. 11 Del Vecchio, JUS, 46. 
2. Nic. Eth., V, 3, ll3la. In this he followed Plato. Socrates 
defined justice as 11gi ving each man v-Jhat is due to him. 11 
Rep., I, 331. 
3. "The unjust is 'What violates proportion. 11 Nic. Eth., V, 3, 
ll3lb. In this Aristotle followed the Pythagoreans. Del 
Vecchio, JUS, 42-43. 
4. Nic. Eth., V, 4, 1132a. 
5. Del Vecchio, ·JUs, ·1ao. 
6. 11 In Genesis 15:6 ,EAbraham believed and he counted it to hm 
for righteousnessy it is manifest that the biblical conceJ?tion 
has nothing to do with distributive justice." Schrey, BDJ, 2. 
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point of view Biblical history began vdth an unjust act and the 
entire record of redemption is fraught with injustice. Israel did 
not deserve to be chosen in the first place;1 she was, in fact, 
11the fewest of all peoples 11 , 2 and turned out to be a regular 
nharlot 11 of a nation.3 Just as one would have expected God to choose 
a nation more worthy of His attention, so one would have expected 
Him to cast that nation off when it proved persistently unfaithful. 
This was not the case, hov1ever; God 1s love seemed unl:imited.4 He 
loved 1iith an everlasting love5 in spite of -- perhaps because of --
everything. To be sure God punished His people with the Ex:ile, but 
only to quicken them to respond and return to the love that -was 
1 dy th d 't' 6 a rea ere, an wa1 1ng. 
It was as difficult then as it is today to comprehend the 
constancy which re;f.'uses to desert man in spit,e of his waywardness 
and renews the covenant as often as he breaks it. 7 Yet God is 
righteous; it {s only th~t His righteousness exceeds that of man 
in its quality of mercy. In a striking sequence of ideasg the 
second Isaiah pictured his God like a conquering monarch of old. 
His arm is raised in victory -- His arm, the prophet pointed 
out, 11that shall rule for Him11 -- and then, in the very next 
verse, that same arm is clasping a young lamb to His bosom as God 
fee(J.s His hungry flock and leads ;it gently home. God 1s just 
1. Deuteronomy 9:4-7, 24; Ezeldel 16:4-6. 
2. Deuteronomy 7:6-8. 
3. Hosea 4:12; Isaiah 15:17; Jeremiah 3:1; Eze~iel 36:26-27. 
4. Hosea 11:8-9. 
5. Isaiah 54:8; Jeremiah 31:3. 
6. Hosea 2:14-23. 
7. Jeremiah 31:3lff. 
8. Isaiah 40:10, ll. 
government is conditioned by His mercy and grace. He is Savior 
even more than He is judge; His essential nature is to be dis-
covered not so much in law as in love. Such was the prophetic 
teaching; such was the teaching of Jesus.l 
. 
In his teaching as in theirs, God cares more for persons 
than He does for law. He cares for every individual, actually 
even for those who oppose His rule and refuse His fellowship., 
because His love is beyond merit. 2 All human ~-righteousness 
is valueless in the light of God's justice, as the elder brother 
of the prodigal son had to learn. 3 No one is actually 1:10rlby of 
God's love;4 it is a love which cannot be earned. God r~l~ases 
the d~btor who owes Him five hundred denarii as readilY a~ the 
one who owes Him onlY fifty. 5 He pays the laborers the same wage 
whether they have 1-rorked one hour in the vineyarQ. or t"toJ"el:lre. 6 
1. "Jesus appears to have taught almost nothing about the 
rights and duties and the adjustment of conflicting claims 
with which justice is mainlY concerned. He refused to 
arbitrate, we are told, in a dispute about property ••• o 
His precepts as to conduct are based, not on the rights 
and duties of men towards one another, but on that parti-
cular relation of man to God which it was his mission to 
proclaim and es·!Jablish. 11 Quick, CAJ, 27. 
2. Dodd suggests that 11what is especially significant in the 
teaching of Jesus is that this goodness-manifests itself 
in unconditional benevolence and beneficence tow-ard the 
undeserving. The Father in heaven is kind to the unthank-
ful and the evi1. 11 Art;(1952), 555. 
3. Luke 15:25-32. -Braun, JLL, 15. 
4. Mark 10 :lS; Matthet'l 19 :17. 
5. Luke 7:41-42. 
6. Matthew 20:1-6. Montefiore suggests that this parable is 
perhaps the most original in the gospels. ERTJ, lOl. 
Brunner says of it : liThe. substance of ffihis parabl,Y 
consists precisely in the cessation of all deserving, and 
in the denial of all lawful claims, and is hence the anti-
thesis of the law of worldly justice. " JSO, 111. 
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His rain falls on just and unjust alike.1 His grace is not the 
product of calculating justice, but the outflow of free and e:x;uberant 
love. However, while it seems indifferent to human merit, it is not 
indifferent to human need. If there is arry motivation for God 1 s 
love beyond the motivation of His o't'm gracious nature whose 11 good 
pleasure11 it is to give, 2 it is His compassion for human need. That 
explains His concern for·lost sheep and prodigal sons, and for the 
laborers whom 11no one has hired11 even at the eleventh hour. 11Those 
who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are "Sick 11 , 3 
and they are the ones whom God, in His infinite mercy, stoops to help. 4 
To sqy God's love seems indifferent to human merit is not to 
suggest that it is indifferent to evil. God's love is righteous 
love; He is the Judge and Destroyer of evil.5 ~et He destroys 
evil for the sake of, and by means of, love. God cannot tolerate 
wrong if He is righteous, but He cannot punish w.rong if He is 
merciful; therefore, fie does not minimize unrighteousness, He 
forgives it. 6 There is all the difference in the world bet11J'een 
1; Matthew 5:45. 
2. Luke 12:32. 
3. lf.Jatthew 9:12. 
4. The word stoops is used advisedlY, for God's love is sovereign 
love. The compassion that clothes the lilies and welcomes the 
prodigal, that seeks the straying sheep and marks the fall of 
a sparrow, is the power that motivates histo:rr.r. The Father of 
all mankind is lord of heaven and earth. His love is as po'trer-
ful as it is concerned. 
Matthew 5=34-35; 11:25; Luke 10:21-22. 
5. Mark 12:1-11, 38-40; Matthet-r 10:28; 13:24-30; 21:12, 33-46; 
23:6-7; 25:30-46; Luke 11:15-17; 12:4-7, 48; 15:11-32; 16:19-31; 
19:45-46; 20:9-19, 45-47. 
6. Luke 23:34. A fuller discussion of forgiveness based on the 
analysis suggested below may be found in the final chapter of 
this study, pp. Zoz.- 2.! 4 . 
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good-natured indulgence and justice, and between justice arid 
costly forgiveness. Indulgence does not make moral distinctions; 
justice and forgiveness do. Both justice ru1d forgiveness re-
cognize the costliness of sin, but justice says to the -wrongdoer: 
You ~ sinned and you must ~ the price, while forgiveness pays 
the price itself. Hence the man on the cross. 
1~ is forgiveness necessary? Because without it reconcilia-
tion is impossible; and reconciliatio~, restoration of relation-
ship with man, is God t s ult:ilnate concern. If the father had 
judged the returning son 11 justly11 he -would have shut the door in 
his face; the boy deserved no better. Instead, '!fwhile he 1vas yet 
at a distance, his father saw him and had compassion,~ and ran and 
embraced him and ld.ssed him"l -- and the broken relationship was 
restored as it never could have been through the door closed by 
justice. 
Why is reconciliation more important to God 'than retribu-
tion? This question calls for a discussion of the nature of· the 
offense itself. 
(2). An Ex:ternal Act -- An Internal Condition 
According to the concept of retributive justice the offense 
. 
is a transgression against the established order, a specific overt 
act or series of acts which must be cancelled out by a punishment 
2 
calculated to match the seriousness of the crime. The Biblical 
1. Luke 15 :20. 
2. Nic. Eth., V, 4, 1132a. 
view goes deeper than this; it looks upon sin as a condition of the 
heart -- the rebellion or pride which alienates a man from God.1 
Redemptive justice is not concerned with outward conduct so much as 
with inward motivation and ultimate result. Aristotle made a 
distinction between degrees of transgression manifested in external 
acts, but Jesus, looking only at the heart, considered the self-
righteousness of the Pha~isees a greater sin than an actual vioiation 
2 
of the moral law. Aristotle made a distinction between an unjust 
act and an unjust character,3 but such a distinction would have been 
impossible for Jesus because he believed that the only source of an 
unjust act is an unjust character.4 
Sin is not a quantity which can be cancelled out'· by punishment, 
but an expression of moral character which can be cured only by a 
radical change of heart. For both the root and fruit of sin is 
separation from God.5 The prophets and Jesus taught that men are at 
variance with themselves and their fellows because they are at 
variance with their Maker, and that the only remedy for this is the 
reestablishment of relationship. 
If, in aqy judgment pronounced, this reestablishment 
of communion is not intended to be the whole heart 
1. The most characteristic word for sin in the Old Testament 
is pesha which means rebellion (Snaith, DIOT, 80): I Samuel 
15:23; Amos 4;6, 9-ll; 5:12; Hosea 4:10,16; 5:2; 6:7; 7:13; 
9:15; Micah 1:5; 3:8; Isaiah 1:2,4-5,18,20,28; 5:24; 9:13; 
10:20-21; 30:1,9; 31:6, etc. 
2. Of. Nic. Eth., V, 8, 1135b with John 8:1-ll. 
3. Nic. Eth., V, 6, 1134a. 
4. Matthew 5:27-28; 15:10-20. 
5. The Biblical authors also consider all sin to be ultimately 
against God; e.g., Psalm 51. 
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of the matter, then, by this conception of 
justice, there is no point to it.l 
Before the means of reestablishing communion can be discussed, 
one further distinction between retributive and redemptive 
justice needs to be considered. 
(3). Cash Nexus --Relationship 
In the vie'lrT that considers the offense an external action 
for 'Which restitution can be made, the individual offender is 
important chiefly as the agent of the crime and as the object of 
retaliation. It is believed that the offending individual can 
be singled out from the community and punished £z the connnunity 
for his transgression against the community. The association 
betw·een the individual and the community is seen in terms of just 
claims and rigbts, 2 an association more comparable to a commercial 
transaction than to a personal relationship. The individual be-
comes an entity to be dealt with rather than a person to be 
respected. 
Corrective justice is no respecter of persons. 
Nor is the individuality of the doer taken 
into account since, as wrong-doer, he is re-
garded only from the negative viewpoint as one 
who has turned away from justice.3 
When the individual is punished more than he actually It deserves II 
1. Van Qyen, Art.(1950), 356. 
2. Aristotle, Nic. ]fuh., V, 4, 1132a. 
3. Husserl, ·Art.(1937); 291. 
Aristotle recognized this problem in the distinction he made 
bet1-reen the equitable and the just. Nic. Eth., V, 10, 1137b. 
3$ 
it is primarily for the deterring effect such punishment 1-Jill 
have on other men, and the individual-as-example is again an 
abstract entity.1 
The Bible suggests a totally different view of the rela-
tionship between the individual and the community. It records 
a curious sort of 11injustice11 ilt two regards --when the 1vhole 
community suffers for the sake of one man, 2 and when the 
individual su:t:fers for the sake of the whole communiti3 --but 
points to the just undergirding of reality which necessitates 
this. For the redeeming justice of the Bible recognizes a level 
of reality far beneath that gJ.impsed by retributive justice. It 
recognizes the unalterable fact that the individual belongs to 
the community. The community is not merely a convenient a~socia­
tion of essentialJ.y independent individuals, 4 but a mutual inter-
dependence anchored in the 1'Jill o£ God. 5 Man is predestined to 
fellow·ship at his creation; he becomes an l only in relation mth 
a thou, and ultimately only mthin the divine-human relationship.6 
No man is sufficient unto himself; personality develops only 
mthin community. The authors of the Bible could not conceive 
1. A far more profound view· of individual punishment beyond 
desert is to be found in the Greek tragedies: e.g., in 
Oedipus r words concerning his self-inflicted blindness. 
Sophocles, "Oedipus Tyr~us11 , OBGV, 36.S-365. 
2. As in Joshua 7:1-26; 22:20; Judges 20:48. 
3. As in Isaiah 42:1-4; 52:13-53:12 and Luke 27:3. 
4• As in Rousseau's contrat social. 
5. The Stoics perceived this (Murray, TSP, 42) but their in-
sight was lost in the gradual secularization of their point 
of view .. 
6. Cullberg, PEDT, 34. This is Huber's thesis in I and Thou. 
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. 1 
of .an individual an art from the commuru.ty. 
The individual members of the C01J!D1uni ty are not only mutually 
interdependent; they are mutually involved with one another. In 
the very nature of the case the innocent suffer for the guilty. 
The burden seems inevitabJ.y to fall just where it is unjust that 
it should fall, on those who a,re not primariJ.y responsible for it. 
From the standpoint of ordinary moral judgment this fact of man r s 
existence is a rock of offense; it seems to loosen the causal 
nexus between what a man does and "how he fares. ParadoricalJ.y, 
however, this seeming injustice is the root of redemption. For 
redemption begins where one not onJ.y bears his own burdens but 
another's as 1-rell, in an "unconditional readiness to ans1;-ter for 
others 11 • 2 
Retributive justice isolates the individual from his com':" 
munity and hence s:impJ.y 'td.dens the breach that the offender,: by 
his offense, has already made in relationship. Redemptive justice, 
on.the other hru1d_, bends every effort to restore relationshi~ by, 
reintegrating the culprit once more into community.3 The methods 
differ as radically as the results. 
1. When the prophetic vocation separated a man from relationship 
· with his fellows, he could exist onJ.y as he was sustained by 
· a more intimate relationship with God, as, for example in the 
cases of Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Jesus. 
2. Van Qyen, Art.(l950), 359. 
3. Van Qyeii., Art .. (1950), 360;; 
,. 
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(4). Readjustment -- Reclamation 
Is justice a static condition of equality or a positive re-
demptive energy which will not rest until it has won the human 
1v.ill to its side? Is it an attempt to readjust the balance of 
the scales1 or to reclaim the heart of the offender? If sin is 
the result of a perverted will, and the will is motivated by its 
love, 2 it would seem that the best way to heal sin, would be to 
bring about a change of heart. Precisely this was God's most 
characteristic work in the Hebrew-Christian history recorded in 
the Bible. All the major prophets from Hosea on saw His grace 
in ter.ms of His gift of Hthe ne1-r heart 11 , 3 and both the Deutero-
nomist and the Psalmist knew that the ability to love the good 
came only from God Himself. 4 Th~ early Christians experienced 
11the new heart 11 through the event of Christ • 
. 
V<Jhat is needed to transfor.m the human heart? 'What is re-
corded of the work of God? It was persistent. As often as His 
people broke the covenant He renewed it; He forgave not merely 
seven times, but seventy times seven. 5 Love like this is 
redemptive. It batters down all resistance; men .cannot w.i.thstand 
it forever. Further.more, God loved the unlovely and undeserving. 
1. "Corrective justice proceeds, without hesitation or devia-
tion, to its end -- the restoration of equality out of 
inequality. 11 Husserl, ll.rt.(l937), 290. 
2. As Jesus suggests to the rich young man in Mark 10:17-22. 
3. Hosea 14:1-7; Jeremiah 24:7; Ezekiel 11:19-20; Isaiah 
57:15. 
4. Deuteronomy 30:6; Psalm 51:10. 
5. Matthew 18:21. 
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In a remarkable psaJ.m1 it is recorded that God broke the bonds of 
men who~ :in prison because~ had rebelled against God's 
rrords. Love like this is creative. To love an enemy is already 
to create a friend. When Jesus ate at the house o:f Zacchaeus, the 
chief tax collector, a sinner, Zacchaeus was transformed and gave 
"half his goods to the poor 11 -- and his heart to God. 2 
Finally, love like this is costly. God went to all lengths 
to win men's hearts. He remained faithful in spite of all possible 
unfaithfulness. He refused to let men go though they cut Him off 
and did Him all possible despite. At the cross His love 
with unweaponed hands and bared breast, /Jace£7 the 
gathered might of evil, and, in the very act of 
dissolutionr- /;ecreatei/ itself in the souls of 
those who Lstruc!,7 it dol'm. It /Yai/ love dy:i.ng 
at the hands of evil men, only to rise again to 
newness of life in the heart of its enemies) 
The Biblical l'JOrd for the change of heart is repentance. It 
is not readjustment to an outsi_de nor.rn, but surrender to a creative 
life-principle working from within. IDve is dynamic; it can be 
known only as it is ·shared. Just as God t s forgiveness reestablishes 
relationship with the repentant heart, so that heart reaches out 
to establish ever-widening circles of relationship 1-dth its fellow 
man. Quickened by the spirit of God t s grace, it moves beyond the 
requirements of human justice by loving an enemy,4 turning the 
1. Psalm 107 :J..0-16. 
2. Luke 19:1-9. 
3 .. Robinson, OJ, ll6. 
4. Natthew 5:45-47; Luke 6:27-29, 35. 
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other cheek,1 and expecting nothing in return. 2 Why? Because it 
has learned through its own experience with God that there is nothing 
to be gained by punishing evil, but everything to be gained by deal-
ing with it creatively. The possibilities for fellowship created 
by the freely given coat and the chosen second mile3 are unpredictable. 
The man who has received all for nothing is constrained to pass on 
what he has received. 
All that retributive justice can do is to balance the scales 
and see that even-handed justice, regardless of status, is applied. 
Redemptive justice on the other hand 
is a new and unique force, both revolutionar,y and 
creative, and wholly unexpected •••• It is a free, 
generous, and seemingly reckless outgoing regard-
less of reciprocity. The Good Samaritan, the Good 
Shepherd, and the Prodigal's father move in a 
mental world which has got far beyond ••• requital 
of individual merit4 --
and the wayfarer was healed, the sheep was found, and the prodigal 
son came home. 
What does this mean in terms of temporal justice, and, more 
particularly, in terms of penal justice? How far is the divine 
order to be reflected in the human? Can the methods used by God 
• also be used by man? How far is man r s judgment to be tempered by 
mercy, his punishment to be inflicted by, and for, the sake of 
love? Is it true that human justice "degenerates into mere order 
without justice if the pull of love is not upon it"?5 These 
1. Matthew 5:39. 
2. Luke 14:12-13. 
3. Matthew 5:40-41. 
4. Moberly, RES, 38-39. 
5. Niebuhr, FAH, 185. 
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questions suggest a second set of presuppositions to be examined: 
those which concern the relationship between the divine and the 
human orders in the on-going life of society. 
2. Tvro Realms of Existence 
Before the possible relationship between justice and love in 
the on-going life of society can be examined, a brief account of 
the history of the concept of natural lav-r must be given, for much 
of the discussion of the relationship between justice and love 
seems to hinge upon whether or not a man can know the 'Will of God 
through 11the natural law· of reason n. 
i. A Brief History of the Concept of Natural Law 
According to Brunner it is in the idea of jus naturale or 
lex naturae that the two main lines of our cultural tradition are 
combined in "a synthesis of' exceptional power 11 • 1 Cl::Iristian thea-
logians from the Apologists through the Reformers found ample 
affirmation of the concept of natural law on the pages of their 
Scriptures.2 
(1). The Concept of Natural law Through the Reformation 
The ChU2~ch Fathers were quick to discover an affinity between 
the law of nature in pagan thought and the scriptural orders of 
1. Brunner, CAC, I, 107. 
2. McNeill; Art. (1946), 168. 
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creation, between the ordering logos of the Greeks and the creating 
and sustaining dabhar of the Hebrews.1 It was one and the same 
Word, they believed, which took flesh and dw·elt among men in Jesus 
Christ. 2 This meant that, quite apart from Christ, aJ.l men have 
some natural knowledge of the plan and purpose of God3 even as Paul 
himself suggested in Romans 2 :14-16. It was Thomas Aquinas who 
established the concept of natural law once and for all in Roman 
Catholic doctrine in his contention that 
the light of natural reason, whereby 1ve discern 
what is good and v.rhat is evil ••• is nothing else 
than the imprint on us of the divine light. It 
is therefore evident that the natural law is 
nothing else than the rational creature r s part-
icipation in the eternal law.4 
In this contention he was simpJ.y sunnnarizing the majority opinion 
of the Fathers before him who had, for the most part, a high regard 
for human reason.5 
The Protestant Reformers attempted to be more Biblical in 
their distrust of human reason, considering it both a source of 
1. See especially Origen, "De Principlistt, ANF, IV, 223-382. 
2. See especially Clement of Alexandria, "The Instructorn, P..NF, 
II, 209-296. 
3. See Justin Martyr, 11The first and Second Apologies n, .ANF, I, 
159-194; Augustine, 11City of God", XI, 27, and 11Confessions 11 , 
II, 4, in BWSA; Abelard, CT, 60; Bernard, LOG, 10, 18. 
4. ~· Theol., II, Q.91, Art.2. 
5. Two outstanding exceptions to this were Tatian, in his 
11Address to the GTeeks", ANF, II, 61-83, and Tertullian, 
in his 11Five Books Against Marcion 11 , Al\JF, III, 269-476. 
Augustine also realized the danger of human pride in 
reason, when reason is infected by an evil "Will. Never-
theless, it was his reason which led him to discover that 
pride, so that :tle became convinced before he v.Jas through 
that men have their intellectual life 11in common with 
angels alone". ncity of C-od11 , V, ll, in BWSA;tt. 
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idolatrous pride and of legalistic distortion.1 Convinced tuat 
man's natural reason had been corrupted by the Fall, they believed 
that he could not discern the truth necessary .for salvation apart 
from the light of Christ. 2 In this they too were follo1dng Paul. 3 
Yet, while it is true that they did not believe that what was left 
of the divine endowment after the Fall had any worth in discerning 
"saving truth 11 , nevertheless, both Luther and Calvin treated man's 
"natural reason" as of great value for wise a...l'ld just conduct in 
social relationships. 4 
The basic convictions of all believers in natural la1-r are that 
"there erists a body of fundamental, unalterable, basic principles, 
uniformly applicable to all mankind, for the just governance of 
society"; 5 that these la1-rs are "found and not made 11 ;6 and that they 
are discovered through the mind of man. The divine reason which 
caused those la~-rS to exist also caused the existence of human 
reason through which those la1-rs are known. 7 The crucial point upon 
"I'Thich all else turns is whether the human reason through 1'lhi.ch those 
laws are known can knov1 them apart from the revelation of God. 
Hugo Grotius and his followers in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries believed it could. 
1. Genesis ll:l-4; Job 11:7-12; Isaiah 41:.21-24. 
2. Calvin, IRC, II, viii, 1; McNeill, Art. (1946), 179. 
3. In Romans 1:21-23 and 10:2-3. 
4. See Luther's interpretations of Galatians 1:14 in CEG. Cf. 
Calvin, ICR, I, iii, 1,2,3; II, ii, 13; II, viii, 1; IV,. xx:, 
14-16. 
5. Frank, COT, 346-347. 
6. According to Dr. stumpf, Art.(l950), 50, this is also the 
contention of uour judges of the Supreme Court 11 • 
7;.. J.v!aritain, Art. (1952), 66. 
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(2). Grotius and Positive Law 
Ironical~, it was Grotius' attempt to preserve the ·freedom 
of God which led him quite unconsciously to foster man's freedom 
from God. Like his predecessors Grotius conceived God, as the 
creator of nature, to be the instigator of the natural order; 
but he was so anxious to free God's will from the necessities of 
that order that he implied a fateful distinction between the im-
mutable 11 laws of nature11 and the creative will of God which was 
y 
reflected in 11divine laws 11 • The order of nature never changes, 
but the plan of God may change and when it does He simp~ alters 
the divine laws, through which He effects the change, accordingly. 
The laws of nature e.xpress a 11natural right11 , while the divine 
laws express God's 11posi ti ve right ••• which springs from the free 
act of fjiiif will". 1 The will of man is also free2 and it fol-
lovm that man too has a positive right to express his will, this 
time in the human laws of the state. The positive laws of human 
society, then, are based on mankind's collective will rather than 
on the will of God. In thus separating natural from divine law 
Grotius began a development which has culminated in the 
positivistic notion of law which is so pervasive today.3 Quite 
contrary to his deepest religious convictions Grotius made 
1. Grotius, DSC, 59. 
2. Grotius, TOR, I, 19 •. 
3. For a definition of this concept se~ Bienenfeld, ROJ, 11-13. 
Van Oyen points out that under the influence of this posi-
tivistic concept law 11 is getting farther and farther arre,y 
from being a God-willed ordering of society for its salva-
tion, and nearer and nearer to being an instrument serving 
one particular interpretation of s6ciety11 • .Art.(l950), 359. 
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possible a conception of law as the instrument of will to power 
or economic advantage rather than as an instrument of the justice 
of God. 
Grotius• influence on theology went even further, for, just 
as he recognized the validity of man's collective will apart from 
the will of God, so he recognized a natural revelation through 
the mind of man quite apart from the special revelation of the 
Bible. "It was his explicit opinion that natural law would be 
. 1 
valid even if there were no GOd, because it is rooted in reason." 
It was this aspect of Grotius• thought Which found its way 
into the "natural" religion of the nineteenth century and even 
into the liberal Protestant~s~. of ~h~- ~w~ntieth?~ a~ i~ was 
primarily to protest s~ch an unbiblical regard f~r human reason 
-- a regard which valued human reason more highly than divine 
revelation and which therefore tended to equate Christianity with 
every other high religion -- that Karl Barth and his 11neo-
. . 
orthodox" followers raised their objections. They claimed that 
the via crucis taught by Jesus not only transcends but also dis-
solves natural. law, and that the agape of the New Tes~ament is 
' 3 incompatible with all h~n standards of righteousness. However, 
in their attempt to get the distinctive Biblical insights back into 
the bloodstream of Christianity, these theologians erred too 
1. Brunner, CAC, I, 109. 
2. Ramsey, Art.(l944), 370. 
3. Wilder, Art.(l946), 130. 
Council of Churches, CPJ, 
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far in the other direction and replaced a too enthusiastic 
rati9nalism with a blind dogmatism.1 
One of the most controversial issues in contemporary Christian 
thought is that of the relationship between the "natural law 
theology11 of Christian liberalism (and Roman Catholicism) a;nd the 
11Ghristological theology- 11 of the Barthians. 2 There are dangers 
in either direction. The two most obvious pitfalls of the natural 
la11 philosophy are its tendency on the one hand to equate. the 
relative and temporal judgments of man with the ~bsolute and eternal 
will of God.,3 and, its tendency toward "exquisite ambiguity11 on the 
other. 11Because of its convenient vagui3ness, the Natural l.ai'.r idea 
lends itself to either side of aJmqst any cause. 114 The t1ro most 
dangerous tendencies of the proponents of the 11Christologica3.. 
theology-11 are their unrealistic exclusiveness and their equaJ.ly 
unrealistic transcendence. If the Barthians forfeit manls natural 
1. "Karl Barth's .belief that the moral life of man would·possess 
no valid principles of guidance, if the Ten Connnandments had 
not introduced such principles·by revelation, is as absurd as 
it is unscriptural.n Niebuhr, NDivi, II, 254. 
2. Bennett, CESP, 117. The Treysa Conference was devoted to 
this question. See Study Department of the World Council of 
Churches, TCBD,,for the repor~. 
3. liUndue confidence in human reason, as the seat and source of 
natural law~ makes this very concept of law into a vehic1e 
of human sin. It gives the peculiar conditions and unique 
circumstances in which reason operates in a particular 
historical moment, the sanctity of universality. 11 Niebuhr., 
NDM, I, 2Sl. 
4. Frank, COT, 348. 11I.awyers and judges could quote the va:gue 
ma:x:i.ms of the law of nature for any position whatsoever, for 
revolution and reaction, plutocracy and connnunity of goods. 
Natural law might be nailed to anyone's mast. It was, in 
fact, so universal that it could never be found." Calm, SOJ., 
7. Cf. Stumpf, Art.(l950), 55. 
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sense of justice,1 they forfeit along with it the chief point of 
( . 
contact which makes it possible for Christians, Jews, and secular 
believers in freedom and justice to cooperate on practical issues 
in society. 2 If they make the justice and love of God too 
transcendent above the relativities of the temporal order there 
is the danger that this justice and love will seem irrelevant to 
this order) Thus the question must finally be faced: what is 
the possible relationship between these two orders? 
ii. The Possible Relationship Between Justice and Love 
Can man's reasonable nature produce an order of justice that 
would be acceptable to the God of prophetic faith? Is it neces-
sary that this should be so or is the realm of human justice alto-
gether separate from the realm of divine grace? Luther thought 
it was: 
We imagine, as it were, two worlds, the one 
heavenly and the other earthly. In these we 
place ••• two kinds of righteousness, being 
separate the one from the other.4 
The two powers or governments, God 1s and Caesar's, 
1. Or man 1s natural 11 sense of injustice" as Dr. Cahn would 
have it in his SOI. Cf. Braun, JLL, 9. Dr. Wilder sug-
gests that Jesus himself had confidence in the persuasive 
power of truth on the human mind and in the ultimate 
moral discernment of common man. To support this sug-
gestion he cites Matthew 5:25; 7:2-11; Mark 3:23-25; 
9:49-50; Luke 7:35. Art.(l946), 134. 
2. Bennett, CESP, 119, 123. 
3. Niebuhr, ICE, 228. 
It is interesting to note that the result of such an argu-
ment is the same as Grotius achieved through quite a dif-
ferent process of reasoning, reasoning which the Barthians 
themselves would deplore. 
4. Luther, CEG, 134. 
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or spiritual and temporal ki~doms, must be kept 
apart, as Christ does ~ere ~atthew 22:15-227 in 
a clear and brief declaration.l 
If Luther was right at this point (and some of the Barthians 
would argue that he was2), there is no point in proceeding 
further with this study. For this reason the attempt must be 
made to prove he was wrong by showing that the divine and human 
orders must be interrelated since divine love is altogether re-
levant to puman justice. The first proof is a negative one which 
will suggest the dangers of separating the divine and human orders 
in the on-going life of society. 
(1). Dangers of Separation 
In a lecture on Christian ethics Reinhold Niebuhr once 
pointed out that it is an historical fact that whenever the divine 
and human orders are complete~ separated in any given culture 
11 the church goes to heaven and the state goes to hell". 3 It has 
already been suggested in the preceeding discussion of natural law 
1. Luther, "G.ospel Sermon, Twenty-th:ird Sundey after Trinity", 
CLT, 214. Painting a striking picture of the social anarchy 
which would result from an attempt to govern the present 
world according to the Gospel, Luther wrote that it 1\would 
be like a shepherd who should place in one fold wolves, 
lions, eagles, and sheep together and let them free~ mingle 
with one another and say, Help yourselves, and be good and 
peaceful among yourselves; the fold is open, there is plenty 
of food; have no fear of dogs and clubs. The sheep, forsooth, 
would keep the peace and would allow themselves to be fed and 
governed in peace, but they would not live long ••• 11 "Secular 
Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed11 , CLT, 218-219. 
2. Brunner, JSO, 129. 
3. A student of Dr. Niebuhr summarizes his position concisely in 
this way: "Church and state are good for each other as long 
as they are not at ease with each other. 11 Miller, ROM, 124. 
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how the state can 11go to hell 11 when ~he laws of the state are 
completely divorced from any grounding in the eternal laws of God. 
In his study of Christianity and Civilization Brunner show-s ho'lir 
the western world helped prepare for the modern totalitarian state 
through the gradual process, begun by Grotius, of detaching the 
conception of justice from its religious basis.l Niebuhr blames 
Luther as well as Grotius for this. He affirms that Luthert s 
rigorous distinction betw·een the realm of grace and the realm of 
law "destroyed the ultimate criterion for judging the moral 
quality o.f the positive law of historic states". 2 'Where there is 
no transcendent frame of reference all justice is arbitrary and 
relative; all law is simply the will of the reigning power • .3 
Calvin offers an instructive example of "the church going 
to heaven 11 and ultimately becoming irrelevant to the ordering of 
society. He claimed that magistrates are to be honored as lithe 
viceregents of Godll since they "exhibit to men an image, as it 
were, of the providence, care, goodness, benevolence,.and justice 
of God 11 ,4 but then he went on to say that the laws enacted by 
these mag?.strates have nothing to do with "the internal govern-
ment of the soul" since that is "above all the statutes and 
decrees of men". 5 Even when the magistrates are dealing 1dth 
mundane affairs "Where they are called upon to "administer the 
1. Brunner,·CAC, I, llOf. 
2. Niebuhr, FAH, 185. 
3. This was classically expressed by Thras.ymachus in Plato's 
Rep., I, 3.38: "Justice is nothing else than the interest 
of the stronger." 
4. Calvin, IRC, IV, xx, 4,6. 
5. Calvin, IRG, IV, x, 5. 
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justice· of C-od", they would be hard put to do this s:ince in the 
final analysis, according to Calv:ID, the justice of God is in-
scrutable.1 
At one point in his theological systau Brunner reveals his 
Calvinistic background; this is in his discussion of social 
2 
ethics • Here he suggests that even though it is the same God who 
gives men the law of justice by which they frame their earthly 
systems and the law of love by which they enter into relationship 
w.ith one another, and even though it is the same man who is subject 
to both the heavenly lai'll' of forgiving love and the earthly law of 
even-handed justice, still the nature of that justice is "radically 
':! 
different 11 from that of love • ..:> Therefore the "man of love" who 
wants to serve the state must 11transform his love entirely :into 
justice 11 while he is acting in the state; or, to use Brunner's ow.n 
figure, he must "change his love into the current coin of justice, 
since that alone is legal tender in the vrorld of systemsn.4 In 
his criticism of this presupposition of Brunner's social ethic, 
Samuel Stumpf contends that Brunner makes far ntoo many concessions 
to the anpirical 'order".5 The place where this becomes most 
obvious so far as tl'lis present study is concerned is :in Brw.ner's 
concept of punishment which will be discussed below.6 His 
1. Calvin, IRC, III, xxiii, 2; III, xxiv, 14, 17. 
2. Beach and Niebuhr, CE, 484. 
3. Brunner, JSO, 116, 125 .. 
4 •. Brunner, JSO, 129, 128. Actually Brunner disputes the basis 
of this present study by his claim that "we have no right to 
rush. in w.ith our Christian principles and poach upon the pre-
serves of the law reformer11 o DI, 478. 
5. stumpf, Art.(l950), 50. 
6. See below, P·1'fOf • 
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assertion that "the message of atonement for the sinner by Jesus 
Christ is only :indirectly connected with the question of ••• just 
punishment"1 does indeed seem to be 11 a concession to the empirical 
order". 
It would seem, then, that the spheres of justice and love 
are divided to their mutual detrim~nt. 2 In order for love to be 
operative in the realm of social action, and for justice to be-
come more than a legalistic order:ing of society, the two must be 
iD.terrelated.3 
(2). Necessity of Interrelation 
Love needs .justice. Love needs justice in order to exist · 
at all. Justice is the precondition of love.4 One must establish 
a just order for the sake of love before he can be loving. The 
competing rights and interests of the community must be taken 
into account, even by love, and a just ordering of society is all 
that makes this possible.5 Justice is the form through which 
love performs its work;6 it is 11love operat:ing at a distance" in 
1. Brunner, JSO, 10. 
2. Braun, JLL, 34. 
3. For a more general orientation to this subject see Quick, 
CAJ, 49-6o, and Braun, JLL, 25-27. In the former Canon 
Quick discusses three points of view from which the rela-
tion of justice to love can be considered; and in the 
latter Dr. Braun describes 11 the social relationships on 
which the path of justice climbs from undiluted selfish-
ness up to the region of pure love11 • 
4. Braun, JLL, 21. 
5. Niebuhr, FAH, 1B4. Niebuhr also points out here that what 
might be considered a 11 lov:ing act11 on the part of an indi vi-
dual could become "ignoble appeasement" when practiced by 
an entire communitj~B~-: ~'\~ ...-..': 
6. Tillich, LPJ, 7;t~!'~r_,:-J~O, ;50~_ ~ :.- ... ~ 
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the impersonal relationships of community life.1 Since the rules 
of any community cannot embody higher standards than those which 
will gain the approval of the average decent man, love has to be 
related to any given situation by a more generally accepted human 
standard than love·itself.2 Justice furnishes that more general-
ly accepted standard, for justice is more easily attainable by 
human beings than love is. Justice stands part way between crude 
selfishness and pure unselfishness, responding to men's claims 
but balancing them against their duties, and putting each man's 
rights and duties on an equal level with those of others.3 When 
men are sure of justice they are free to practice love, free even 
to accept love. Therefore, justice is indispensable to love. 
Yet justice needs love. As justice is the precondition 
of love, so love is the goal toward which alr justice must aim. 
Without the pull of love upon it justice tends to become static, 
for justice seeks to preserve the status quo and it is only 
love which is "perpetually seeking to discover the growing 
interests in the lives of ~owing persons and to anticipate them". 4 
1. Miller, ROM, 112. 
2. Moberly, RES, 59. "In public life, Christian love has to 
be related to tlie existing situation by means of general 
human values or princ~ples, the recognition of which is much 
broader than is the· acceptance of the claims of Christian 
love. I refer to such values as peace and order, justice, 
freedom, or what might be called the material conditions of 
human welfare •••• Christians have no monopoly of these values, 
though in the context of Christian faith each may take on 
a different shade of meaning. 11 Bennett, CAC, 30-31. 
3. Braun, JLL, 21. 
4. Aubrey, Art.(l945), in TCA, 139. 
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Because by its very nature justice must deal with people :i.m-
person~ according to some established principle~ it can 
actually never "do justice" to the individual as a unique per-
sonality. 1 Only love can do that. Therefore the more justice 
is concerned with the relations between persons, the more love 
is necessar,y, since in any personal relationships differences 
between persons cannot be wholly disregarded as justice tends 
2 
to do. 
Since a harmony achieved through justice simply balances 
men1s claims and prevents them from taking advantage of one 
another, it is never more than an approximation of brotherhood.3 
Such a harmony is, therefore, n:either creative nor redemptlve. 
Neither are even the most just la1vs~ though they be administered 
by fair and unprejudiced men. For that reason even the most 
perfect system of justice will appear imperfect in the light of 
love, since even 1vhen just,ice has exacted its penalty and the 
scaies are level, the real moral problem._w:ill not have been 
solved if the evil will remains. It' is the aim of love to redeem 
that will. 4 
Finally~ love not only provides the aim of justice and 
exposes and corrects its weaknesses, it also furnishes its most 
dynamic motivation. Justice is good but it is not a gospel and 
1. Bennett, CAC~ 37; Brunner, JSO~ 22. 
2. Brunner, JSO, 29. 
3. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 252. 
4. Braun, JIL, 19-20. 
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few men will die for it. It i'IOuld seem, then, that in a:rry social 
reform the Christian r s primary task is uto bring to the cause of 
justice that religious devotion w.i. thout which the cause is lost 11 • 1 
If Christianity is true, the most convincing proof of the 
necessa11r interrelation between the two realms of existence is 
the Incarnation itself when divine love 11took flesh u to di•Iell in 
the realm of human justice. The crucified became a reality in a 
i'rorld which had produced the blindfolded goddess. It is possible, 
of course, to claim that all that this historical fact proves is 
that the spirit of redemptive love will alw·a;ys be crucified in a 
civilization which is based on distributive justice. Neverthe-
less one may also look at the fact of Incarnation in terms of 
div~e revelation -- a revelation which affir.ms that this sort of 
love is possible, even in a i'IOrld where impersonal distributive 
justice still obtains. To be sure it is possible only through 
grace; but it is nonetheless possible. Moreover to affir.m that 
the ti'IO realms are irr7levant to each other is to deny the witness 
of ~esus himself,. for the one thing he seemed to be stressi.11g, 
both in his life and in his teaching, is that men are to model 
2 
their conduct upon the character of God. Jesus J own criterion 
for criticizing or supplanting the Law of Israel was al1~ys his 
own understanding of the spirit of God. 
To summarize what has been suggested so far: there is a 
radical difference between the retributive justice of legal 
1. Quick, CAJ, 60. 
2. See the Ser.mon on the Mount and parallels, for example. 
&4 
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thought and the redemptive justice of f3iblical thought, becatJ,se 
the one is based on the reasonable processes of the human mind, 
and the other, on the grace of God. Hov.rever, the human mind and 
the grace of God are not inimical to one another since it is 
through the grace of God that man is a reasonable being. More-
over, it -was in order to serve His ultimate purpose of redemption 
that God gave man his reason. In this -way the divine and human 
realms are altogether relevant to one another: the one to sustain, 
and the other to serve. Nevertheless, even in the history of 
Christian theology man has not always used his reason to serve 
the redemptive purpose of God, but rather to balance the scales 
of justice through legalistic retribution. Some of the ways in 
. 
which legal thought has thus influenced Christian theology will 
be shovm in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Some Influences of Legalistic Thinking on Christian Theology 
From the beginning Christianity has split its allegiance 
between the two concepts of justice, the retributive and the 
redemptive. In spite of the man on the cross, Christians through 
all ages have had a high regard for the blindfolded goddess with 
her scales and sword. 
Christianity came by its concern with retribution naturally. 
The Old Testament is full of it. One would like to believe that 
the ancient Hebrews moved from the unlimited vengeance of Lamech1 s 
war song 1 to the lex talionis of the Pentateuch which limited 
vengeance to only an eye for an eye; 2 and from there on to the 
redemptive justice of Hosea, Jeremiah, Deutero-Isaiah, and Jonah. 
However, this was not the case. Some of the latest books3 are 
most urgently concerned with retribution against the 11unjust man11 
(i.~., the enemy). The two concepts parallel each other ~hrough­
out the Old Testament. In the Psalter itself, for instance, one 
finds words of bitterest retaliation such as these: 
The righteous will rejoice When he sees the vengeance; 
he will bathe his feet in the blood of the wicked;4 
close beside such tenderly redemptive ones as these: 
The Lord ••• does not deal with us according to our sins, 
1. Genesis 4:23-24. 
2. As in Genesis 9:6; Exodus 21:23-25; Leviticus 24:10-16; 
Deuteronomy 19:21. 
3. Nahum, many of the late Psalms, Joel, and Esther, for example. 
4. Psalm 58:10-11. 
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nor requite us according to our iniquities •••• 
as far as the east is from the west, so fay 
does he remo~e our transgressions from us. 
The same is true of the New Testament. In spite of the 
emphasis of the Gospels on "saving the lost" and on Jesus r 
obvious concern for, and friendship with, publicans and sinners, 
the element of retributive just~ce is strong. The place where 
it is perhaps most obvious is in the teaching about the final 
judgment where everyone will eventually get his just deserts by 
being consigned either to heaven or to hell. However it is open 
to question whether this emphasis stems from the genuine teaching 
of Jesus. Even granting that Jesus was a man of his day and 
therefore subject to the thought forms of the time and place in 
which he lived, the evidence is not conclusive that Jesus taught 
about divine retribution in the crass terms later attributed to 
him. Mark, for example, mentions hell as a place of punishment 
only once, when he says, "If your hand causes you to sin, cut it 
off; it is better for you to enter life maimed than with t1ro 
hands to go to hell, to the unquenchable fire 11 • 2 Luke also 
mentions hell as a place of punishment only once: 11But I will 
warn you whom to fear: fear him who, after he has killed, has 
power to cast into hell 11 • 3 Matthew, on the other hand, mentions 
hell several times; in fact he seems almost to stress the con-
cept. He uses the Marean passage twice, and the Lucan passage 
1. Psalm 103:10,12. 
2. Mark 9 :43-48. 
3. Luke 12:5. 
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once.1 Then he adds several passages of his own. Only Matthew 
says that the man who ridicules his brother "shall be liable to 
the hell of fir.e 11 ; 2 there are no parallels to this in the other 
gospels. Only Matthew has the parable of the net m "Which the 
wicked are caught and cast mto "the furnace of fireu. 3 Both 
Matthe1v and Luke have the parables of the master returning un-
expectedly, the great banquet,· and the talents, but only Matthew 
has the faithless servants and.the unprepared guest "cast mto 
outer darkness 11 where "men will weep and gnash their teeth". 4 All 
three of the synoptic evangelists have lithe first shall be last 
and the last first", but only J.vlatthew equates the former with 
the Jews "Who also "will be thro-vm into outer darkness" where 
"men will weep and gnash their teeth u. 5 Only Matthew speaks of 
the Pharisees as 11serpents 11 and a "brood of vipers" and asks how 
6 
they will escape 'lbemg sentenced to hell". FinalJ.y, Matthew 
alone has the parable of the fmal judgment m which the sheep ' 
are separated from the goats who are·told to "depart from me, you 
cursed,. mto the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his 
angels 11 .7 
As for the rest of the Ne\v Testament, the emphasis on final 
judgment is less marked in Paul's letters than in the later 
1. Matthew 5:30 and 1$:$; Matthel'l 10:2$. 
2. Matthew 5:22. 
3. Matthew 13 :49-50. 
4. Matthew 24:51; 22:13; 25:30. 
5. Matthew S:ll-12. 
6. Matthew 23:3~. 
7. Matthew 25:31-46. 
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epistles written during the exigencies of persecution and schism. 
It is most marked in one of the most 11popular 11 of the persecution 
documents, the Book of Revelation, in which the vindictive spirit 
dominates the scene. 1Yluch of the eschatological symbolism used 
later by the Church Fathers was derived from this book. 2 It is at 
least possible 'that such an emphasis on the retributive element in 
the final judgment was foreign to the spirit of Jesus and -was 
brought into Christianity by later writers. 3 At any rate the 
spirit of retribut.i ve justi-ce has been present ever since and few 
theologians have thought to question it.4 
In this chapter some of the ways in which this legalistic 
• 
spirit has influenced Christian thought 'Will be shmm. First a 
study will be made of the concept of hell in the history of theo-
logy. Then the two important legal theories of atonement i'Jill be 
examined. In all these cases the retributive thsory of justice is 
uppermost. 
1. Paul did suggest, hoi-rever, that the "saints" 'Will take 
part in the final judging, but this was in his corres-
pondence with the church in Corinth where the spirit of 
schism -was rampant.. I Corinthians 6 :2. This idea -was 
later elaborated by Augustine. See below, p.6'3 • 
2. The "lake of fire 11 in ch. 20 was stressed by Hippolyiius, for 
example, and the concept of the tv~ resurrections in this 
same chapter was elaborated by Augustine in his concept of 
the "two deaths". See below, p. 6~ 
3. The author of the Fourth Gospel, who ma;y or ma;y not have 
been closer to the spirit of Jesus, spoke of the Judgment 
as now and simply as the self-separation from the Word of 
thoS"e'"'"who "loved darkness rather than light". John 3:16-19. 
4 .• It did occur to one of the heretics (i.e., Marcion) to ask 
, how the God who, required men to demand an eye for an eye 
could also require them to turn the other cheek. Tertullian 
had a ready answer: because God wanted to take His om 
vengeance on the evil-doerl 11Aga:inst Marcion 11 , ANF, III, 
370-371. 
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1. The Concept of Hell 
The concept of hell is a crucial one in any study of justice, 
for 11hell represents retributive punishment in its furthest and 
clearest development without any redemptive element in it at al]~l 
The persistence of this concept in Christian theology ~ll be 
shown below, first in the teaching of the pr:imary figures in the 
history of Christian thought and then in Christian thinking today. 
i. In the History of Christian Thought 
While the Apostolic Fathers agreed in principle that "Christ 
died to save sinners 11 , they failed to consider such a possibility 
for sinful heretics. For all such unbelievers there will 
undoubtedly be a day of judgment when, according to I Clement, 
, . 
2 
God will give 11such as depart from Him to punishment and torture 11 • 
Ignatius affirmed that 11whoever sets at naught His doctrine shall 
go into helln,3 and II Clement agreed that "those who have ••• 
denied Jesus by their words or their deeds are punished by ter-
rible torture in unquenchable fire 11 .4 Barnabas was convinced that 
11the IDrd will judge the wor~d without respect of persons. Each 
will receive as he has done 11 .5 According to each of these men the 
fear of punishment is a better deterrent to sin (i.e., unbelief) 
1. Robinson, CJ, 94. 
2. Clement, "Epistle to the Corinthians", ANF, I, 8. 
3.' Ignatius, "Epistle to the Ephesians", .ANF, I, 56. 
4. II Clement, 11Epistle11 , FOG, I, 77. 
5. Barnabas, 11Epistle11 , ANF, I, 139. 
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than is the promise qf reward •. 
The same can be said about the teaching of the later Greek 
Fathers. If possible they were even more legalistic in their 
conceptions of justice than the Apostolic Fathers had been. They 
all agreed that men w.ill receive just deserts in the life to come 
for their evil deeds and unbelie~ in this present life.1 God 
would be less than just if this were not so. Moreover men idll 
have only themselves to blame for their eternal punishment, for 
the,y are perfectlY free to choose the good if they so desire.2 
It is the w.ilfulness of their wickedness that angers and offends 
God) Tertullian seemed to lmow only a 11 God of retributionll who 
exacts from men what He has committed to them, 4 and who must 
"avenge" Himself against evildoers by a "severity indispensable 
to justice". 5 Justin, at least, believed that "the heavenly 
Father desires rather the repentance than the punishment of the 
sinner11 , 6 but one wonders what hope there is for repentance in 
1. Justin Martyr, "The First Apology11 , ANF, I, 168; 
Irenaeus, 11Against Heresies 11 , ANF, I, 468; 
Theophilus, liTo Autolycus 11 , ANF, II, 93; 
Athenagoras, HA Plea for the Christians 11 , ANF, II, 146; 
Clement, liThe Instructor11 , ANF, II, 225; 
Origen, nne Principiis'~ .ANF, IV, 240, 293.. 
Tatian went even further; he contended that God will punish 
a man "who is not bad but /jn.ereJ:il associates with the 
bad". "Address to the Greeks", ANF, II, 73. 
2. Justin Martyr, "The First Apology 11 , ANF, I, 177; 
Clement, liThe Instructor II, in .ANF, II, 226; 
Origen, 11De Principiis", ANF, IV, 347. 
3. Tertullian, "Five Books Against Marcion", ANF.., I_;I:I, 293. 
4. Tertullian, IIFive Books Against Marcion 11 , .ANF, III, 319, 399. 
Cf. Irenaeus, II .Against Heresi.es 11 , ANF, III, 517. 
5. Tertullian, liFive Books Against Marcion11 , ANF, III, 309. 
6. Justin Martyr, liThe First Apology11 , ANF, I, 167. 
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the "rayless scenery.of ·gloomy Tartarus, where never shines a beam 
for the irradiating voice of the Word 11 • 1 Each of the Apologists 
1.vrote vigorously about the place of punishment, put HippoJ.yl:;p.s 
outdid them all 1.dth his description of 1'the boiling flood of hell's 
eternal lake of firen and 11the worm that ceaselessly coils for 
food around the body whose scum has bred it 11 • 2 
Of all these early theologians it was Origen alone w·ho be-
lieved that men can continue to grow through punishment inflicted 
after death so that God will one day have His redeeming way ~th 
sinners by means of llthe purging fires of helln. According to 
Origen the punishment one endures in hell is actually meant to 
restore him to relationship with ~d and, therefore, will not be 
eternal) How·ever, as Augustine pointed out, later:, Origen was 
condemned by the church for his 11indulgence in the matter of · 
punishing sinnersn.4 
Augustine elaborated the concept of hell even more fully than 
tpe Fathers before him had done. Taking his cue from the Book of 
Revelation, he envisaged a 11first 11 and a nsecond 11 death.5 During 
the llfirst deathn 'Which will last one thousand years, the sinner 
will still be redeemable. If he remains a sinner to the end of 
that time he will be 11raised againll only to be condemned to the 
1. Hippolytus, liThe Refutation of All Heresies 11 , ANF, v, 152-
153. . 
2,. Hippolytus, liThe Refutation of All Heresiesn, ANF, v, 153. 
3_. Origen, "De Principiisn, ANF, IV, 344-34f3. 
4. Augustine, ncity of God 11 , XXI, 17, in BWSA, II. 
5,. Augustine, "City of Godll, XIII,2,8; XIX,ll,28; XX,_9 in !MSA,II. 
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•rsecond death 11 of everlasting punishment. Another idea which 
Augustine took from the Book of Revelation (and from Paul) was 
his notion that "through God's grace11 the saints will 11become 
unconquerable 11 in order to ntorment their enemies II, the sinners 
in hell, into eternity •1 
While Augustine acknowledged realistically, in the light of 
< ' 
his own e:x:perience, that the Hills of lifen are common to good· 
and bad alike,2 he abandoned this realism the moment he began to 
speculate about eternal life in which everyone will get his 11 just 
deSerts 11 ,3 and where the fires of hell will burn even more bright-
ly for the hardened criminal.4 Moreover, in spite of the dura-
tion of his punishment, th~ sinner's sensitivity to pain 1-r.i..ll not 
abate as his body is 11burned with fir en, and his soul is nas it 
were, gnawed by the worm of anguish11 .5 He will, in fact, 'lbe 
tormented day and night forever 11 • 6 It is a dreadful fate that 
a1..raits the sinner -- to be caught eternally between life and 
death so that he can never finally live and enjoy God, nor ever 
finally die and escape his pain.7 
While God does His utmost to redeem sinners in this present 
life, "turning them to Himself by wonderful meansn /~ He apparently 
washes His hands of them entirely in the life to come. One cannot 
1. 11City of God II, XX, 12, in BWSA, II. 
2. 11City of Godn, I, 8,9, in BWSA, II. 
3. 110n the Trinity11 , IV, 12, 20, in BWSA, II. 
4. 11City of God II, XXI, 16, in BWSA, II. 
5. 11City of God 11 , XIII, 2; XIX, 28; XXI, 9, in BVJSA, II. 
6. 11 City of Godn, XXI, 26, in BWSA, II. 
7. IICity of God II, XXI, 3, in BWSA, II. 
8. 11 Confessions", VI, 7, in BIN"SA, I; 11City of God 11 , I, 8, in BWSA,II. 
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help wondering, if "God does not wholly desert those 1mom He 
condemns ••• nor shuts up in His anger His tender mercies 11 in this 
life, why He chooses to do so in the life to come.1 It is 
instructive to discover that Augustine based his concept of ever-
lasting punishment on an analogy of the laws of the "earthly 
city11 rather than on the nature of God: 
As the laws of this present city do not provide 
for the executed criminal's return to it, so 
neither is he who is condemned to the second death 
recalled again to life everlasting.2 
The Schoolmen continued this legalistic emphasis on divine 
retribution. Even. Abelard, who vre.s milder than the rest, sug-
gested that the pagans 1 belief in retribution 11according to merit 11 
was one ·of the proofs that they were Christians before Christ. 3 
Although both AnseJ.m and Bernard were fully atvare of the Cross 
through which God "freed us from our sins, and from His ovm wrath, 
and from hell tt, 4 they did not seem to consider those good effects 
for the sinners of their own day. For those 11reprobatesll there 
was nothing but the1 unalterable vengeance 11 of a God who would 
neither wash a1vay their evil deeds nor accept their good ones but 
would simply harden their hearts 11lest perchance they should 
grieve and repent 11 • 5 Since the sinner had forfeited his chance to 
live 11according to the just laws of God 11 there was nothing left 
for him, Bernard thought, but to be ttruled by himself as a 
..--
1. Augustine, liCity of God 11 , JGITI, 22, in BWSA, II. 
2. Augustine, ttCity of God11 , llX, ll, in BWSA, II. 
3. Abelard, CT, 59-61. 
4. AnseJ.m, CDH, I, 6. 
5. Bernard, SOH, 82-83. 
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criminal".1 Anselm, however, was not content to leave the 1-r.i..cked 
man to his own devices, Hfor either man renders due submission to 
God of his own will ••• or else God subjects him to Himself by 
torments 11 •
2 In his explanation of Christ's counsel to forgive 
nthose who trespass against us 11 Anselm ha;ked back to Tertullian.3 
It was, he affirmed, not a counsel to make man forgiving but 
rather a command to give God His due, "for to execute vengeance 
belongs to none but Him who is lord of all 11 .4 
Following the Schoolmen, Thomas Aquinas also had a good deal 
to say about the eternal fires of hell which will be 11the instru-
ment of God's vindictive justice11 .5 According to Thomas, however, 
the torment of hell mil not be limited to physical suffering; 
the sinner will be subjected to the spiritual anguish of carrying 
into eternity the sinful desires of his heart and having them 
eternally unsatisfied.6 Like all but Origen before him Thomas 
looked for nothing ultimately redemptive in life after death, 
since "those who are found evil at .L£he instant of death? mll be 
forever obstinate in evil 11 -- and hence forever deserving of 
punishment and receiving it.7 
8 Thomas justified eternal punishment on three g;r·ounds: 
(1) just as in human law a_man may be e..."'Ci..led or killed for 
1. Bernard, LOG, 40. 
2. Anselm, CDH, I, 14. 
3. See above, note # 4 , p .. 5Cf • 
4. Anselm, CDH, I, 12. 
5• AqUinas, COT, 177, 180. 
6. Aquinas, COT, 175. 
7. Aquinas, COT, 174. 
8. Aquinas, COT; 183. 
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connnitting adultery or murder, so it is just for God 11to inflict 
eternal punishment of a sin committed in a moment of time; (2) 
since "the greater the person 'Who is offended, the more grievous 
is the offense", tl a man -who has offended the infinite God must 
suffer infinitely; and (3) if "a sinner is incorrigible, so that 
his 'Will is obstinately fixed in sin, as ••• is the case with the 
damned, his punishment ought never to come to an end11 • It would 
seem that at these three points Thomas got his insight into the 
justice of God through the legal practice of his day rather than 
through the prophetic teaching of the Bible.2 His assertion that, 
while God wants all men to be saved, 11He wills some men to be 
damned as His justice exa.ctsrr3 seems to stress God's righteous-
ness at the expense of His mercy, or at least to limit His mercy 
.. . 
to this present life. 
.... 
The apparently unjust element in Thomas' doctrine (which was 
to appeq.r later in @'alvin's doctrine of double predestina·tiion) 
was his concept of human guilt. In spite of his repeated affirma-
tions concerning man's freedom of will and consequent responsibility, 
Thomas actually seemed to believe that the man who is "forever 
obstinate in evil" is God's responsibility after all. Since 
man cannot prepare himself to receive the light 
1. Here Thomas followed .Anselm and early Teutonic law. See 
below, p.18 f . 
2. When, for ·example, Thomas -was discussing the final judgment 
he wrote: 11in discussing this matter, we must take cogniz-
• ance of the three phases which, apparently, constitute a 
~judicial process." COT, 243. 
3.· Aquinas, ST, I, Q~l9, Art.6. 
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of grace except by the .@ratuitous help of God 
moving him inwardly ••• Lhi/ prepares himself 
only inasmuch as his free choice is prepared 
by God ••.• and thus inequality is found, inas-
much as God by His care provides greater gifts 
for some and lesser gifts for others.l 
In other words God chooses to save same men in this life by 
moving their wills to good through the influence of His grace. 
The rest He punishes eternally for their llguilt 11 in failing to 
receive the light of grace which He has failed to offer them. 
The 11guilt11 in this case would seem to be wholly GodtS.. Con-
temporary secular thought often delimits man 1s will by attribut-
ing his criminal tendencies to his environment or to his physical 
or psychical make-up, but at least it does not attribute such 
limitation to the inscrutable workings of ttdi vine wisdom". For 
Thomas the wisdom of God is the cause of the inequality of all 
things2 and hence, ultimately, of crime itself (although of course 
Thomas never admitted this): 
The evil of natural defect ••• He does will, by 
willing the good to which such evils are attached. 
Thus, in willing justice, He wills punishment; and 
in willing the preservation of the order of nature, 
He wills some things to be naturally corrupted • .3 
Although the Reformers protested against so much that the 
church had taken from Thomas .Aquinas, they agreed with Thomas 
himself at one c:r:uc:ial point: that it is God who ultimately 
determines man's eternal destinY, either to salvation or to 
destruction. Calvin was more-outspoken concerning the predestining 
1. Aquinas, ST, II, Q.l09 and ll2. 
2. Aquinas, ST, II, Q.ll2, Art.4. 
3. Aquinas, ST, I, Q.l9, Art.9. 
will of 
God the Arbiter and Governor of all things, 
Who, in His own wisdom has, from the remotest 
eternity, decreed what he wollld do, and now,1by His oim power, executes what He has decreed. 
HOivever, the fact of predestination was very much a reality for 
Luther as well. 11Thus11 , he claimed, 
our being righteous is taken entirely out of 
our hands and put in the hand of God •••• since 
God is certain and His predestination ~annot 
fail, and no one can withstand Him. ••• 
Therefore,-from this consideration alone, it is 
impossible to deny that our life and all our 
actions are under the direction, not of our 
prudence, but of the wonderful power, wisdom, 
and goodness of God.3 
The point the Reformers were determined to make was that a man 
cannot be really good apart from God.4 This seems a valid and 
necessary assertifunJ iu is the conclusion they drew from it (i.e., 
that some men are 11apart from God11 because God Himself wills it) 
that is open to question. 
That the reprobate obeynot the word of God, 
vihen made knovm to them, is justly imputed to 
the wickedness and depravity of their hearts, 
provided it be at the same time stated that 
they are abandoned to this depravity because 
they have been. raised up, by. a just but in-
scrutable judgment of God, tg disPlay His 
glory in their condemnation.~ 
Thus, even though God has not chosen to illuminate the hearts 
and minds of all men with His redeeming word, still, by that· same 
1. Calvin, ICR, I, XVi, 8. 
2. Luther, WML, VI, 459. 
3. Luther, WML, I, 123. 
4. Luther, F.PR, 107. 
5! Calvin, ICR, III, xxiv, 14. 
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word, those whom He has not chosen to illumine will be "rendered 
more inexcusable at the day of judgment111 when He separates "the 
' 2 
sheep· from the goats, the elect from the reprobate 11 • 
The manifest injustice of this did not seem to bother Calvin 
who was content simp]y to affirm that since 11the will of God is 
the highest rule of justice ••• what He wills must be considered 
just, for this very reason, because He wills it 11 • 3 Luther agreed 
with him that nsince God is a just Judge, we must love and laud 
His justice ••• even when He miserab]y destroys the wicked". We 
should, in fact, rejoice in 11the goodness of the jastice of God 
our Avenger11 when it "rages against sinners" who are, after all, 
"enemies of all men and of God."4 
In his concept of life after death Luther seemed to believe 
that God is more concerned with the punishment of sin per ~ 
than with the reformation of the sinner, since "for a single 
lapse" persons who 11 seemed all their life long to be serving 
God ••• are now being punished forever". 5 Calvin suggested that in 
this present world the church should punish a man both to protect 
its good name and to serve as an ex.a.mple to others who might be 
led astray, for II indulging in a 11eak and ill-judged lenityu in 
such cases 11to the detr:iment of multitudes" is 11the worst kind 
1. Calvin, ICR, II, v, 5. 
2. Calvin, ICR, II, ~, l7. 
3-. Calvin, ICR, IV, :xxiii, 2. 
4. Luther, WML, I, 157-159. 
5• Luther, WML, I, 127. 
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1 
of cruelty". It is even possible that such pl.Ulisbment might lead 
the man himself to repentance. Suppose however that it was not 
predestined from all eternity that this man would repent? Then 
nothing remains for him but 
darkness, weeping, and gnashing of teeth, 
unextinguishable fire, a wor.m incessantly 
gnawing at the heart •. jfre 1<r.i..ll bf!.7 alienated 
from the presence of God, and, in addition to 
this, !fie will e:x;perienc~ such hostility 
from the Divine Majesty as to be unable to 
escape from its continual pursuit ••• • How 
great and severe ••• is the punishment, to endure 
the never ceasing effects of His 1vrath!2 
It is remarkable that Luther and Calvin, who had apparently 
e:x;perienced nthe inestimable greatness of God t s mercyn themsel:ves, 
could yet so coolly consign a large proportion of their brethren 
. 
to eternal damnation through the righteous will of that same God. 
If they had been saved, wby not others? Had they any right thus 
to limit the possibilities of God's grace? Calvin declared that 
11those whom the lord does not favour with the government of His 
spirit, He abandons, in righteous judgment, to the influence of 
Satan11 • 3 Perhaps the cr:i.minal is one of those whom IIHe has created 
to a life of shame and a death of destruction, that they might be 
instruments of His wrath, and examples of His severity11 .4 Perhaps 
he is among those poor unfortunates who "are born devoted from the 
WGmb to certain death, that His name may be glorified in their 
1: Calvin, ICR, IV, xx, 10. 
2. Calvin, ICR, III, xxv, 12. 
3. Calvin, ICR, II, iv, 1. 
4. Calvin, ICR, III, xxiv, 13. 
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destruction11 • 1 If so, the old-fashioned penal methods which 
11abandon11 a man nto his depravity11 may be the best answer to the 
cirimina1 1s existence after all. 
When qne considers this aspect of the teaching of the 
~ 
' Reformers he can better understand Donald Powell Wilson's conten-
tion that 
civilization's past five hundred years of legalized 
sadism ••• follow·s logically in our culture, the 
conscience of which is inured by a God who burns 
His erring chil~en in eternal fires.2 
In the first eighteen c6lturies of Christian culture only one 
important theologian (i.e., Origen) questioned the traditional 
cbncept of hell. It was not until the nineteenth century that the 
voice of theology was raised against it in the persons of 
Friedrich Schleier.macher and Albrecht Ritschl. Untii this time 
the concept •of hell revealed. two strange anomalies in Christian 
thought: (1) that the persistent God who had worked all through 
the long histor.y recorded in the Bible for the sake of mants 
redemption in this life was apparently willing to give man up for 
lost at his ,~death; and (2) that the merciful God who "came downn 
for the sake of sinners in the first century A.D. was not con-
cerned with sinners thereafter, except to punish them. The truth 
men had perceived at the cross ~~s somehow not considered relevant 
in their concept of hell. It was their sense of justice in the 
legal realm which guided men here. 
1. Calvin~ ICR, III, xxiii, 6. 
2. Wilson, ~C, 172. 
~1 
Both Schleier.macher and Ritschl objected to the use of legal 
categories in discussing the realm o.f divine grace. Ritschl 
wanted to lmow what right Christian theology has 
to take for granted, as the supreme rule of the 
Divine world-order, the recompensing of hufuan 
actions by rewards and punishments, thus e:x:plairi.-
ing the world order on the analogy of the State 
or civil society.l 
Such a eoncept, he· maintained, is 11under the influence of the 
models of pre-Christian religion 11 , that of the Greeks, Romans, 
and Israelites who 11regarded the State as, even in the religious 
sense, the highest goodn. 2 . 
It was not that they believed the divine and human realms 
are irrelevant to one another. On the contrary Ritschl would 
have agreed with Schleier.macher that 11the holiness of Godn, which 
works through the human conscience, 11is the divine causality that 
legislates in the corporate life of manu) It was smp]y that 
they found legal terms too J.:miting to e:x;press the redemptive 
I 
np.ture of God 1 s government. According to Schleier.macher 11if we 
regard the individual as the proper object of divine justice, we 
degrade that attr±bute to a mere counterpart of civil justice, 
1'lhich we so often feel to be injustice11 , 4 and Ritschl agreed that 
"the ideal of God and His Kingdom transcends the analogy of State 
processes 115 for 11the Christian religion is not a legal federation 
1. Ritschl, CDJR, 50-51. · 
2: Ritschl, CDJR, 361-362. 
3. Schleiermacher, CF, 343-344; cf. 284f. and 470f. 
4. Schleiermacher, CF, 348. 
5. Ritschl, CDJR, 92. 
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between God and mann .1 
These tvJO founders of liberal theology consequently set the 
whole process of redemption in an entirely different frame1~rk 
from that used by their predecessors: 
Our task is to ascertain in general the 
attribute of God through which the positively 
Christian conception of forgiveness of sins 
is to be understood •••• Jesus explicitly con-
nected this operation of God with His at-
·tribute ~ Father.2 --
Perhaps in substituting the 1-rord Father for King and La:~v--giver 
they came closer to the teaching of Jesus himself. At arry rate 
they came to vastly different conclusions about divine punishment, 
both here and hereafter, from those of the Fathers before them.3 
I 
Schleiermacher and Ritschl reached the same conclusions about 
man's eternal destiny: all souls will one day be restpred. If 
there is a state of eternal blessedness -- and all Christian 
. 
theologians are agreed that there is -- there can be no eternal 
damnation, for the blessed (with sympathy a vital part of their 
blessedness) could not be blissful while they knew that the damned 
were enduring such suffering.4 Nor is there arry 11spiritual death 11 } 
Final judgment is not the sep?ration of sheep from goats which the 
rtunpurified Christian temper" has popularly conceived it to be, 
but simply the symbol of the ultimate distinction bet1v-een right 
1. Ritschl, CDJR, 362. 
2.· Ritschl, CDJR, 93. 
3. For a discussion of their concepts of punishment in this 
present life; see below, p.Jl''f f: .. 
4. Schleiermacher, OF, 721. 
5. Ritschl, CDJR, 52. 
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and wrong.1 '. Both theologians stressed universal reconciliation 
with God as the aim of His redemptive work in Christ. 2 In living 
felfowship with Christ the powers of the regenerate are put at 
~ His disposal,3 and man becomes ever more recognizably God's son.4 
Such is, in each case, theffisence of life eternal. 
Thus Schleiermacher and Ritschl did ~way with the concept of 
hell as a state of everlasting. punishment. There are, hoi'Tever, 
several contemporar.Y theologians who wonder whether the idea of 
hell is not.a necessary one in any adequate for.mulation of the 
divine-human relationship. 
ii. In Contemporar,y Christian Theology 
Christian theologians no longer think of hell as a literal 
place of everlasting torment; the graphic descriptions left by the 
Fathers are either taken symbolically or else replaced by spiritual 
conceptions of a state of damnation. There seems to be general 
agreement that hell, if it exists at all, may best be described as 
a state of alienation from God, caused by incompatibility with Him. 5 
The emphasis is on the fact that the state of hell is chosen by man 
himself. 
There are t-vro factors which would seem to make hell in this 
-
1. Schleier.macher, CF, _716. 
2. Schleier.macher, CF, 3ll, 722; Ritschl, CDJR, 382. 
3. Schleier.macher, CF, 505; 
4. Schleier.macher, CF, 499; Ritschl, CDJR, 9, 138. 
5. 11 The whole process o'f sin is a progressive alienation from God; 
and the climax of such a progressive alienation is that 
essential incompatibleness with God which we call hell. 11 
Moberly, AAP, 15. 
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sense a real possibility: t~e reality of God•s righteousness 
and the freedom of man. No matter what God would do for man, He 
cannot, being God, either indulge him or coerce him. Walter 
Marshall Horton points out· that if God were to compel His rebellious 
children to come into His kingdom, it would be "no longer a kingdom 
of justice and love, but a tyranny against which we ought to 
re'bel11 .1 Man is, at least theoretically, free to say No to God 
forever and thus to experience the "unspeakable loss and suffering 
involved in the refusal to accept the rule of God the Fat..ller in 
the heart and in the world. n2 This may or may not have been Jesus 1 
insight in his assertion that there is one sin even God Himself 
cannot forgive, the sin against the Holy Spirit, the sin of 
ultimate denial of God;·3 not because God does not offer forgive-
ness, but because the heart that denies Him cannot accept it • 
. Thus w. c. dePauley claims that there are men who nby constant 
continuation in "tiTongdofung11 have 11idlled themselves outside the 
sphere of grace11 ; and he quotes Dr. Gore as saying UFinally lost 
souls ••• I feel bound to believe there may be. 11 4 Georgia Harkness 
also suggests that there comes a.time ~men man has "sinned aw~' 
the freedom he once had by identifying himself completely with sin.5 
1. Horton, CTEA, 269. 
2. Robinson, OJ, 96. 
3. Mark 3:28-29; Matthew 6:14-15; 12:31-32; Luke 12:10; 18:22-25. 
"Both Testaments know 9f a l~t to God1 s forgiveness •••• vThere 
the conditions of the divine forgiveness cannot grow, as the 
soul is closed for God." DeJong, DHF, 221. Of. Moberly, AAP, 
56, 60-61; Taylor,-FAR, ch. 1. 
4. dePauley, PHD, 141. 
5. Harkness, UCF, 147. 
When that time comes R.C. Moberly contends that man "should be 
left by God altogether to himself11 • 1 Norman Pittenger sums up 
the position of those who believe in eternal punishment 1.-ri.th these 
'!.'lOrds: 
There is no other way ••• by which human 
responsibility, human freedom, and the utter 
respect which God shows to this supreme 
reality,2may be maintained, than the doctrine of hell. 
He goes on to point out that the possibility of hell is actually 
nan instance of divine mercyn since it is possible only through 
God's gracious permission of human freedom.3 
There are certain contemporary theologians, ho"t<Tever, who can-
not reconcile the concept of everlasting damnation with the 
character and purpose of God. E.S. Brightman, for instance, 
claims that the 11tradi tional belief in hell makes God a being as 
cruel, vengeful, and unrelenting as the most hateful and arbitrary 
human sinner 11 • 4 He finds no solution to the problem of good and 
evil in the traditional view of heaven and hell but simpJ.y a 
radical perpetuation of it on a cosmic scale, 5 since it is ttto act 
out of all proportion to a human sense of justice11 to suggest that 
the soul 1 s eternal destiny rests on the choices made in the 
1; Moberly, AAP, 16. 
2. Pittenger, His Bod.y the Church. (New York: Morehouse-Gorham 
Company, 1945),.,.129. 
3. Dr. Pittenger also points out that the Church 11has never said 
of a single soul that it was in hell or to be consigned there 
-- no, not even of Judas Iscariot 11 • HBC, 129. 
4. Brightman, POR, 4D7. 
5. Brightman, POR, 406. 
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relatively short span of a human life-time.1 Nels Ferr6 reminds 
one of Schleiermacher in his criticism of the concept of hell: 
If hell were eternal, furthermore, heaven would 
be an eternal place of mourning. All those truly 
in the Agape fellowship would identify their lot 
with the lost •••• That is why we have said else-
where that heaven can be heaven only when it has 
emptied hell. 2 · 
Perhaps Norman Robinson makes the most telling thrust against.the 
concept of everlasting damnation i'Then he asks: 
Can we believe that the love, 'Which was also the 
passion for justice, that went to the Cross and 
there prayed for the forgiveness of those who 
nailed Him there, could ever suffer final defeat?3 
In an excellent b;rief summary of the concept of final judg-
ment in Christian theology4 Walter M. Horton shows how Christian 
thinkers have ever been disturbed and divided in their concepts 
of the outcome of the divine-human drama. Origen stressed the 
ultimate triumph of God t s grace in winning all men to redemption, 
while Augustine conten~ed just as strongly that the final con-
summation of history would be a complete separation of righteous 
saints from unrighteous sinners. According to Horton the church 
has generally accepted Augustine's view in preference to Origen1s, 
but 1'she has done so with a troubled mind 11 • Yet when certain 
1. Brightman, POR, 407. Both Augustine and Thomas attempted 
to solve this manifest inequity by saying simply that no 
human law 11ever ·regulated the duration of the punishment by 
the duration of the offence punished11 • Augustine, 11City of 
God 11 , XXI, 11, in BWSA!'(. Cf. Aquinas, COT, 183 • 
2. Ferre, Evil and the Christian Faith. ( New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1947)p.ll9. See above, P·7.3 
3. Robinson, CJ, 98. 
4. Horton, CTEA, 268-271. 
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distinguished contemporary theologians (e.g., Karl Barth1) have 
tended toward Origen' s teaching, they have been attacked for it 
by their colleagues. Thus the -majority opinion in Christian thought 
seems still to be colored by the legalism of a traditional doctrine 
of final judgment and the accompanying concept of hell. 
2. Legal Theories of Atonement 
One further point at which both Schleiermacher and Ritschl 
found unwarranted legalism in the history of Christian doctrine 
was in certain theories of the atonement. .Any such theories, they 
claimed, which vie1-r 
man's relation to God and God's imputation of sin 
under the catep.or.v of a merely eXternal legal 
relationship Lhavi7 had a most detrimental effect 
upon interpretation of the work of redemption.2 
The two persons most responsible for such theories were Anselm in 
the eleventh century and Grot ius in the seventeenth. Each of these 
men used the legal concepts of his own day in his exposition of 
the divine-human relationship focussed in the atonement. 
i. As Suggested by Anselm 
By Anselm's day the payment of fines had been substituted 
for corporal punishment in the case of many crimes, and these 
fines were fixed according to the social status of the victim. 
1. In his discussion of final judgment (DIO, 133-136) Barth 
states that "there is a decision and a division, but by Him 
, who has interceded for us". 
2 •. Schleiermacher, CF, 301, 460. Cf. Ritschl, CDJR, 70. 
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A man's place in the social hierarchy of feudalism determined his 
wergild; that is, the measure of the nworth n of the man.1 F:i.nes 
for the saJne crime would vary accord:ing to the 11worth11 of the 
victim. It was w.i..thin this feudal fraJne of reference that .Anselm 
proposed his theory of atonement which presupposes two things: 
the absolute sinfulness of man in his fallen nature and the ab-
solute worthiness of God. 
Accord:ing to .Anselm man in his sin was like a servant who had 
deliberately fallen into a deep ditch to keep from fulfilling his 
master's connnands. 2 Even if he could have got ten out by h:im.f}elf, 
11J"hich he was totally unable to do, he could never have paid the 
necessary fine he owed God to restore the glor.y he had taken from 
Him by his folly, since the debt was infinite to correspond to the 
infinite worth of God, and man himself is simply a finite being. 
God would have been less than just, therefore, if He had compas-
sionately waived the fine since 11it is not right to cancel sin 
w.i..thout compensation or punishment 11 .3 ConsequentJ.y, until man 
could pay his ndebt of honor 114 he was "justly exposed (by God) to 
1. Cantor, CCCJ, 250; Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 340; Sen, FPP, 14. 
2. Anselm, CDH, I, 24. 
3. Anselm, CDH, I, 12, 23. "Therefore God maintains nothing 
with more justice than the honor of his own dignity.... Does 
it seem to you that he wholly preserves it, if he allo1ffl 
himself to be so defrauded of it as that he should neither 
receive satisfaction nor punish the one defrauding him ••• ? 
Therefore the honor taken away must be repaid, or punish-._ 
ment w.i..ll follow; other-vdse, either God will not be just to 
himself, or he will be w·eak in respect to both _parties; and 
this it is impious even to think of1t. Anselm, CDH, I, 13. 
4. Anselm, CDH, I, 11. 
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the tormenting of the devil11 • 1 Yet how can a man in a ditch, and 
a poor man at that, ever "render God His due 11 ?2 The situation, 
which had been caused by the wilfulness of man on the one hand and 
the justice of God the Father on the other, would have been 
eternallY unresolved had not God the Son intervened and taken it 
upon Himself to pay the debt for man • .3 Only God as God coulcl. repczy-
such an infinite debt, but onlY God as man could repay it on behalf 
of the real debtor; hence the Incarnation and the consequent atone-
ment~ 
Yet does not.Anselmts attempt to preserve a legalisti~ concept 
of God's justice in spite of God's manifest mercy do violence to 
the nature of God Himself? Can the divine nature be separa:t,ed in 
this way, and the wrath of God the Father be appeased by the mercy 
of God the Son? Is it not more valid to suggest (as Lombard did4) 
that God's love was not the result of the atonement but its cause, 
and that the costliness of that love was not borne simply by a 
11part 11 of God, but by God in His just and merciful totality? 
Moreover, can the process of atonement ever be so automatic 
for man? Anselm's great concern was that satisfaction be made, , 
and, in his system, it is God, not man, who is concerned rdth the 
debt and its remission. Man remains in bondage to the devil1dth-
out a qualm of conscience about his debt to God. Then the, debt is 
1. Anselm, CDH, I~ 7. 
2. Anselm, CDH, I, 11. 
,3. Anselm, CDH, I, 11, 16. 
4., Lombard, quoted in Fisher, HCD, 227. 
, 
so 
paid and man is fr~ed. But is he? Anselm believed that sin must 
be either punished or paid for, but does either punishment or pay-
1 
ment reach the core of the unrepentant heart? Without repentance 
can ~y man know redemption? In Anselm 1 s system man seems to be 
the witness of a transaction rather than an active participant in a 
redemptiv.e relationship. 
ii. As Suggested by Grotius 
Grotius developed his governmental theory of the atonement 
in an attempt to defend Anselm's theory against the attacks of 
Socinus. Grotius' theo:ry has much in corrnnon with Anselm's but dif-
fers with it by emphasizing the preservation of just gover1~ent in 
place of.God's offended honor. This difference reflects the change 
in social and political environment from feudalism to statehood. 
In feudalism the preservation of the dignity of the lord was 
of first importance; hence Anselm's emphasi~ on the necessity of 
atonement in order to restore the offended dignity of God. However, 
in a growing state the preservation of order is paramount; hence 
Grotius' assertion that the atonement was God's attempt to preserve 
1. This was the point of Schleier.ma.cher' s criticism 'When he 
claimed that the view 11that Christ is supposed to have felt 
the primary and most direct punishment of sin, namely, the 
divine wrath, as striking Him and resting upon Him • .,.is 
obviously based on the assumption that there is an absolute 
necessity in the divine punishment without any regard to 
the natural connection of punishment with moral evil. This 
again can hardly be divorced from a conception of the divine 
righteousness which has· been transferred to God from the 
crudest human conditions 11 • CF, 460. 
8J. 
the order of His government against the disruptions of manrs sin. 
According to Grotius God 1 s activity in the atonement 1-re.s determined 
primarily by what good government prescribes.1 If God had punished 
men as they deserved, they would all have been condemned to eternal 
death; yet if He had failed to punish them at all the moral order 
would have been endangered, since to let sins go unpunished is 11un-
just in a ruler, even in God11 • 2 Every ruler, including God, "is 
praised for his justice, because he does not remit punishment, but 
severely exacts it11 .3 So Grotius stressed the fact that God 
punished Christ for man 1 s sins in order lito testify openly of the 
desert of sin and His own hatred of sinn4 and thus to display and 
to vindicate His moral government.5 
Grotius suggested that in secular courts of law one man often 
bears the penalty of another since 11it is essential to punishment 
that it should be inflicted on account of sin, /fm!} it is not es-
sential that it should be inflicted upon the sinner himself 11 • 6 So 
it is with the demand of God' that sin must be punished at any cost, 
' 
a demand Which made the atonement necessary if the justice of God's 
government was to be maintained. "When Grotius continued his dis-
cussion of the atonement with the assertion that "the custom of the 
Gentiles in expiating sins by the slaughtering of men or of sheep 
affords no little help in understanding ••. the words proper to this 
1. dePauley, PHD, 124. 
2. Grotius, DSC, 64. 
3. Grotius, DSC, 65, 34-35. 
4. Grotius, DSC, 137, 109. 
5. Grotius, DSC, 1-2. 
6. Grotius, DSC, 82-83, BB. 
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argument 111 he seems, like .Anselm, to have been in danger of 
objectivizing the 'Whole process of: atonement. Apparently it did 
not occur to him that vicarious su~fering may reflect rather than 
effect God's mercy, and that it is actually powerless to restore 
justice unless it works upon the heart of the actual sinner and 
moves it to repentance. 
Thus Grotius substituted the analogy of a court of law· for 
Anselm's feudal custom but, 'While he reflected a political develop-
ment beyond Anselm's day, he did not seem to reflect any significant 
·theological change. The emphasis was still on the tension in the 
heart of God between His justice and His mercy instead of on the 
necessary change in the heart of man. It is true that sin must 
be taken seriously, that the moral order must indeed be preserved, 
but both men viewed this preservation in terms of an impersonal 
legalism rather than in terms of·personal relationship. For them 
God is a Ruler or a Judge confronting an offending subject rather 
than a Father facing a wayward son, and His activity in the atone-
ment is a legal transaction rather than the restoration of rela-
t . h" 2 ~ons l.p. 
The influence of .Anselm and Grotius on subsequent theology 
was profound. Calvin incorporated much of Anselm's teaching in 
his ovm concept of the atonement3 which was all but undisputed 
until the time of Soc:i:nus. Then Grotius revived the spirit of 
1. Grotius, DSC, 212. 
2. Joyce, Art.(l924), in Hastings, ERE, II, 441-442. 
3. S.ee especially Calvin, ICR, II, .:rii, 3 and xv.i, 10. 
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AnseJm in his Defense Aga~st Socinus in which he formulated his 
governmental theor,y of atonement. This theor,y entered Methodist 
theology through the writings of Richard Watson, and it dominated 
the theology of New England until the latter half of the nine-
teenth century.l 
In his Doctrine of the Atonement Leonard Hodgson contends 
that 11the substitutionar-y- doctrine, or, indeed any doctrine which 
regards the death of Christ as expiatory, implies at bottom the 
retributivFJ theor,y of punishment 11 • 2 The same must of course be 
said for the doctrine of eternal damnation in hell. In each case, 
it is the balanced scales of justice that are determinative rather 
than the words of forgiveness from the cross. 
Hm·rever, this is only part of the picture. Christian theology 
has not only been affected by penal practices but has also affected 
them. Many Christian names and movements have figured in the long 
histor,y of penal reform. For a considerable number of Christians 
the man on the cross rather than the blindfolded goddess has been 
the determining sy:nibol in this area. In the following chapter' 
some of the efforts of Christians to achieve a redemptive justice 
in the treatment of criminals will be discussed. 
--1. Grotius, DSC, xl, lvii. Fer.m, APD, 115. 
2. Hodgson, DOA, 53. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Some Influences of Theological Thought on Penal Practice 
After suggesting that such words as penitentiaEl, reform-
atory, and pardon establish the fact that the Christian church 
11has a vested interest in corrections 11 , Frederick Kuether states 
that the church has influenced the history of penology in three 
ways: by modifying civil practices in dealing with offenders, by 
establishing prisons, and by initiating the chaplaincy service.1 
The first two of these influences are closely related since the 
establishment of the modern prison was one way in which a group 
of Christians modified civil practices in dealing with offenders; 
consequently, they will ~e considered together in the first part 
of this chapter in a discussion of the effect of theology on penal 
practices. In the second part of the chapter the role of the 
prison chaplain will be examined and evaluated. 
1. The Effect of Theology on Penal Practice 
The connection between religion and penal justice was very 
close to begin 1dth. In primitive cultures crime was (and still 
is) considered an offence against the spirits or gods which im-
perils the whole community by exposing it to the vengeance of the 
spirit w·orld. Therefore punishment of the evil-doer had a 
religious sanction as a means of expiation to ward off the dangerous 
1. Kuether, Art.(l951), 254. 
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effects of di v.ine wrath.1 At first there was no limit to the 
vengeance which could be taken on behalf of the gods; the most 
effective way to placate them was to get rid of the culprit, 
either by death or by banishment.2 As a result of the primitive 
belief in 11contagion rr this punishment was often extended to the 
members of the culprit r s family as w.eil, for they were considered 
"unclean 11 by their association 111ith him. 3 Gradualzy, however, a 
more enlightened theology led to a number of reforms in penal 
practices. The development of Hebrew law recorded in the 
Pentateuch offers several good ~ples of this. A summa11r of 
the effects of theology on the penal practice reflected in the Old 
Testament will be given in the first part of this section. 
The second part of this section will be devoted to a study 
of the effects of theology on prison and other penal reform. Here 
a fairly persistent pattern may be observed. Throughout the past 
r 
nineteen centuries there has been a gradual seCularization of penal 
philosophy. As Christianity broke away from Judaism, the church 
accepted the civil laws of the state in preference to rabbinical 
law. 4 Then as the church itself became more powerful, it extended 
its ow.n rule far beyond the range of purezy ecclesiasti?al matters.5 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 337; Cantor, CCCJ, 249; Oppenheimer, 
ROP, 172. 
2. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 338, 355; Oppenheimer, ROP, 255, 261. 
3. As in the case of Achan r s fami:cy who -.;-vere wiped out along 
with Achan himself when he stole some of the 11devoted11 spoils. 
Joshua, ch. 7 and 22:20. Goldin, HLCP, 18. 
4. See, for example, Romans 13:1-7. 
5. The source of this -.;-vhole section on Canon Law is Hazeltine, 
Art.(l930) in Seligman, (ed.), ESS, III, 182-185. 
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It claimed extensive jurisdiction over the laity in criminal and 
civil matters utouching sin 11 -- and what human behavior does not 
ntouch sin11 ? The church attempted to enforce morality by legal 
means in canon law. In the Corpus Juris ·Canonici ecclesiastical 
jurists elaborated and modernized traditions of Roman law, Ger.manic 
law· and custom, and medieval tmm law and feudal custom; and de-
veloped rules and techniques which were far in advance of temporal 
law. Canon law and ecclesiastical court practices became models 
for temporal lawyers. Consequently, during the Middle Ages canon 
law exerted a far reaching influence on all branches of secular 
la1v, but most especially on criminal law .1 Since the Refonnation, 
however, canon law has been gradually restricted in its application 
to the purely ecclesiastical sphere even in the Roman Catholic 
Church. Thus once again the secularization of penal philosophy has 
been evident. It is evident in still a third area, that of penal 
reform. A great many movements for penal reform lvere begun by con-
cerned Christian· individuals or groups working in the name of their 
Lord, but in almost every case they have been taken over by secular 
agencies -vrorking on behalf of the state. The greater part of this 
chapter will be concerned with the history of these reform move-
ments. 
i. As Reflected in the Old Testament 
As the Hebrews moved from the stage of primitive religion 
1. See belo1v, p. ·q1f. 
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through state religion and inally into prophetic religion, their 
concept of the nature of Gdd became increasingly sensitive. The 
God who seemed not only to allow1 but even to demand2 unlimited 
vengeance to begin 'With 't"J'as gradually understood to require justice 
on a much higher level. The fundamental principle established in 
the early Mosaic code3 --that one must worship God through right-
eo us dealings 'tri. th his fellow men -- remained the same through the 
development of the later Deuteronomic4 and Holiness5 codes, but 
these later codes reflected not only an advanced culture but also 
a higher conception of righteousness. 
Probably as early as the lYiosaic code the principle of limited 
vengeance had been established. 6 The lex talionis may seem crude; 
and vindictive judged by Christian standards, but it was a great 
advance over primitive practice to limit retaliation to ~ an eye 
for an eye. Under the lex talionis the act of vengeance was per-
formed by a representative of the group or by the individual him-
self under group sanctions. 7 This was the first step to"t-ro.rd public 
control of private wrongs and it 't'la.S taken to restrict the pos-
sibility of blood feuds where 'tvhole families might be involved in 
reciprocal acts of vengeance endangering the entire community. To 
begin with the decisions of the 11third party11 brought in to 
arbitrate (usually the tribal -elders or judges) \vere not necessarily 
1. As in Lamech 1s war song recorded in Genesis 4:23-24. 
2. Joshua 10:40; 11:10-14. 
3. Recorded in EKodus 20:22-23:19. 
4. Recorded in Deuteronomy, chs. 12-26. 
5. Recorded in Leviticus, chs. 17-26. 
6. Exodus 21:23. 
7. De Jong, DHF, 275; Sen, FPP, 25-26. 
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binding, 1 but this 11third pa:rty11 gradually became so important 
that larJS had to be made against his taking bribes to pervert 
justice.2 
Another important limitation of private vengeance was the 
right of sanctuary. 3 Cities of refuge to which the accused might 
flee and thereby escape punishment until it could be determined 
whether or not he was guilty, were set aside by law. 4 A legal 
distinction was made between murder (by intent) and manslaughter 
(by accident) and punishment was meted out accordingly. 5 In the 
Deuteronomic code a legal distinction was also made between rape 
and adultery.6 For the lesser crimes of manslaughter and adultery 
compensation could be In.a:de by paying a fine. 7 Sometimes a man r s 
oath given at the altar was sufficient to clear him of suspected 
guilt. 8 
The judge had become an important minister of justice by. the 
seventh century B.C., and every attempt was made to give the ac.-
cused a fair trial.9 He could not be condemned to death on the 
evidence of a single witness and false witnesses were dealt: .with 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 341 •. 
2. Exodus 23:8; Deuteronomy 16:19. 
3. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 341. 
4. Exodus 21:13; Deuteronomy 19 :1-13. 11As late as the thirteenth 
century a person could claim refuge in a church for a 
stipulated period of time.u Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 341. 
5. Exodus 21:12-14; Deuteronomy 19:1-13. 
6. Deuteronomy 22:23-28. 
7. EXodus 21:18,22; 22:1-15; Deuteronomy 22:18-19. 
B. Exodus 22:11. By the time of the Holiness Code a man could 
make restitution to God for unwitting sins through atoning 
sacrifices. Leviticus 5:14-18; 6:3-5,7. 
9. Deuteronomy 16:18; 17:8-15; 19:16-19; 25:1-3. 
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harshly.1 One of the most important steps taken at this time was 
to establish by law the principle of individual responsibility. 
No longer could a whole family be put to death for the crime of 
one man; from now on every man was to be put to death for his own 
sin.2 
The teachings of the eighth century prophets reflected the 
Mosaic legislation and were reflected in the Deuteronomic. Although 
there was prophetic criticism of the ritualistic aspects of the 
codes, the prophets did not questio~ the basic concepts of justice 
but simply the failure of the leaders to carry them out. The 
highest concept of legal justice was probably reached in the famous 
passage in the Holiness code about treating one's neighbor as one-
self .3 This was simply one of the ways a man was to be "holy" in 
order to worship more adequately his ho~ God.4 This code also made 
it altogether clear that justice is no respecter of persons,5 a 
principle which had been stressed by the prophets from Amos on. 
Thus some of the most basic principles of justice were incorporated 
in the Old Testament before the time of Christ. What the Christian 
witness had to add to this was simply a wider application of human 
mercy and a deeper comprehension of the merqy of tied. 
1. Deuteronomy 17:6; 19:15-19. 
2. Deuteronomy 24:16. In Ezekiel's later elaboration of this 
he carried the principle of individual responsibility so 
far that he overlooked the .very real possibility of corporate 
guilt and punishment. Ezekiel, ch. 18. 
3. Leviticus 19:18. 
4. Leviticus 19:2. 
5. Leviticus 19:15. This is also one of the aspects of the Graeco-
Roman concept of justice objectified by the blindfolded goddess. 
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ii. As Reflected in Prison and other Penal Reform 
· As J. Arthur Hoyles points out, the first Christian ministry 
among prisoners was carried on by Christians :llnprisoned for their 
faith.1 From Pa~l the Apostle on down through John Bunyan this 
rather haphazard and sporadic ministry was the only Christian 
witness prisoners had. It was not until the :llnprisonment of 
George Fox in seventeenth century England that such an experience 
bore fruit in a measure of systematic care for prisoners. 2 Until 
that time the primary effect of theology on penal justice came 
through the influence exerted on temporal jurisprudence by the 
canon law and ecclesiastical courts of the Middle Ages. The church 
inflicted punishment for one of t-wo reasons: to expiate the un-
righteous act or to recla:lln the unrighteous man. In general the 
church courts did not prescribe either death or mutilation as 
punishments, or permit arry corporal punishment which -would result 
in loss of blood.3 These practices of the ecclesiastical courts 
were far in adY,ance of those of the temporal courts and had a 
favorable effect on them. One of the principles established by 
canon law and the ecclesiastical courts was that of individual 
responsibility for asocial conduct.4 Although this principle is 
disputed among contemporary penologists5 it is nevertheless the 
1. Hoyles, RIP, 1; Keuther, Art.(l951), 255. 
2. Hoyles, RIP, 1-3. 
3. Hazeltine, Art.(l930), 183. 
4. Cantor, CCCJ, 265. 
5 .• Cantor, CCCJ, 251; N:orris, Art.(l949), 299. 
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basis of statutory criminal law today •1 
The eighteenth century was the great century of prison refor.m, 
but even before that a limited amount of systematic Christian 
concern for prisoners had been evidenced. The first to undertake 
this ministry to prisoners were the Quakers under the influence of 
George Fox himself whose "ministrations ••• in the various prisons 
in which he was held form a prelude to the subsequent work of the 
prison chaplain If. 2 Fox's Journal reveals the incredibly poor con-
ditions of jails and prisons in seventeenth century England. 
Persons of every age, sex, physical and mental condition were 
crowded together in dilapidated_ and filthy buildings in charge of 
untrained and unpaid keepers 1mo earned their living by charging 
the prisoners fees. As there was no adequate provision for feed-
ing or clothing the inmates, disease was rampant and it was dan-
gerous even to come in contact 1dth the prisoners. For many of 
them imprisonment was equivalent to the death sentence.3 Such 
conditions were intolerable to sensitive Christian consciences and 
in the late seventeenth century the Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge4 began to protest against them so vigorously that periodic 
jail inspections were _instituted. Meanwhile the Quakers, under the 
influence of John Bellers,5 worked to obtain a more just and humane 
1. See below·, p.11Bf. 
2 •. Hoyles, RIP, 3. 
3. Morris, Art. (1949), 293; Hoyles, RIP, 47-48. 
4,. In 1702 an influential "Essay toward the Reformation of 
Newgate and other Prisons in and about London" 1..ras published 
~ by the Committee on Prisons of the SPGK. Kuether, .Art. (1951), 
254. 
5. Fry, AOL, 42. 
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treatment of prisoners. Their efforts bore fruit in America when 
the Quakers of West Jersey and Pennsylvania opened workhouses where 
food and lodging i'Tere provided the prisoners free of charge.1 
.Although it is the rationalistic movement in England and on 
the continent which is credited with having ushered in the era of 
penal reform in the eighteenth century, and although the spiritual 
leaders of that reform. 1-1ere inspired by general humanitarian rather 
than specifically Christian principles,2 
neither the philosophy of Rousseau and Bentham, 
nor the politics of Romilly and Peal, could have 
achieved large scale reforms had they not received 
the backing of a powerful religious movement.3 
The mainspring of reform. was the powerful evangelical revival 
begun by the Wesleys in 1730. In the sunnner of that year one of 
the members of 11the Holy Club 11 infected his fellow members with a 
deep concern for the spiritual interests of prisoners. They 
obtained permission to visit prisoners in Oxford Castle and to 
arrange services of worship for them there. 4 John and Charles 
Wesley themselves worked among the prisoners at Newgate until 
popular feelingS against John closed prison doors against him. 
Charles, hOl'lever, continued the work and wrote many of his hymns 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 377-378. 11The doctrine that befor~ 
God even the worst offender has his clams upon his fellow·-
men, obscured and corrupted as it was for centuries, still 
exerted an influence upon religious people, making them ready 
for a remarkable co-operation between rationalists and Chris-
tians which had such striking effects at the turn of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 11 • Fry, AOL, 39. 
2. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 3l71-372. 
3. Hoyles, RIP, 46. 
4. Hoyles, RIP, 4f. 
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especially for prisoners to sing. _Because prisons and jails were 
run for profit until well into the eighteenth century, there i<Va.S 
no money for regular religious observances and the prisoners had 
to depend on the ministrations of the few devoted Christians imo 
chose to witness to their faith in this way.1 
For the purposes of this study the most important name among 
the eighteenth centur.r reformers is that of John Howard, a com-
mitted Christian whose concern for prisoners grew out of his own 
experiences, first as a prisoner in France and later as a sheriff 
2 
in Bedfordshire, England. Howard traveled nearly 50,000 miles 
visiting jails and prisons and studying the conditions of prisoners 
all over the world. This remarkable man "accompanied by his 
indigestion ••• his Bible and his notebook", traveled continuously 
"allowing himself neither rest nor diversionu carrying out his 
"self-imposed mission of discovering to his contemporaries the 
horrors hidden away in their prisons" .3 He finally died of jail 
fever in the Ukraine in 1790 but not until he had published his 
tremendously influential book on The State of Prisons, had pre-
1. The work of the Wesleys was carried on by Sarah Peters in 
Ne't'lgate and Silas Told, who for twenty-five years was un-
official missioner in the jails of London. Mrs. Elizabeth 
Fry, who came to be known as "Newgate 1 s angel", began 
systematic Bible readings in Newgate and refurbished the 
old prison laundry to provide suitable work for the women 
prisoners to do. .Another Christian woman, Sarah Martin, 
taught many of the prisoners at Yarmouth jail to read and 
'Write. For the most part these persons ':lere products of 
the continuing Quaker conce~n or the Methodist revival. 
Hayles, RIP, 5-'14, 49; Fry, AOL, 45-46. 
2. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 385-387, 398, 462, 707, 725; 
Elliot, CMS, 497~98, 585-586; Morris, Art.(l949), 293. 
3. Fry, AOL, 45. 
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va.iled upon Parliament to abolish the fee system and improve 
sanitary conditions in English jails, and had drafted the 
Penitentiary Act of 1779 in which he incorporated his philosophy 
of penal reform. The prisons provided for in this act were never 
built, but some experimentation along the l:ines of the Act was at-
tempted in local jails, and Howard's philosophy most certainlY 
influenced the rrork of the Quakers in Pennsylvania. 
The penitentiary idea applied to the reformation of young 
offenders had appeared in t't-J"O Protestant and several Roman Catholic 
institutions on the continent as earlY as the seventeenth century, 1 
but the Quakers in Pennsylvania are generallY credited with having 
established the first penitentiar-Y' in the late eighteenth century. 2 
Until that time treatment of crime had consisted primarilY of 
execution or some form of corporal punishment.3 Jails and prisons, 
had been used simplY to house criminals awaiting trial or e.xecu-
tion, or as places where corporal punishment could be inflicted. 
The Quakers were 
1. In 1593 and 1603 the Protestants of Amsterdam built houses 
of correction for women and then for men. In 1615 the 
Sisters of the Conservatorio de Santa Croce della Penitenzia 
founded a house of training and correction for abandoned 
girls and erring 1-romen in Rome. In 1631 these same sisters 
established a second home in Nancy. In 1670 Filippo Franci 
combined isolation in cells with religious instruction in 
his home for wayward boys in Florence, ItalY. In 1704 Pope 
Clement XI established a correctional prison for juveniles 
in Rome 'Which also aimed at reformation through penitence. 
In 1773 Jean Jacque Philippe Vilain opened his workhouse 
for vagrant boys in Ghent. For descriptions of these 
institutions see Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 382ff.; Beck, FS, 
3; Kuether, Art.(l951), 255; Morris, Art.(l949), 293-295. 
2. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 346-347, 390f.; Dienstein, AYG, 128; 
Martin, BDW, 112-116; Sen, FPP, 28-29. 
3. Martin, BDW, 110. 
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the only considerable religious group ••• in ear]y 
modern times who discerned any discrepancy be-
tween the Christian religion of love and the 
infliction of brutal corporal punishment upon 
their fellowmen.l 
It was in protest to the savagery of contempora:cy practices that 
the,y made imprisonment itself a punishment to replace corporal 
punishment. 
ShortJy before the American revolution the Quaker Richard 
Wistar, who had been providing soup for prisoners in the Walnut 
street jail at his own e:xpense, formed the Philadelphia Society 
for Alleviating Distressed Prisoners. In 1777 the group changed 
its name to The Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the :trliseries 
of Public Prisons2 and settled down to work in earnest with a 
constitution which included the following: 
1. Our obligations are not canceled by the 
crimes of the guilty. 
2. We must extend compassion to the guilty. 
3. Undue suffering must be prevented. 
4. The links vlhich bind the human family 
together must under all circumstances be 
preserved unbroken. 
5. There must be no criminal class. 
6. Such punishments must be devised as will 
restore LiaWbreakeril to virtue and 
happiness .3 · 
Thus the aim of this society was to treat the laWbreaker with 
respect and restore him to useful citizenship. The members, half 
of whom were Quakers, believed that this could be done most 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 346-347. 
2. Noi'I called The Pennsylvania Prison Society. For a history 
of this organization see N.K. Teeters, Thez Were in Prison, 
(Philadelphia: Winston, < 193 7 .) 
3. Quoted in Bennett, Art.(l931), 380. 
effectively by imprisoning him in an individUA-l cell where he would 
not only escape the evils of contamination so manifest in congregate 
prisons, but also have a chance to reflect on his sins and repent •1 
The prisoner was to regard his cell as 11the beautiful gate of 'the 
2 
Temple leading to a happy life and by a peaceful end, to Heaven11 • 
The first penitentiary was established in a separate cellblock in 
. ' 
the Walnut Street jail, but an entirely separate institution, 
Eastern Penitentiary, was built soon after.3 
Dr. Sen suggests that behind this penal reform of the Quakers 
lay 11the unconscious influence of the Church of the Middle Ages 
and of canonical lai'l", which sai'l" in solitary confinement not only 
the way to expiation, but pre-eminently the way to penitence and 
refor.mn. 4 Yet solitary confinement did not produce the desired 
effect on the prisoners. Because they were allowed no news of the 
outside world and rare]y saw another human being except the of-
ficers of the prison, they w·ere more often deadened or driven mad 
by their confinement than made penitent. 5 Moreover the altruistic 
hopes of the reformers were not realized, for almost every form of 
the corporal punishment against which the Quakers had protested :in 
establishing their penitentiaries _.'Nas brought back into the 
1. Dienstein, AYG, 128. 
2. Quoted from the Thirteenth Annual Report of the Prison 
Inspectors, p. 6, by Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 402. It is 
ironic that the pr:i.mary left-over of the penitentiary today 
~ is the dreaded solitary confinement for punishment of incor-
rigibles. 
3 • Elliott, OMS, 583. 
4. Sen, FPP, 28-29; Kuether, Art.(l951), 255. 
5. Hoyles, RIP, 35. 
penitentiaries as a method of enforcing discipline.1 
Although the primary motivation of the modern prison was a 
religious one, secular considerations soon altered prison practice. 
The "Auburn system11 (so-called because it was first put into effect 
in Auburn Penitentiary in New York) was found to be considerablY 
cheaper to manage (and less conducive to insanity) than the ''Penn-
sylvania system11 of the Quakers and became the pattern for all 
subsequent imprisonment in the United States.2 Under this system 
prisoners worked and ate together in silence during the day and 
slept in individual cells at night. 
As prisons became increasingly secularized here and abroad, 
special treatment for young offenders became the profound concern 
of a remarkable Christian woman :in England, Miss Mary Carperrter.3 
Her pioneer work in the Ragged School Movement for the re-education 
of young delinquents i'I'B.S based on her conviction that religion is 
absolutely essential to true reformation.4 Although her unorthodox 
theology was frowned on in some quarters, her work brought res·ults. 
In 1854 the Youthful Offenders Act became law, and thereafter . 
children were no longer to be committed to prison but rather to 
the Reformatory Schools provide.Q by the Act. 
1. Barnes and Teeters, I~C, 423. 
2. Martin, BDW, 112-116. Great Britain and many European 
countries still favor the Pennsylvania system. Rogers, 
Art. (1955)' 40. 
3. For the story of Miss Carpenter see J. Est lin Carpenter, 
The Life and ~1Jork of l>iary Carpenter, (london: Macmillan, 
1879.} 
4. Hoyles, TYD, 210-213. 
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The reformatory movement in this country was an outgro"tvth of 
the Cincinnati Prison Congress in 1870 where an enlightened declara-
1 
tion of principles laid the basis for the New Penology. lYiany of 
the principles "tvere put into practice in the Elmira Reformatory for 
young men where reformation rather than expiation or penitence was 
the aim. It was his visit to the Elmira Reformatory which inspired 
Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brice to establish the English Borstal system 
for young offenders between the ages of 16 and 21.2 It has been 
claimed that this system, begun early in the twentieth century, 
"represents an attempt to apply on a large scale to young criminals 
those principles which animated the Founder of Christianityn.3 
Probation is another contemporary penal practice that was 
initiated on the strength of one man's Christian concern for his 
fellows. In 1$41 the Boston cobbler John Augustus stood bail and 
took .full responsibility for a drunkard 1vho had been hailed before 
the Boston Police Court. He soon persuaded judges to release other 
offenders to his care. Presently the chaplain of the Bosto11 jail 
and other volunteers began to act as .friendly counselors to arrested 
men and women placed in their charge. Thirty years later this 
1. For a condensation of these principles se_e Barnes and Teeters, 
NHC, 524-527; Martin, BDW, 116-ll7. 
2. For a discussion of its distinctive features see Morris, 
Art.(l949), 297; Sen, FPP, 93-100; Fr,y, AOL, 135-145. 
nAt their best Borstals are probably the most hopeful . 
achievement of our penal institutions for adolescents and 
adults." Fry, AOL, 135. 
3.· Cited in Hoyles, TYD, 210. 
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probation work was taken over by the state when it provided for 
its first official probation officer by an act of 1878.1 Shortly 
before this the concept of probation began to prove acceptable to 
English courts but there was no official personnel who could act 
as probation officers. Therefore the Church of England Temperance 
Society established Police Court Missions to provide Christian 
supervision for arrested persons placed on probation. In 1907 the 
Probation of Offenders ~ct empovrered the courts to appoint paid 
officers and the system gradually became secularized.2 
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A final project, Christian in motivation, which has now bec-mme 
part of regular pen~ p~actice is the after-prison care which was 
begun by the Salvation A~ in London in 2865 and extended to this 
country twenty years later. Through its Prison Gate Brigades the 
Ar.my took the initiative in solving one of the most difficult 
problems of penal justice: how to reintroduce the ex-convict into 
the society which rejected him.3 Although secular agencies have 
come to the aid of the Army in this matter, the problem is still 
far from satisfactorilY solved and perhaps is one of the places 
where enlightened Christian concern can proVide the best answer. 
Thus the Christian sPirit has played a very vital part in 
penal reform. Even a sociologist, Mabel Elliott, affirms that it 
is religious leaders, rl'ith their insistence on the dignity of 
1. Glueck, CCSP, 182; Sen, FPP, 107. 
2. Hoyles, TYD, 192. 
3. Sheppard, Ar~. (1949), 429-431. Sheppard also mentions the 
work of the ~rench Division of the Salvation Army in the 
liquidation of the Devil 1 s Island penal colony in French 
Guiana as being an example of 11 applied religion in the field 
of criminologY''• 433. Elliott, CI'4"S, 367. 
human personality, the redemptive power of love, and the futility 
of vindictive punishment who have supplied the basic concepts of 
modern penology •1 No less figure in contemporary penology than 
James V. Bennett, Director of the United states Bureau of Prisons, 
clams that practically the only people genuinely :interested in 
the crminals r lot all through the history of punishment were 
11those driven by the spirit of a religious mission11 • 2 Consequent-
ly, as this study has suggested, many of the most mportant con-
temporary correctional institutions -- the penitentiary, the 
reformatory, probation, after care -- were begun on Christian 
initiative. Yet the record of the church has not been consistent: 
Inspired by the ideals and efforts of some of the 
foundipg fathers ,Lthe churc.h7 was at tmes putting 
into effect practices which were far in advance 
of their tmes. .All too often, how·ever, the vision 
was lost, and ffihe church7 joined in the hue and 
cry for punishment pure and smple. 3 
.An interest:ing confirmation of this mey be found in the early 
legislation of New England. Each of the laws in the Massachusetts 
Bay colony included a proper Biblical reference to indicate its 
essential authority, and the quotations used to authorize punish-
ment were invariably taken from the Old Testament. The effect of 
this was not negligible since 11the Puritan tradition ••• has been 
written large in the matrix of American statutory criminal law·". 4 
~e emphasis on retributive justice in the Christian theology 
1. Elliott, CMS, 643. 
2. Bennett, Art.(l937), 379. 
3. Kuether, Art.(l951), 255. 
4. Elliott, CJf.lS, 261-263. Cf. Pound, CJA, 132-133. 
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examined in Chapter Tt-vp is further evidence that 11 the Vision was 
lost" as Dr. Kuether claims. All this evidence substantiates Dr. 
Morrist and Dr. DeWolfts contention, stated in the Introduction~ 
that the church itself is responsible for much of the Ufundament-
alism11 that persists in penll practice today •1 
Dr. Hoyles points out that the church was w.i.lling to express 
its concern for the humane treatment of crimi..TJ.als only so long as 
this concern dlfud not ~nterfere with the secular power of the 
government. 2 It 't-ras primarily for this reason that the church t-ras 
careful to let governmental agencies take over the institutions 
Which the church itself had established as soon as the government 
was willing to do so. .Qbviously the motivation of secular agencies 
is quite different from that of the church: 
The early reformers •••• wanted to help a criminal 
reform for the good of his soul •••• their methods 
were religious. Today our interest is an enlight-
ened self-interes~•···our methods are sociological 
and psychological 
and penitentiaries do not produce penitence~ reformatories do 
not reform~_and probation and after-care have been tried and found 
wanting.4 The penal machinery of the state has been far from sue-
cessful. Is the church to blame? Perhaps it is, for in spite of 
the fact that members of the church of the seventeenth, eighteenth, 
and nineteenth centuries made important contributions to penal 
justice tihen they established more humane correctional practices 
1. See above,. p.l2. 11Fundamentalism11 is not Dr. DeWolft s term here. 
2. Hoyles, TYD, 172. 
3. 11artin, BDW, 231. 
4. Macintosh, Art.(l940), 66. 
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which could then be taken over by the state, they have not ful-
filled a further, and equally important function: to act as the 
conscience of the cormnunity in judging and refining the penal 
practices of the state.1 Perhaps the person most responsible for 
a~ening this conscience, and in a position most favorable for 
doing so, is the prison chaplain himself. 
2. The Effect of the Prison Chaplain on Penal Practice 
Rehabilitation of the prisoner is becoming increasingly the 
aim of prison administrators. To a considerable extent it was an 
enlightened theology Which led the way to thinking of prison as a 
place of rehabilitation instead of a place of retribution, and it 
has been, and still is, the role of the prison chaplain to effect 
this rehabilitation so far as it is humanly possible.2 Next to ' 
the warden and his guards, the chaplain was probably the earliest 
paid staff member of the prison) As early as 1716 it i'18.S noted 
that the staff of Waldheim prison included a chaplain, and in 1733 
the British Parliament authorized magistrates to appoint chaplains 
to all prisons.4 The history of prison chaplains is an honorable 
one: they were the first teachers in prison, the first prison 
librarians, the first social case workers, the first to use 
individual treatment of prisoners, and the first to introduce 
1. Kuether, llrt.(l951), 254: 
2. McGiffert, Art.(l942), 249. 
3.~Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 662. 
4.-Kuether, Art.(l951), 255. 
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1 
recreational equipment behind prison bars. In addition to all 
this they have, of course, been the spiritual advisors of the 
prison community. Yet even with this admirable record of service 
to commend him, the prison chaplain is not uni-versally accepted 
as a necessary part of correctional work. 
i. The Difficulties of His Role 
Some students of penology claim that "the effectiveness of 
the prison chaplain has long been debatable" and that in a majority 
of institutions the chaplain "is still persona non grata or is 
merely tolerated by the warden". 2 Even a most sympathetic observer 
has had to admit that in some prisons 11the chaplain is still 
tolerated as an unavoidable nuisance, and with considerable just-
ification". 3 There are several reasons for this. Far too often 
the chaplaincy has been a1varded as a political plum and st~~dards 
of appointment have been far too low. 4 Consequently much of the 
religious leadership in prison is of a dubious quality. Many prison 
chaplains are 11broken-do'W11 ministers" or 11parish mis-fits" who are 
either too naive or too incompetent to offer effective motivation 
toward moral rehabilitation or to help men overcome their conflict 
with society. 5 The chaplain who is so unimaginative that he talks 
continually about release from this world when all his charges are 
1. Bennett, Art.(l937), 381; Elliott, CMS, 642; Kuether, 
Art.(l951), 256; McGiffert, Art.(l942), 249. 
2 • Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 66 5. 
3. McGiffert, Art.(l942), 249. 
4. Bennett, Art.(l937), 381. 
5. Cedarleaf, Art.(l954), 40~. Elliott, CMS, 643, 835; 0 1Meara, 
Art. (1941)' 430. 
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interested in is release from prison, is bound to be a failure.1 
One prisoner wrote of such persons : 
MY impression of the average chaplain is that he 
is a broken-do1rm. failure, half a man of God and 
half a politician with a very anemic mind. If 
religion is to be of any value at all, it ought 
to be put to use in changing the attitudes of 
his prisoners. But with the kind of chaplains 
with which I am familiar, this process is like 
trying to cut glass with a piece of soap.2 
Even if the chaplain enters prison service with good qual-
ifications but "With too little training there is a very real danger 
that he will sucCUll\b to the "occupational disease" of institution-
alization. This can take many forms. The chaplain may quite un-
consciouszy become a 11yes man11 for the warden or a "stool pigeon" 
to the guards3 (and in either case he will be classified as a "ratu 
by the convicts themselves4). He may be so overcome by the com-
ple.xities of the prison situation that he will take refuge in the 
"hail-fellow-well-met" of a superficial "run-around-and-seem-to-be-
busyn sort of ministry; or he may be so una1'1are of the complexities 
of prison life that he 1-lill plunge into personal relationships far 
beyond his capacity to handle and then end up disillusioned and 
bitter when things do not turn out as he had hoped. 5 
In an attempt to find men with the necessary qualifications 
for this specialized ministry and to give them the necessary 
1. Wines, PAR, 345-346. 
2. Erom an article in Prison World, Juzy-August, 1940, p. 19; 
~oted by Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 663. 
3. Barnes and Teeters, NHC,. 663. 
4. For an e.."'Ccellent discussion of the 11rat concept" see McCleery, 
TSJ, 14f. 
5. Kuether, Art.(l951), 259. 
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training, the Federal Prison Service enlisted the help of the 
Federal Council of Churches-and the Council for the Clinical 
Training of Theological Students to institute a special course for 
all future ministers interested in the prison chaplaincy.1 Under 
the plan theological students must have at least t1ro summers of 
special training, one in a mental hospital and one in a Federal 
prison, where they work under th~ supervision of institutional 
2 
officials as well as their theological advisors. The program was 
begun e.."'q)erimentally in 1925 and proved so successful during the 
next few years that since 1937 there has been at least one full-
time and fu.l:cy trained chaplain in every Federal prison.3 The 
same cannot be said of state and county institutions, however. 
Very fe1-J" of them have full-time chaplains. As a matter of fact 
only fifty per cent of the prison population has the services of 
a full-time chaplain; the rest must get along with occasional part-
time ministrations, some for only one hour a month. Many city and 
county jails have no chaplain whatsoever. 4 
One final reason for lack of success in the prison chaplaincy 
is that the chaplain has often been called upon to fill so many 
roles that he has had too little time left to carry on his 11proper 11 
I 
work of religious ministration. In .a study made by the .American 
Prison Association working in cooperation with the Committee on 
1. Bennett, Art. (1937), 385 •. 
2. McGiffert, Art. (1942), 24 9. 
3. For a short history of the program see Kuether, Art. (1951), 
256. 
4. McGiffert, Art.(l942), 24$; 0 1Meara, Art.(l94l), 429-430~ 
106 
Prison Chaplains of the Federal Council of Churches it was dis-
covered that besides conducting worship and counseling prisoners 
on religious matters~ many chaplains are asked to carry on programs 
of club wo:rk~ dramatics, forums, social case work; to supervise 
the library~ :i.rnnate publications, physical education~ and musical 
and military training; to write reports, serve on the classifica-
. 1 
tion connnittee, and to censor mail. All but the last of these 
may be worthy pursuits and each may play a necessary part in the 
prison program, but one man cannot accomplish many of them. idth 
any degree of competence. The chaplain should not be forced to be 
a Jack-of-all-trades simply because there is no one else on hand 
to do the necessary chores. On the other hand the chaplain cannot 
limit his activities so strenuously that he remains out of touch 
with the prisoners themselves. He must visit his men in their 
cells~ in the hospital, in solitary. He must be "i"r.i..th them. in the 
yard, in the shops, in the dining hall. His work must be 11fused 
with 1matever else they learn and do, and not be a thing apart, a 
veneer". 
2 
ii. n1e Possibilities of His Role 
Actually the prison chaplain has a three-fold ministry.3 His 
first and most obvious work is w.i..th the prisoners themselves, as 
leader in worship, spiritual counselor~ and religious educator --
1~ McGiffert, Art.(l942)~ 248. 
2. Wines, PAR, 346. 
3. For a more formal discussion of the chaplain's duties see 
Kuether, Art.(l951), 258-259. 
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and all of this with the ultimate aim of personal rehabilitation. 
No member of the staff has such resources for healing the bruised 
and bitter spirits of the convicts, for giving them a new per-
spective and a sturdier moral grounding than he does. Yet unlike 
any other member of the staff, he has no authority other than the 
authority of his convictions to empower his activity1 -- his con-
victions and his compassion. For a chaplain must have compassion 
and the grace to love even the unlove~ with a love that will not 
let him go. 
His task is not an easy one. How does one bring his people 
into the presence of the Lord with guards standing warily on every 
side armed with clubs and tear gas, watching for any sign of 
2 
revolt? How does one talk about father~ care and brotherly love 
to men who have known neither in their previous experience? How 
can one talk about Christian fellowship when he is so fully aware 
how little any of these men will be welcomed into the fellowship 
of any church when they are released? Many of his charges are 
uneducated and unchurched.3 He must not talk down to them, but he 
must speak a language they can understand.4 All of his charges are 
rebellious under the conditions of their confinement and resentful 
of the society which put them there. 5 They are without hope, 
1. McGiffert, Art.(l942), 24S. 
2. "Truly this atmosphere is one to cheer the heart of a 
Jonathan Edwards -- humble sinners in the hands of an angry 
God. 11 Bennett, Art. (1937Y, 3S3. 
3. Wilson, MSC, 109. 
4. Bennett, Art.(l937), 3S2. 
5. Hassler, DSC, 97, lSl; Kuether, Art.(l951), 260. 
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'Without joy, without faith. Yet it is his sacred trust and 
responsibility to quicken the inner springs of their spirits where 
any true reformation must begin.1 Occasionally he succeeds. He 
succeeds when he realizes a prisoner's basic need for understanding, 
2 for acceptance, for respect. He succeeds when he offers his men a 
chance to giYe of themselves. The need for such self-giving is 
apparently great among prisoners. There are always more volunteers 
than can be used when medical tests involving hmna.n 11guinea pigs" 
are to be made. Durmg the war convicts 'WOrked long hours overtime 
on a voluntary basis. They are probably the country's most willing 
blood donors. They are willing not only to give time and energy-
to studying the problems of juvenile delinquency, but also to make 
donations from their meagre savings 11to help those poor kids u. 3 
Without knowing the Greek term for it, prisoners seem capable of a 
remarkable degree of agape love. The outstanding success of 
Alcoholics Anonymous in prison communities attests to that.4 Per-
haps this is the chaplain r s most hopeful clue. 
The chaplain's ministry in prison capnot be J.d.mited to the 
\ 
convicts themselves. He has a very real responsibility to their 
1. Bennett, Art.(l937), 383-384. 
2. McCleery, TSJ, 16. In his study of t'WO groups of inmates in a 
southern prison Dr. l-1cCleery discovered that in order to fill 
a ps,ychological need for self-justification convicts have 
created a mythology of their own. If the chaplain can replace 
this false set of beliefs by getting the men to accept their 
guilt and the responsibility it entails, he will have taken 
with them the first step of rehabilitation. 51-58. 
3. McCormick, Art.(l951), 416. Also from an interview with Dr. 
1'-firiam Van Waters on February 25, 1953. 
4 .. Anonymous, Al"'t. (1954). 
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11keepers 11 as we11.1 The staff of every prison consists of persons 
'primarily involved with treatment and others primarily concerned 
with custody. The two groups are often working at cross purposes 
and tension is high between them. 2 In this situation the chaplain 
can perform a real ministry of reconciliation. Because his work 
keeps him in contact with guards and maintenance cre"tre as well as 
with professional staff and administrators, he is in a position to 
redefine and restate the various points of view, mak:ing each more 
understandable to the other. 3 Moreover it is the chaplain who is 
best fitted to temper the administrator's justice w"ith kindness, 
to point out to the guards that history has proved that cruelty 
has failed to cure crime, and to convince the treatment staff that 
a man • s spirit is as much in need of care as his body and mi'l'ld, 
even though the spirit does not lend itself so readily to testing 
and classification. 
The third aspect of the chaplain's three-fold ministry carries 
him beyond the prison walls to the connnunities from which the 
prisoners have come and to which they will one day return. Here 
again he must perform a ministry of reconciliation for he is 
perhaps the one best qualified to interpret the convict to society 
and to reinterpret society to the convict.4 This may prove to be 
the hardest part of his work, for society in general hates and 
fears the convict while the convict is convinced that, so far as 
1. Bennett, Art.(l937), 387. 
2. Barnes, H.E., 11Forward11 in Hassler, DSC, vii. 
3~ Kuether, Art.(l951), 257-258. 
4. J.vicGiffert, Art. (1942), 249. 
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society in general goes, he is more sinned against than sinning.l 
The chaplain must do everything in his power to convince those on 
the outside that mere incarceration of offenders is not enough 
since they are not so much bad persons needing punishment as they 
are sick persons needing treatment. 2 He must make them aware of 
the fact that ninety-five per cent of those now in prison will 
return to society, for good or evil, depending on the treatment 
they receive in prison and the reception they get when they have 
served their time. With his knowledge of the past history of his 
convict charges the prison chaplain is in a strategic position to 
point out to the community the conditions which must be met to 
prevent further crime. Above all perhaps he must convince the 
members of the community that the criminal is, in most cases, a 
human being like themselves, with their needs, their failures, 
their possibilities. As Director Bennett put it: 11 The Prison 
Chaplain epitomizes that place of our work 'Which seeks to rekindle 
the spirit of Christian tolerance in the community11 .3 
Surely the job of the prison chaplain is one of the most 
challenging in the entire Christian ministry. The difficulties of 
the work do not commend it to any but the sturdiest spirits, but 
for these spirits the possibilities of the work are quite literallY 
endless. It is a preaching, teaching, healing, reconciling ministry 
1. Dr. Wilson gives several reasons for this, among them the 
capriciousness of the written law and its interpretation, and 
the corruption of law enforcement. MSC, 176. 
2. Kuether, Art.(l951), 263-264; Dienstein, AYG, 119, 139. 
3. Bennett, Art.(l937), 387. 
11'1 
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that is as necessary outside the prison walls as it is within. 
Thus religion has played, and is playing, a vital part in the 
.. 
history of penal justice. To say that penal justice has had an 
) 
adverse effect on Christian theology is only part of the story. 
It is also true that Christian theology has had a favorable effect 
on penal justice. Yet much rema:ins to be done and it is this 
aspect of the problem vrhich 'Will be dis cussed :in the following 
chapter. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Theological Resources for Formulating 
a Christian Philosopny of Penal Justice 
By the admission of those 'Who are most crucially involved in 
it the present correctional system of this country is far from 
adequate.1 From apprehension of the criminal through his r-elease 
from prison there are inconsistencies in purpose and injusticesin 
practice which must be overcome.2 11oreover there is an enormous 
amount of preventative and restorative work waiting to be done in 
the society from 'Which the crminal comes and to 'Which he "trill one 
day return. students of penology are in substantial agreement 
about the inadequacies of the present system; perhaps even more 
significantly they are in agreement as to how it could be made 
more adequate. It is not any disagreement among the eJq>erts 'Which 
keeps someth:ing from be:ing done; it is the fear, the vindictive-
ness, 3 or the apatcy4 of the public -- the voters and the taxf.. 
payers -- 'Which militates against improvement. Even though the 
present system is wasteful of human lives and enormously expensive, 
deep-seated prejudice against the criminal prevents change.5 
1. Scudder, Art.(l954), 32; Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 381, 433. 
2. Glueck, CCSP, 57. 
3. Fox, Art.(l956), 20; cf. Van Waters, Art.(l950), 2$1. 
4. Martin, BDW, 2$1. 
5. 110f all branches of sociology criminology shows the most re-
markable tendency to preserve in an active form viei'TS and 
reactions 'Which, in other sciences, would have been dis-
carded long ago as inadequate, obsolete, or even archaic. 11 
Dr. Grace Pailthorpe, Studies in the Psychology of 
Delinquency, $. Quoted by Moberly, RES, 6. Cf. Rusche and 
Kirchhemer, PSS, 207. 
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Part of that public is Christian -- some onlY nominallY so, 
but' some 1-r.i..th conviction. Even those with conviction need 
guidance. What are the resources in Christian theology which will 
help them fonnulate a Christian philosophy of penal justice? 
There are at least four such resources: the Christian concept of 
the purpose of God, of the freedom of man, of the collective nature 
of guilt, and of the redemptive community. In this chapter the 
theological basis of each of these concepts will be examined first 
and then, in each case, the relevance of that concept to penal 
practice will be suggested. 
1. A Concept of the Purpose of God 
The dual emphasis on retribution and redemption in Christian 
thought which has been suggested in the t'WO preceeding chapters is 
rooted in the Biblical concept of God Himself. Each emphasis 
stresses but one aspect of the two which the authors of both the 
Old Testament and the New· found altogether essential to the total 
being of God: justice and love. The Psalmist put it succinctly: 
The I.ord is just in all his ways, 
and kind in all his doingsl --
not just .2!: kind, but just and kind. As Origen put it many 
centuries later: "Neither goodness without justice, nor justice 
without goodness, can display the Lf~ dignity of the divine 
nature". 2 To stress God Is justice at the e:xpense of His love 
1. Psa.J..m 145 :17. 
2. Origen, 11De Principiis 11 , ANF, IV, 280. 
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leads to the sort of legalism recorded in Chapter Two. To stress 
His love with no regard for His justice leads to the sort of 
sentimentalism which is as effective as 11cutting glass with soap", 
as the convict put it in Chapter Three. Yet how can these seeminglY 
inconsistent elements be part of one and the same being?l Does the 
tension man experiences between what justice seems to demand and 
what love requires reflect a similar tension in the nature of God? 
Christian theologians have never thought so and the history of 
theology may be read as the history of their attempts to show how 
these two aspects of the diVine nature are ultimatelY reconciled in 
the purpose of God, a purpose Which is structured in justice and 
motivated by love. 
i. The Theological Basis of a Concept of God's Purpose 
The theological basis of a concept of God's purpose is the 
historical experience, recorded in the Hebrew-Christian scriptures, 
of God's merciful justice, His justifYing mercy, and His redeeming 
grace. Through this experience men learned that God's purpose is 
redemptive, that the actions of His justice through which He 
vindicates His moral order "are propelled and supported by the 
beat:i.ng heart of lovett. 2 
... 
1. Brunner, CDG, l$$-l$9. 
2. Van Qyen, Art.(l950), 355. 
1J:5 
(1). God's Merciful Justice 
In the Biblical record the punishment inflicted by God was 
not all meant to be destructive; much of it was meant to be dis-
ciplinary to lead men back from their erring ways •1 11Know then 
in your heart that, as a man disciplines his son, the !J:>rd your 
God disciplines you. 112 Like a refiner t~pering his metal or a 
gardener pruning his vineyard, God uses the instrument o:f His 
punishment :for the sake of man's improvement and gro~ffih.3 Thus 
while it is God's justice which punishes uilrighteousness in men, 
such justice is actually a sign of God's mercy. 4 
Clement and Origen were the :first post-Biblical theologians 
to take this concept seriously. Each o:f them affir.med that divine 
punishment in this present life is actually a merciful provision 
to heal man o:f his sin. God the Just is God the Physician who 
uses bitter but beneficial medicine, perhaps even the surgeon's 
knife, to cure men of their transgressing, and all :for the sake 
l 
of their ult:i.mate salvation. 5 Accorcllilg to Clement God punishes 
men :for three reasons: to make the sinner better, to restrain 
others :from :following his bad example, and to preserve the honor 
of the injured. 6 The last point would seem to leave room :for re-
1. nEven 'Where God t s wrath is revealed, this revelation is not 
made in order to annihilate Israel, but in order to remove 
its. resistance, to lead it to repentance and obedience, in 
order to create real union w.i.th God." Brunner, CJ;:>G, 194. 
2. Deuteronomw $:5~ 
3. Isaiah 4$:10; Zechariah 13:9; Malachi 3:3; Isaiah 5:5. 
4. Psalms 94:12; Proverbs 3:12; Hebrews'·12:5-ll; Revelation 3:19. 
5. Clement, "The Instructor11 , ANF, II, 225-233; Origen, 11De 
Principiis", ANF, IV, 27$-279, 334. 
6 • Clement, 111-ti.scellanies 11 , ANF, II, 43$. 
116 
taliation, but Clement asserted positively that God does not punish 
man in this present life for the sake of vengeance. 1 This side of 
Judgment His punishment is both disciplinary and,instructive and is 
aimed primarily at the restoration of the sinner. 
Augustine agreed that "when He exposes us to adversities, it 
is either to prove our perfections or correct our imperfections112 
but his concept of divine justice went deeper than this. Until 
Augustine with his searching psychological insight suggested other-
wise, theologians assumed that God 1s punishment consists in the 
social calamities and personal misfortunes with which men have to 
contend. Augustine, and Bernard after him, made it clear that the 
worst aspect of Qod r s punishment is an inward and almost automatic 
one: that the deliberately evil will soon los~ its capacity for 
goodness.3 This suggests that man needs something more than dis-
cipline if he is to attain righteo119ness. This "something more" will 
be discussed below.4 
Thomas reverted to the more objective notion of God's punish-
ment, but added the concept of degrees of guilt. Like CleJmnt and 
Origen he thought o~ God 1 s punishment as a "medicine that is cor-
rective of s:in"; like Aristotle he thought of it as a means of 
restoring the right order violated by sin: 5 but he made a distinction 
b~tween "a defect in non-voluntary action" which is a fault (peccatum) 
1. Clement, "The Instrugtor", ANF, II, 227. 
2. Augustine, "City of God", I, 29, in BWSA, II. 
3. Augustine, "City of God'!, XIV, 15 and XIX, 15 in BWSA, II; . 
"Confessions", I, 7 and IV, 9, in BWSA, I; Bernard LOG 40 
4. See below, p. 145f. ' ' • 
5. Aquinas, COT, 121, 172, 1S3; ST, I, Q.49, Art.3; ST, II, Q.95, 
Art.l. 
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and 11 a defect in voluntary action11 which is a sin (culpa). Only 
the latter deserves blame and punishment. If a man's actions are 
mixed, "the sin is diminished in proportion to the admixture of the 
involuntary element" and God's punishment is adjusted accordingly •1 
A similar distinction is made today between "criminal" (i.e., pre-
meditated) and 11non-criminal11 (i.e., unpremeditated) acts an~ in 
the recognition of "doctrines" (i.e., extenuating circumstances of 
age and mental derangement). Thomas himself recognized and made 
allowance for both of these 11 doctrines 11 in his concept of the 
merciful justice of God. Just as a child cannot be expected to use 
his reason 11 through the deficiency of his age", so a man is nsome-
times unable to make use of what is in him habitually [_i.e., reasoi/ 
because or some :i.mpediment11 • 2 God holds neither culpable since 
11there is no place for reward or punishment in dealing with ir-
rational creatures11 .3· How·ever, for a mature man in his right mind, 
ignorance of the law is no excuse since such ignorance is nvolun-
t~ry11 and will be punished as such by God. 4 Nevertheless Thomas did 
suggest that in God 1 s eyes the same act might be virtuous for one 
and vicious for another 11 owing to the various conditions of men". 5 
In all of this Thomas 1 reasoning is interestingly in accord with 
the 11degrees of guilt" clauses in most contemporary statutory laws .. 
Luther was another in the long line of theologians who claimed 
1. Aquinas, ST, II, Q.20, Art., 4; COT, 120. 
2. Aquinas, ST, II, Q.94, Art.l. 
3. Aquinas, COT, 143. 
4. Aquinas, ST, II, Q.6, Art.l-8. 
5. Aquinas, ST, II, "~94, Art .. 3. 
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that the evil a man sUffers in this life as a result of his un-
righteousness is actually punishment from the hand of a loving God 
who is trying to preserve him from greater sin. As "loving parents 11 
beat their sons "until the blood flows to keep them from becoming 
evildoersn so God Uin His mercy chastens" men to keep them from 
the ultimate dam..11ation of hell.1 Since the sin that is within him 
is a man 1 s "fiercest foe", he should rejoice 11in this work of the 
. 
2 
high justice of God11 • Thus it is that through the "strangen work 
of His wrath God may one day accomplish the 11proper 11 work of His 
3 
mercy. "Because God takes ••• His love infinitely serious]y, He 
cannot do otherwise than be angry although 'really' He is only love. 
His wrath is simply the ,r~sW-t of the infiniteJ.y serious love of 
God."4 
Like Luther, Grotius found in God 1 s punishments "no Incon-
sistency with Goodness; but on the contrary, these proceed from 
Goodness itselfn. Returning to a familiar analogy, he likened such 
punishments to the medicine of "a good Physician" 1rmose unpleasant 
" 
11Physick 11 purges a man of his imperfections. 5 
Although Schleiermacher -,vas unlike the theologians who pre-
ceded him :in so many respects, his concept of God's dis.ciplinary 
punishment -,vas not essentially different from theirs except at one 
point. Schleiermacher believed that in this present life God 
L Luther, WML, I, 115.::.116. 
2: Luther, vJML, I, 158. 
3: Watson, quoting Luther in LGBG, 181-182. 
4: Brunner, CDG, 169-170 •• 
5. Grotius, TOR, I, 8, 19. 
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punishes men through "the evil that issues from sin or is ordained 
as its concomitant" •1 However, this punishment, which men 
experience as social and natural evil, 2 is not meant to be reform-
ative (for in that case a s.ystem of divine penalties would have 
served the purpose of redemption3) or retributive (for it is not 
the individual but the totality of mankind which suffers a corporate 
penalty for its corporate guilt4) but deterrent for the unregenerate 
and educational for the regenerate. 
Ritschl dif£ered radical~ from his spiritual forebear at this 
point. He contended that punishment as a deterrent presupposes a 
legal concept of God's dealing with men which is quite at odds with 
a process of education by divine love. 5 Furthermore evil, which is 
simplY "the whole compass of possible restrictions of our purposive 
activity", is a natural event and has nothing to do with divine 
punishment. 6 He was the first important theologian to claim this. 
Sin is an act or an attitude which offends the moral nature of God 
and thus severs the moral fellowship between a man and God. 7 The 
resulting separation cannot be cured by punishment, which would 
simply serve to widen the breach, but only by pardon, because pardon 
cancels "that aspect of injury received which interrupts the inter-
course between the injured person and the offender"8 and accepts 
1. Schleiermacher, CF, 290. 
2. Schleier.macher, CF, 317. 
3. Schleier.macher, CF, 350. 
4. Schleiermacher, CF, 348-349. 
5. Ritschl, CDJR, 47. 
6. Ritschl, CDJR, 351-352. 
7. Ritschl, CDJR, 53, 62. 
8. Ritschl, CDJR, 61. 
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the sinner back into the fell01-1ship with God in 1-1h~ch alone his 
salvation can be realized.1 Contrary to all who had gone before 
him Ritschl did not use the concept of disciplinary punishment, to 
reconcile God's justice and His mercy; instead he talked solely in 
terms of justification by God's accepting love. For this reason 
his point of view will be discussed more fully in the follo-rri.ng 
section. 
ii. God's JustifYing Mercy 
Through the long history recorded in the Old Testament God 
punished his wayward people for their sins, y~t He did not ac-
complish their righteousness. In love He had given them the law 
to show them the way; He punished them in love when they failed to 
fulfill the law; yet their waY"toJard hearts were simply hardened 
against Him. During their punislnnent they 'WOuld return to Him in 
fear "for a little while 11 , but when their afflictions ceased they 
"turned again" back to their sinful (i.e., self-sufficient) ways. 
Punishment served only to remind them of the demands of God's 
order; it did not seem to bring them any closer to His purpose for 
them which was acceptance of His way as their way because they ac-
cepted Him in love. Obviously something more than punishment was 
needed to turn their 1dlful 11hearts of stone 11 into "hearts of flesh" 
that 'WOuld beat in responsive love. Discipline was necessary, but 
discipline was not enough, for discipline could not produce devo-
tioU.. It was the conviction of those "Who wrote the New Testament 
1. Ritschl, CDJR, 107, 13B. 
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that God accomplished the nsomething morett, not by disregarding 
the structure of His justice, but by fulfilling it in love. 
It was Luther who recovered for Christian theology Paulls 
crucial concept of justification. In an experience not unlike 
Paul t s, Luther discovered that no matter how hard one tries, no man 
can finally fulfill the demands of God's righteousness. Falling 
short of this he either despairs in his own sin or takes refuge in 
self-righteousness, and both despair and self-righteousness lead 
him further from redemptive relationship with God. If God treated 
man as he deserves to be treated (i.e., justly according to human 
standards) He would never cease punishing him, but both Paul and 
Luther discovered that God does not work this way. They discovered 
that 11the human scene is always under the divine yearning as well 
as under the divine judgment. That momentous insight ••• provides 
precisely the basis from which Christianity transcends the human 
dilernma 11 • 1 'What matters most to God is His relationship with man. 
He has worked throughout history to create, sustain, and reestablish 
His covenant 1rith men. If man is not worthy enough for such rela-
tionship, God 1dll accept him anyway, and by that very acceptance 
create the worthiness He demands. This is what Paul meant by 
justification. 11All have sinned and fall short of the glor.r of 
God11 , Paul claimed; yet 11they are justified by ffiod tiJ grace as a 
gift n2 -- they are made acceptable to God by His accept:in:n.g love. 
1. Sherrill, GAR, 164. 
2. Romans 3:23-24 • .,.lrV'Jhat Paul calls the 'righteousness' of God 
is not conformity -vrith an outside norm, or even imitation of 
a personal example, but surrender to a creative life-principle 
working from within. 11 Robinson, CJ, 76. 
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From his own experience of justification Luther could agree 1:-r.i..th 
Paul: "God r s love does not find, but creates, its lovable object 
•••• since God's love ••• loves sinners, the evil, the foolish, the 
weak, that it may make them righteous, good, wise, and strong.ul 
Perhaps because man's sense of justice is stronger than his 
comprehension of love, Paul's great discover,y of justification was 
all but lost until its rediscover,y by Luther and then all but lost 
again. Contrary to both Pa:ul and Luther most theologians failed 
to grasp the fact that such justification is not a once-and-for-all 
event but an on-going process.2 In spite of the Calvinistic claims 
concerning predestination and the sectarian claims concerning con-
version, no man is ever beyond a 11 state of sin" judged by the 
standard of God's righteousness, and no man is ever without just~fi-
cation; that is, no lila.11 is ever unacceptable to the love of God. 
It was Albrecht Ritschl who reaffirmed this truth for modern theo-
logy. 
In his "t«>rk on The Christian Doctrine of Justification and 
Reconciliation Ritschl claimed that the·most serious effect of 
man's sin is his consequent separatibn from God, and that the pro-
blem of such separation is in no way solved by divine punishment. 
Such punisl~ent serves only to widen the breach between man and 
1. Luther, quoted in Watson, LGBG, 6S. Cf. WML, II, 420; WML, 
III, 159. 
2. 11 ••• growth in grace makes our moral sense more sensitive, 
and so our moral failures assume a still graver aspect. We 
are miserable sinners to the end of the chapter; and the rule 
of life day by day must be a continued cycle of renewed 
penitence and renewed forgiveness • 11 Roberts, .Art. (1953), 139. 
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his Maker and thus to make it increasingly difficult for hm to 
1 
achieve his eternal dest'iny of fellowship with God. It is God's 
forgiveness alone which can bring a man back into healing relation-
ship with Him. Such forgiveness does not cancel the moral con-
sequences of sin but makes it possible for a man to face those con-
sequences, and even to grm-r in the midst of them, with the assurance 
2 
that God is 1rorldp.g with him and for his sake. Justification 
"signifies the bringing back of the sinner into nearness 1rr.i.th God, 
the removal of the existent opposition to God11 .3 It does not mpute 
righteousness to man but it assists him in it through the unbroken 
effects of God's quickening fellowship. The forgiveness of God is 
like the pardon granted by a human ruler;4 it recognizes both the 
validity of the law· that has been broken and the unrighteousness of 
the lawbreaker, but it recognizes further that the lawbreaker can 
be redeemed more surely within a community of righteousness than 
apart from it. From Ritschl 1s point of view an even betteranalogy 
of God's forgiveness is a father's forgiveness of his child,5 for 
11the fellowship with God to 1-vhich sinners are admitted, is conceived 
to be as close as that which exists between the head and the members 
of a family". 6 In any case 
1. Ritschl, CDJR, 53. 
2. 11The ground of justification, or the forgiJreness of sins, is 
the benevolent, gracious, merciful purpose of God to vouch-
safe to sinful men the privilege of access to Himself .n 
Ritschl, CDJR, 108. 
3. Ritschl, CDJR, 1oo; 138. 
4. Ritschl, CDJR, 6lf. 
5. Ritschl, CDJR, 94~95. 
6. Ritschl, CDJR, 98. 
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the peculiar status before God into which 
Christianity brings believers ••• consists in 
this, tbat God receives believers, in spite 
of their sin and their consciousness:of guilt, 
into that fellowship with Himself which 1 guarantees their salvation or eternal life. 
As the followers of Paul and Luther erred on the side of 
legalism, the. follow·ers of Ritschl erred on the side of sentiment-
ality. Vincent Taylor claims that 11a generation of superficial 
theology has left many people with a sentimental belief in a good-
natured and almost complacent God11 • Fellowship with H:i.m is con-
ceived to be a very simple matter into which man can enter 1"lhen-
ever he pleases vdthout cost to himself or to God.2 Men have been 
so anxious, in fact, to exclude legal ideas from their thought of 
God that they have actually compromised the ethical foundations of 
their theology.3 Consequently, what contemporar,r theology needs 
more than anything else, according to Dr. Taylor, is 11a renewed 
emphasis on the truths for which justification stands 11 • 4 Alexander 
1-tiller agrees with Taylor at this point and in his Repewal of Man 
he has tried to translate the doctrine of justification into terms 
which will be meaningful to the contemporar,r mind. A more system-
atic contemporary treatment of justification is to be found in 
Brunner• s Christian Doctrine of God. It is a treatment which has 
much in common 1ilth both Luther and Ritschl. 
Like Luther, Brunner is a1-mre of the love of God which "does 
1. Ritschl, CDJR, 107. 
2. Taylor, FAR, 79. 
3. Taylor, FAR, 80. 
4. Taylor, FAR, 77-79. 
125 
not desire to get but to gi ve 11 , a love which loves the unlovely 
in order to make them more lovable. He finds the highest e.."'q)res-
sion of this love to be its Ufidelity to the unfaithful", even to 
those rtwho desecrate His sanctuaryn and are nrebellious and dis-
obedientn •1 
Like Ritschl, Brunner stresses the fact that God's forgive-
ness does not sweep a1~y ~the just penalty which is pronounced upon 
the sinnern, nor does it in any ltTaY ignore the validity of God• s 
2 law·. Nevertheless it 11changes the whole outlook of His rebellious 
child, breaks doltm his resistance, and gives freely to the loveless 
that love which the law required in vain 11 • 3 Brunner carries his 
explanation of this fact a step beyond Ritschl•s. He shows that 
God in His sovereign freedom can set men free from the punishment 
demanded by the law, because God Himself is not bound by the law. 
The law is not an ultimate, or independent, entity.; it is simply one 
of the orders of God • s creation through which He Ca.11Jl accomplish His 
purpose. If that purpose can be served more effectively some other 
way, God is ever free to take that other way. 4 Yet any other ltmy 
1v.ill manifest the holiness of God as well as His love, and the 
seriousness of His judgment as 1'lell as the graciousness of His 
pardon.~ 
The Christian concept of justification is irrevocably connected 
with the sacrificial death of Christ. According to Paul it is only 
1. Brunner, CDG, 186. 
2. Brunner, CDG, 281. 
3. Brunner, CDG, 280. 
4. Brunner, CDG, 279-280. 
5. Brunner, CDG, 281. 
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"through the redemption which is in Jesus Christ, whom God put for-
ward as an expiation by his blood" that men "are justified. by His 
grace as a gift" .1 Luther, Ritschl, and Brunner are all agreed on 
this crucial point. 2 Even when God forgives the lawbreaker, the 
cost of the broken moral order must be borne by someone and, at the 
cross, the cost was borne by God Himself.3 Yet that is not the end 
of the story. In the New Testament the crucifixion is followed by 
the resurrection. 
The Agape love from beyond man which shone forth 
in Christ did not end at Calvary. In the good 
providence of God there is in the universe still 
that which keeps that love active, forever in-
vading man's life, again and again conquering 
man's own self •••• In a word, a man has to reckon 
••• with the spirit of Christ as well as with the 
cross of Christ.4 
In the Biblical history God's redemptive purpose has still another 
resource: the resource of God's redeeming grace. 
1. Romans 3:24-25. 
2. Luther, WML, VI, 457; Ritschl, CDJR, 63; Brunner, CDG, 
276, 2Bl. 
3. "Whatever He chose, He chose fully, for Himself as for us. 
This is, I think, uni~e in the theistic religions of the 
world. I do not remember any other in which the Creator 
so accepted His own terms -- at least in the limited sense 
of existence upon this earth •••• alone among the gods, He 
deigned to endure the kind of justice He decreed." 
Williams, Art.(1943), 169-170. 
4. Sherrill, GAR, 1$7. 
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(3). God's Redeeming Grace 
In his Justification of God P. T. Forsyth speaks of the grace 
of God as ttthat end which not only waits for us but 'WOrks in us ••• 
an end that can realize itself :in the face of all opposition11 • 1 It 
is in such grace, even more than in His mercy, that the omnipotence 
2 
of God is finally expressed. It is not the power of brute force, 
not even the power of persuasion, but rather a power, as Abelard 
put it, which "uses even evil for a good purpose, and in a wonder-
ful way turns perversity to good account•r. 3 
Joseph recognized the "i-JOrkings of this grace "When he 'said to 
his brothers who had come to him in Egypt, 11You meant evil against 
me; but God meant it for goodn.4 However, the place where it shines 
forth most clearly in all of history is at the crucifixion-resurrec-
tion where God used man• s .max:imu.m 'WOrst to serve His maximum best. 
The resurrection proclaimed to those who were held in the grip of 
fear and futility after the crucifixion that there is a mighty power 
at 'WOrk in the vJOrld vrhich is mightier than all the forces loJ'hich 
crucified their Lord. 5 This resurrection power-- this healing, 
life-giving, transforming grace of God -- is still at 'WOrk in the 
world "making all things new11 ; 6 and wherever it is at work -- in 
city slums, in juvenile courts, in prison c-ells -- God is ac-
complishing His purpose of redemption. 
1. Forsyth, JOG, 61. 
2. De Jong, DHF, 61. 
3. Abelard, CT, 45. 
4. Genesis 50:20 
5. Acts: 2:32f. 
6. Roberts, PCVM, 76. 
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Thus the purpose of God is personal; He came in Person 
and He works 'With persons to fulfill it. It is an on-going pm:•pose 
1qhich looks more to the future than to the past1 because it is more 
concerned with the wayfarer than with the way~ 2 It is a purpose 
which creates the righteousness it demands; not without the cost-
liness of the cross, but also not without the victor.r of the resur-
rection. Finally, it is a purpose which proclaims to all men, in 
every time and place, that evil is really redeemed only as God 
uses it for good. 
ii. Relevance to Penal Practice 
If it is true, as Ezekiel suggested and the New Testament con-
fir.med, that God has "no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but 
that the wicked turn from his way and live11 ,'3 the theological con-
cept of the purpose of God is relevant to penal practice in two 
ways : it suggests that the aim of all treatment of offenders should 
be redemptive rather than punitive, and it suggests further that 
any attitude or action which assumes ~hat any person is irredeemable 
is contrary to God r s purpose f'or men. 
1. Robinson, CJ, 124. 
2. Snaith, DIOT, 172. 
'3. Ezekiel '33:11. 
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(1) Redemptive Treatment in Place of Retributive Punishment 
The one place 1vhere redemptive treatment is being used to some 
extent in contemporary coJ:Tectional work in this country is with 
juvenile offenders. With the passage of the Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act in 19501 the blindfolded goddess was directed 11to remove 
the blindfold, to see the child and to take him by the hand, so to 
speak, and lead him to firmer ground u. 2 The purpose of this Act 
is "to substitute for retributive punishment methods of training 
designed to correct and prevent anti-social tendencies 11 .3 Under 
the provisions of the Act it is no longer a 'case of balancing the 
scales of justice by impersonally imposing a certain penalty for a 
certain crime. The child is to be dealt with as an individual, 
with needs of his own to be fulfilled. Moreover, the Act affir.ms 
that it is the responsibility of the child's commQ~ity to fulfill 
those needs. The judicial function is limited to that of determin-
ing guilt; an examining board of experts determines the treatment. 4 
The first institution built under the provisions of the Act to 
provide 11better rehabilitat,ion work designed to salvage the lives 
of youngsters 11 is well equipped for an intensive religious, 
psychiatric, and academic program and for broad vocational train-
ing; and the enrol1ment in this institution is to be.;kept small 
enough so that the childr~en will be able to have individual treat-
1. For descriptions of this Act see Barksdale, Art.(l955); 
Beck, FS; Brovmell, Art.(l953); Campbell, Art.(l954). 
2. Beck, FS, $6. 
3. As set forth in the House report for the Slst Congress, 
quoted by Campbell, Art. (1954), S. 
4. Brownell, Art.(l953), 9. · 
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ment by carefully chosen staff members.1 In short, because the 
traditional methods of dealing v-rith offenders "have fallen short 
of their objectives and do not offer full protection to societyn, 
the Federal Youth Corrections Act has rejected nthe basically 
punitive approach characteristic of the administration of justice 
for hundreds of years 11 and has put :in its place a redemptive pro-
gram of rehabilitation. 2 
If the retributive approach can be laid aside :in favor of the 
redemptive :in the case of young offenders, why not w.ith older men? 
Should not the same principles apply here? Most experts agree that 
they should, but the ordinary citizen is not convinced. He seems 
to think that, while there might be some hope for juvenile de-
linquents, hardened criminals are a hopeless lot who must be kept 
out of trouble by :imprisonment. Under the present system they ~ 
a hopeless lot. Miss Fry points out that the early Babylonian 
cuneiform. writing for the word prison was made up of the signs for 
house and for dark) It is still true that even the best of prisons 
are "houses of darkness 11 so far as redemption is concerned.4 
Prisons today are 11admirable place£ rJ in which to inflict brutal 
punishment, whether it be physical or mentalu. They are the n1ast 
place[rt7 in the world in which to expect reformative influences to 
1. Barksdale, Art.(l95~), 8. 
2. Brownell, Art.(l953), 9. 
3. Fry, AOL, 40. 
4. 11We must admit that many of our prisons have few and un-
fortunately some have none of the elements which can have a 
constructive influence on offenders. 11 Bennett, Art. (1956), 
16. Cf. Fenton, Art.(l956), 26. 
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be created and applied11 • 1 The reason for this is that the modern 
prison is organized about a dichoto~ of custody and treatment2 
and; 1dth the public still custody-minded, cust~dy must win. Con-
sequently, the prison program is designed to prevent riots and 
escapes rather than to rehabilitate the inmate.!3 So far as in-
carceration is concerned, the present system is remarkably success-
ful; so far as rehabilitation is concerned, it is a demonstrated 
failure. 4 The effects of the prison environment on the inmate will 
be discussed below. 5 Suffice it to say here that life in prison 
actually produces more criminality than it deters because, under 
the present system most of the prisoners who are eventually re-
leased are "equipped with some new prison-acquired skills and 
motivated by prison-enforced resentment 11 • 6 
For this reason some students of penology believe that all 
prisons must be abolished.? However, most penologists believe that 
it is not the prisons themselves, but the concentration on custody 
which must go. Prison life could be redemptive if the pr:i..ma.ry 
emphasis were placed on treatment rather than on custody, on re-
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 433, 817. uwe are still to a large 
extent suggesting that the prison service should plow the 
fruitful furrow and tend the springing plant, and giving them 
as a tool for the purpose an ancient steam roller." Fry, 
AOL, 203. 
2. Nelson, Art.(l954), 48. 
3. Martin, BDW, 233, 243-244. 
4. Dienste:in, AYG, 129-138. 
5. See below·, p .t..;<tf • 
6. Hassler, DSC, 179. 
7. ~wept those used to house the "irredeemables 11 who will be dis-
cussed below. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 830; Martin, BDW, 268. 
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habilitation rather than on retribution.1 One of the most promising 
experiments in this direction is the practice of group counseling 
being attempted to a limited extent in certain of the more progressive 
prisons. 2 The primar,y objective of such group counseling is to help 
the innlate gain insight into his mm feelings and attitudes by dis-
cussing them freely with a leader who accepts him as a person, and 
with a small group of mutually helpful fellow inmates. The leaders 
of the groups are the guards and other prison employees who are in 
most frequent contact with the inmates. They are encouraged during 
the ses;:;ions to talk freely with the inmates as man to man in the 
hope not only that they will become more aware of the prisoners' 
outlook, but that the prisoners, in turn, will come to appreciate 
more fully the problems of the custodial officers. The experiments 
were begun as a therapeutic treatment for the prisoners, but many 
of the leaders have also been "healed" in the process. They have 
discovered that the inmates really ~ persons after all and that 
it gives one a 11 good feeling" to treat them as such. Perhaps it is 
this change of attitude on the part of the custodial officers which 
has had the most therapeutic effect on the prisoners, for the 
prisoners have discovered, even to this limited extent, something that 
they need to know: that not all men are their enemies, and that for-
giveness, and even love, do exist, and can be extended to them.3 
If prisons are to become places of redemption, instead of 
1. See "Blueprint for the Progressive Prison", Fox, Art.(l956). 
2. For a description of such experiments see Fenton, Art.(l956). 
The following discussion was taken from this article. 
3. Hassler, DSC, 91. 
merely centers of incarceration, certain changes in sentencing 
procedure are indispensable. Adult correctional authorities must 
follow the lead of the Federal Youth Corrections Act by separating 
the guilt-determining and the sentencing functions of the courts.1 
The sole function of the criminal judges should be to determine 
guilt; sentences should be imposed by a 11treatment tribunal11 , a 
board of experts who have made a careful study of the backgroimd 
and the possibilities of the individual involved. 2 Here, as in the 
case of young offenders, it will not be the crime connnitted which 
will determine the sentence, but the needs of the criminal himself; 
and the aim of the sentence will be to restore him to useful 
citizenship.3 The length of the sentence cannot be determined at 
the out set, but must depend on the individual's response to his 
treatment. 4 It is impossible to rehabilitate a man if he is re-
quired to spend a certain number of years in prison after his re-
habilitation merely to finish 11serving his time 11 • 5 .Any good effects 
of a program for rehabilitation 1dll be dissipated the moment a 
convict is required to stay in prison aqy longer than is absolutely 
necessar.y for his rehabilitation.6 
Thus from a Christian point of view· the primary aim of :i.m-
prisonment nmst be redemption. Possible alternatives to :imprison-
ment for the sake of redemption will be discussed below, 7 but first 
1. Glueck, CCSP, 44-45; Campbell, Art.(l954), 7-8. 
2. Glueck, CCSP, 95-96. Cf. Ma11nheim, CJSR, 219, 241. 
3. Morris, CAC, 54; Glueck, CCSP, 137. 
4. Sen, FPP, lll-112; Macintosh, Art. (1940), 65-69. 
5. Lawes, Art.(l940), 68, and TTYS, 385-386. 
6. Duffy, SQS, 65. 
7. See below, p./SBf. 
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it is necessar.r to inquire Whether it is valid for a Christian 
philosophy of penal justice to consider any individual beyond the 
possibility of redemption. 
(2). No One Beyond Redemption 
Even those who would go so far as to abolish prisons alto-
gether for the majority of persons convicted of crime believe that 
a certain number of prisons should be maintained in which to in-
carcerate society1 s irredeemables •1 One psychologist Who believes 
firmly that most criminals should be treated instead of imprisoned 
nevertheless advocates that 11unsal vageables 11 be permanently 
segregated and retained for study and research. 2 He claims that 
11they should be available for every kind and variety of scientific 
endeavor necessar.r to the populace at large". They are not, in 
other words, to be treated as individuals in their o1.m right, but 
simply as objects of scientific· experiment. A milder vie'!.'J' advocates 
that criminal incurables be perpetually segregated, not with any 
penal intent, but merely to protect society.3 Yet one student of 
penology asserts that no matter what others claim, 11the Christian 
is not entitled to say that any offender is beyond hop en. 4 He 
bases his assertion on the "amazing and almost incredible trans-
for.mations" which have occurred "in the lives of desperate criminalsU 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 8JQ; Martin, BDW, 267-268. 
2. Lindner, SWM, 397-398. 
3. Moberly, RES, 14. 
4. Hoyles, RIP, 73. 
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and refers to these transformations as 11miracles of grace" ,.1 
The place where the question of the 11irredeemable 11 becomes most 
acute is in a consideration of capital punishment. The primary 
argument for the retention of capital ppnishment is that it serves 
as the most effective deterrent to crime. Actually this is not the 
case. A prison warden, whose unhappy duty it has been to execute 
many offenders, intervievred all the condemned men before their 
execution and dis covered that 11the death penalty did not deter 
LaPY tSY them, even momentarily, from committing their crimes. 2 
:Moreover, where capital punishment has been abolished there has been 
no increase in the crimes which were formerly punishable b,y death.3 
Nevertheless those who insist on the retention of capital punishment 
are urnnoved by statistical evidence against its efficacy. 4 
From the Christian point of view there are many arguments 
against capital punishment. Sir Walter Moberly suggests, for in-
stance, that capital punishment 11appears to pey the murderer the 
co:rrq:>liment of imitation 11 .5 Dr. John C. Bennett claims that in view 
of the human fallibility of judges and jurie,s 11the irrevocable 
1. Hayles, RIP, 11J.vliraclesStill Happenn, pp. 72-85. 
Summing up his prison ministry of eighteen years, the Reverend 
Howard P. Kellett said: Uif I were to give one conviction 
out of my years of ministry in prisons, it would be s:imply 
this: I have yet to find one individual I consider hopeless. 11 
I.aGuardia, Art • (19 56) , 27. 
Dr. IYiiriam Van Waters stated in a personal interview (on Feb. 
25, 1953) that she agrees with Mr. Kellett completely. 
2. DuffY, SQS, 53. 
3. Sen, FPP, 139; Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 355-359. 
4. Ridley, Art.(l954), 19. 
5. Moberly, RES, 3. 
. t •t 1 character of the death penalty11 is sufficient argument agams J.: • 
The Reverend Glanville Murray suggests that the death penalty is 
"contrary to the whole spirit of the Christian Faith 11 because it 
tends to destroy reverence for human life.2 Konrad Braun argues 
that capital punishment is ntotally inconsistent with the spirit of 
love" because it assumes that certain human beings are incapable of 
improvement in this life.3 This was also the claim of the late 
Archbishop of Canterbury William Temple. He asserted that since no 
character is fully formed until death, there is always a chance for 
redemption. The true character of any man is nthat which God r s 
eternal knowledge apprehends, and this includes !;he effects upon 
him of all work of grace11 • Consequently, no man is 1.Jhat he now ap-
pears but what he is becoming, and any penal system is unjust which 
treats him as anything else.4 Perhaps the most logical argument 
against capital punishment is that suggested by Canon Quick. He 
claims that if a man is no longer morally redeemable, he is no longer 
morally responsible, and theref9re does not deserve to be punished 
by death.5 
Yet in spite of the cogency of these arguments, many Christians 
are not -convinced that capital punishment should be abolished. Is 
this because 11the real purpose of the death penalty is to provide a 
safety valve for popular passionn?6 The likelihood of this' is sug-
gested by the fact that much more attention is given to preserving 
1. Bennett, Art.(l956), 50. 
2. Quoted by Fry, AOL, 182-183. 
3. Braun, JIJ., 39. 
4. Temple, EPA, 38-39. 
5. Quick, ·CAJ, 10-ll. 
6. Hoyles, RIP, 127. 
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the health of a condemned man in prison than to improving the 
physical condition of the prisoner serving a sentence. To let the 
condemned man die a natural dea.t}J. would be to cheat the public of 
its revenge.1 In the recent debate in the House of Lords before a 
vote was taken to retain the death penalty in Britain, the present 
Archbishop of Canterbury declared that it is "right in the name of 
God and society to :impose the death penalty". 2 Miss Florence 
Nightingale was no cr:i.rn.inologist, but- she could have answ·ered the 
Archbishop with some wise Christian words: 
Can He too on]y punish, instead of reforming? 
The ideal of eternal damnation had its origin 
amid a society which exercised punishment; and 
as soon as mankind sees that there is no such 
word, eternal punishment will disappear out of 
our religion -- everlasting damnation and capital 
punishment will go out together.3 
In the light of God's redemptive purpose any form of retributive 
punishment' wether it be "stultifying time-serving11 or the death 
sentence, would seem to be untenable. Christian theology can agree 
whole-heartedly with the progressive penologists who advocate re-
habilitating treatment in place of retributive punishment. Holvever, 
there is one aspect of such treatment programs with which Christian 
theology will disagree; that is, the disregard for human freedom 
which is popular among many of the foremost contemporar,y crimino-
logists. The second theological resource for formulating a 
Christian philosophy of penal justice is the concept of human freedom. 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 354. 
2. Quoted in "Letter from London" on p. 62 of The New Yorker for 
July 28, 1956. 
3. Quoted by Fry, AOL, 183. 
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2. A Concept of the Freedom of Man 
Earlier in this stu~ it was suggested that one of the 
principles established by canon law in the Middle Ages was that 
of individual moral responsibility for asocial behavior. During 
that time, however, the individual was still considered to be an 
integral part of his community. As the individual emerged as a 
free agent during the Renaissance, he was increasingly divorced 
from his social context and was thought to be capable of free 
choice in every aspect of his conduct, irrespective of his heredity 
and envirornnent. It came to be believed that the criminal members 
of society wilfully chose to be bad and their behavior 1-re.s punished 
accordingly. In the centuries that followed societies became in-
creasingl.y outraged at their non-conforming members and capital and 
corporal punishments flourished against what were considered to be 
deliberate wrongdoers.1 
In the mid-nineteenth century this view of criminal behavior 
was challenged by Cesare Lombroso and the so-called positive 
school of penology which gre1..r up as a result of his work. Lombroso 
and his followers claimed that men are not free moral agents, that 
certain men are born criminals and are consequently not responsible 
for their misdeeds. 2 This biological determinism soon gave way to 
economic and social deterll)inism. No man is a born cr:i..minal, it was 
cla:i.med; instead he is made that way by the social system in which 
he gro1..rs up. The slogan of the positive school then became never.v 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 355f. 
2. Morris, Art.(l949), 298. 
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society has the criminals it deserves 11 .1 With the rise of the 
new science of psychology, economic and social determinism v~s re-
placed by a psychological determinism which ascribed all criminal 
behavior to childhood influences. 
Thus every new discovery in the behavioral sciences led to a 
new type of penological determinism. Most recently criminal conduct 
is being attributed to the functioning of the ductless glands. 2 
Advocates of the New Penology (as the contemporary positive school 
of penology is called) are not necessarily agreed on the particular 
type of determinism they favor, but they are united in their claim 
that people are driven to criminal action by external or internal 
forces beyond their control and are consequently not morally 
responsible for what they do. 'fwo champions of this point of view 
sum up their position in this ~y: 
Modern psychological chemistry, Qynamic psychology 
and sociology have proved the free moral agent 
theory of human conduct preposterous m its assump-
tions and its implications. Every human being 
finds his conduct and his thoughts determined by 
the combined influences of his biological heredity 
and his social surroundings .3 
Another advocate of the New Penology claims that 11the whole question 
of moral responsibility is simply irrelevant in a discussion of 
penal philosophyn. 4 
Christian theology seriously challenges this most popular and 
pervasive point of view. It claims that a denial of individual 
1. Boyles, RIP, 102. 
2. Cantor, CCCJ, 26S-270. 
3. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 355, S26. 
4. Cantor, CCCJ, 270. 
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responsibility is no less than a denial of personality itself.1 As 
it was pointed out in the preceding section, the Christian theo-
logian agrees with the penologist that punishment alone is not the 
answer to crime, that one who is socially ill needs treatment as 
much as does one who is suffering from a malignant disease. However 
he does not agree with the New Penology as to the nature of that · 
treatment. The social illness of most criminals is not an illness 
of the bo~ or of the mind, but of the will and must be treated ac-
cordingly. With its emphasis on determinism and its consequent 
denial of the freedom of the will, the New Penology claims that a 
man is simply "conditioned" into crime and that the only solution 
is to 11 condition11 him out of it. Many contemporary programs for 
rehabilitation are based on the hypothesis that 11 training on the 
habit-level alone can undo the evil effects of earlier 'condition-
ing'n.2 
Christian theology questions this whole concept. Conditioning 
may be all very well for Pavlov's dogs but :in men it leaves a 
crucial area, the area of the human will, untouched. Men cannot 
simply be acted upon, shaped from without. To put it in theological 
terms, unless the sinner acknowledges his guilt and voluntarily 
turns from his sin, he cannot be 11born again" no matter how ardent-
1y he is 11 treated11 psychologically. If under unfavorable conditions 
the will chose a certain course of action, a better course of action 
1. Temple, EPA, 29. Dr. Van Oyen points to a further danger 
of the deterministic view: II By committing one particular 
crime, ffi ma!If is • placed' in respect to his whole being." 
Art. (1950), 358. 
2. Lindner, SWM, 25. Cf. Cantor, CCCJ, 270. 
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will not be produced simply by changing these conditions, but only 
by stimulating the will to ~ to change, by enlisting it in the 
service of a higher loyalty. 
i. The Theological Basis of a Concept of Human Freedom 
The crucial command of the old covenant is Choose!1 and the 
equally crucial command of the new is Repent! 2 Both choosing and 
repenting call for an act of will, so the Biblical authors obviously 
.asSllllled freedom of the human w.i..ll. They were acutely aware that 
such freedom not only implies responsibility, it also creates the 
possibility of sin. Moreover, it is altogether necessar.y for re-
demption, for goodness is truly good only when it is freely w.i..lled.3 
(1). Freedom and Responsibility 
The purpose of God which was discussed in the opening section 
of this chapter implies the freedom of man; for relationship cannot 
be forced, it must be -won. 4 At no point in the Old Testament did 
God command Israel to love Him. He pursued her and He -wooed her, 
but all He asked was her answering love in return. The same is true 
in the New Testament. Jesus had no scruples about imposing his will 
on the loaves or on the storm, but it -was a different matter with 
Peter and Judas.5 He could force natural objects to obey him, but 
1. Deuterono~ 30:10. 
2. Mark 1:15; Hatthew· 4:17. 
3. Robinson, CJ, 97. 
4. 11Freedom belongs of necessity to the destiny of man. God can 
only have communion with a free being •••• Love ••• is an activity 
of freedom11 • Brunner, JSO, 55, 56. 
5. Hodgson, DOA, 80. 
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he had to win his disciples to goodness, and even he was not always 
successful in this. 
The Biblical concept of human freedom is expressed succinctlY 
in the myths of creation contained in the first two chapters of 
Genesis. Here it is evident that man is a creature like every 
other creature, made of the same dust, animated by the same breath, 
as totally dependent on God for his existence as any other creature 
is. Yet it is also evident that man is different from every other 
creature in one crucial respect. All the rest of creation simplY 
responds to God automatically and instinctively; man alone is able 
to respond of his own free will. Therefore man is able to fulfill 
God's purpose in a unique sort of way, actually to 1-.r.ill God's will, 
to want it as a matter of choice, not merely to accept it as a 
matter of course. He is also able, in a unique sort of way, to 
sin: to disobey God, to th1-re.rt His will.1 God could not make man 
capable of saying Yes without at the same time making him capable 
of saying No. He could not set him free to make moral decisions 
without running the risk that such freedom would be abused. That 
is what happened in the mythical story in Genesis 3 and it has 
been happening ever since. 
(2). Sin and Grace 
The authors of the Bible took sin, and man r s responsibility 
for sin, altogether seriously. They did not talk about extenuating 
1. All this is assumed in Genesis 2:15-17. 
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.·. 
circumstances, nor did they ever deny human guilt.1 Sin is 
strictly a theological word. It does not belong in the vocabularies 
of sociologists or psychologists; they have replaced it with mal-
adjustment. The Bible suggests, however, that maladjustment is not 
the root of man t s trouble, but only the fruit of it. The real root 
is s:in: separation from God caused by a willful denial of the 
divine-human relationship.2 Yet man's denial is never the last 
word in Biblical history. Even in the Old Testament, speaking 
symbolically, crucifixion is followed by resurrection. As. P. T. 
Forsyth put it: 
There was never such a fateful experiment as when 
God trusted man w.i. th freedom. But our Christian 
faith is that He well knew what He was about. He 
did not do that as a mere adventure, without knowing 
that He had the power to remedy any abuse of it that 
might occur, and to do this by a new creation more 
mighty, marvellous, and nwsterious than the first. 
He had means to emancipate even freedom, to convert 
moral freedom, even in its ruin, into spiritual.3 
Such is the power of grace, already discussed in the preced:ing 
section. It is a power which does not deny human freedom, but 
demands it. Through the grace of God the Prodigal Son was brought 
to a point where there was only one way left, the way home. Yet he 
had to choose to take that way; he had to say 11I will arise and go. 114 
This decision to ret~1 home was as much his own as his earlier 
decision to leave home; yet it was also the work of grace. 
1. Tillich, TNB, 4-5. 
2. "Sin is ••• an alienation of the whole self from God.ll Moberly, 
RES, 37. Cf. Kean, MOE, 178; MoberlY, AAP, 32; Taylor, FAR, 
x:ix:; Augustine, 11City of God", XIV, 13, in BWSA, II. 
3. Forsyth, JOG, 123, 67. 
4. Luke 15:18; Robinson, CJ, 99. 
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According to the prophetic interpretation of histor.r men 
experience God 1 s judgment on their sin in moments of crisis. 1 They 
have made a -wrong choice, but they are not destroyed; instead they 
are confronted by God with a fresh opportunity to make another 
choice. 2 The command and the opportunity to choose are unending. 
Yet this is not enough, for left to his own devices man will con-
tinually choose amiss. So man is not left to his own devices. 
Paul knew this, and Augustine and Luther knew it after him. They 
were all volu.11tarists. They knel'l that the cause of personal and 
social disorder is not to be found in anything external to man, but 
in the lldevices and desires" of his own heart -- in his misdirected 
loyalty and his perverted faith.3 Yet they also knew that man can-
not change his will, cannot 11create a new heart 11 , 1rithin himself. 
This is a work of grace. 
It is easy to read a certain theological determinism into the 
-writing of these men, but this is to miss the profundity of their 
concept of grace. Augustine, for example, affirmed that mants 1-ri.ll 
is undoubtedly free, since 11the divine commands which are most 
suited to the will itself illustrate its freedom 11 • 4 No one, even 
God, can force man against his will into either good or evil. 
Furthermore, a man is free to change his life if he wills to, but 
he does not so will. 5 This is the crux of it. Augustine did not 
1. Sherrill, SOS, 13-15. 
2. Ockel, GUI, 17. 
3. Beach and Niebuhr, CE, 476-477. IIAnd I inquired what iniquity 
was and found it, to be no substance, but the perversion of the 
will, turned aside from Thee, 0 God. 11 Augustine, "Confessionsu, 
VII, 22, in BVJSA, I. 1-ioberly, RES, 51. 
4. Augustine, 110n Grace and Free Will 11 , ch. 4, in BWSA, I. 
5. Augustine, non Grace and Free Will11 , ch. 38, in B~SA, I. 
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deny man's power of choice, but simply his ability, unaided, to 
choose the good; for he asserted that man is so blinded by self-
love that, unless he is enkindled by God, he wills 'tvhatever he wills 
in bondage to himself. Only the grace of God can enlighten him and 
1 
empo1-rer him to choose the good. 11It is certain that it is 111e who 
will when we will, but it is He who makes us will what is good •••• 
it is He who makes us act by supplying efficacious power to our 
·n u2 WJ. • 
The power of grace, then,does not replace the will,3 but 
motivates it for good.4 The will with which Saul persecuted the 
church was the same will with which Paul propagated Christianity 
-- and yet altogether different, for the love which motivated that 
will had been cha.nged.5 Paul himself took no credit for that trans-
formation; he simply said, JJBy the grace of God I am what I amn. 6 
For Paul knew, as Augustine and Luther were to discover after him, 
that man's will is controlled by his love, and that the only escape 
from self-love is the love of God which "stirs us up and recalls us; 
I 
kindles and dravlS us; inflames and grows sweet unto us". 7 To 
create and nourish such love in the heart is the supreme "'ioJOrk of 
1. Augustine, 110n Grace and Free Will 11 , ch. 9, in BWSA, I. 
2. Augustine, 110n Grace and Free Will 11 , chs. 32, 17, in BWSA, I. 
3. Augustine, 110n Nature and Grace", ch. 36, in BWSA, I. 
4. Augustine, "On Grace and Free 1rJ"ill 11 , chs. 31, 41, in BWSA, I. 
5. Galatians 1:13-15. Dr. David Roberts describes a man t s con-
version in this way: 11In a sense, he wakes up to the same 
world and the same self; yet both have been overwhelmingly 
transformed, not through something he has consciously willed, 
but - usually - through something which has "t-JOrked through 
him despite himself." PCVM, 76. 
6. I Corinthians 15:10. 
7. Augustine, rrconfessions 11 , viii, 9, in BWSA, I. Cf. Romans 
7:15-25 and Luther, WML, VI, 452. 
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divine grace. The initiative lies with God. 11We love because LGod.J 
first loved us.nl Man's love is simply response. However man~ 
respond; there is nothing automatic about the workings of God's 
grace.2 
(3). The Necessity of Repentance 
The nature of man's response to grace is repentance. From a 
Christian point of view repentance is a necessary prelude to any 
radical (i.e., root) change of life. It is the one indispensable 
condition for entr.y into the Kingdom of God, for one cannot live in 
God's Kingdom, according to God's will, without it.3 Repentance 
does not mean being sorr.y; it means being born again, living all of 
life from a new center.4 It is not brought about b,r fear, or even 
by a feeling of guilt, but by a profound sense of gratitude. 5 It 
is the kindness of God that leads to repentance, that is able to 
change hard and impenitent hearts. Paul elucidated all this in 
his letter to the Romans. After writing for eleven chapters about 
what the grace of God has done in Christ, he began the twelfth 
chapter with the words 11 I appeal to you, therefore, brethren", and 
filled the next four chapters with ethical injunctions. The 
1. I John 4:19. 
2. Paul expressed the relationship between free will and grace 
in his letter to the Philippians (2:12, 13) with these words: 
"Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for God 
is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good 
pleasure." 
3. Matthew 4:17; Mark 1:15; Luke 5:32. 
4. Sherrill, GAR, 210-212; Chamberlain, MOR, 22. 
5. Chamberlain, MOR, 160-189. 
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Christian ethic is a therefore ethic, an ethic of response, but it 
is none the less responsible. "Grace does not flow through man 
merely as a channel, but grasps the whole personality. Godts grace 
is realized in man through the appeal to man's responsibility. nl 
11Be transformed by the renewal of your mind11 , Paul said (and meant 
by this Repent), "that you may prove what is the will of God 11 by 
living a nev; life of responsible and loving fellowship with men. 
Thus from the Biblical point of view human responsibility, sin, 
and repentance all tur~ on the freedom of man. God 1s pu1-pose of 
redemption could not be accomplished without it. 
ii. Relevance to Penal Practice 
The question of human freedom is particularly relevant to a 
consideration of criminal law and of the practice of imprisonment, 
for the first affirms freedom of the will and the second denies it. 
Yet even the criminal law with its affirmation of freedom falls 
short of the Biblical teaching because it fails to give full con-
sideration to the individual person involved.2 
(1). Affirmation of Freedom in Criminal Law 
In his study of Criminal Justice in America Roscoe Pound shows 
how the criminal law of this country is based on a theory of 
punishing the vicious 1dll. 11It postulates a free moral agent, 
confronted 1vith a choice be.tween doing right and wrong, and choosing 
1. De Jong, DHF, 215. 
2. Cherbonnier, HOH, 17. 
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free:Js" to do wrong. 111 The legal answer to this wrong choice, how-
ever, is retributive punishment rather than any creative attempt to 
change the vicious 1-dll. 2 The law calls for a penalty to be :imposed 
:i.mpersonal:cy without any regard for the motives of the criminal 
1'ihich caused h:i.m to break the law in the first place.3 Therefore 
he can take his punishment in the prescribed doses and remain essen-
tially untouched. Moreover, the law considers the person who makes 
an unsuccessful attempt at crime less guilty that the one i'Iho sue-
ceeds, although the will to commit the criminal act was the same in 
each case.4 
The aim of the law is to prevent repetition by offenders and 
to deter imitators, but actually it accomplishes neither of these 
ends because it is based on a wrong conception of the mind and 
character of man. Sir Walter Mober:cy tells about a person who was 
convicted for the same crime, and punished for it, 2$0 times~ 5 This 
is an eA~reme case but it shows that criminal laws fail to stop 
recidivism because they seek to preserve the status quo in society 
rather than to bring about any radical change in the heart of the 
offender. The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 
has made this interesting _observation: that if one were to take any 
1. Pound, CJA, 33-34. "The criminal is conceived of ffiy lai/ as 
a free-willing person who has deliberately chosen the path of 
evil. " Gl1feck, CCSP, 56 • 
2. Dienstein, AYG, 154. Glueck, CCSP, 87. 11Do we not still tend 
to regard a wrong act as a 1quantity• which must be cancelled 
out by punishment, rather than as an expression of moral 
character, the only radical cure for which is •repentance• or 
'change of mind' ?11 Robinson, CJ, 64. 
3. Moberly, RES, 10-ll. 
4. Cantor, CCCJ, 2$0. 
5. MoberlY, RES, 9. 
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ten doctors, ten lawyers,. ten ministers, and ten criminals, "all 
equally interested and habituated in their professions", he would 
find it equally hard to change the life pattern of each group. In 
each case there would have to be new attitudes, new social values, 
and a new philosophy of life, and these could be brought about only 
. 
by a radical change of will. Punishment would not be arry more ef-
fective in changing the will of one group than another.1 
The law calling for retributive punishment is not only inef-
fective, it is, in marry cases, actually unjust because it disre-
gards the rights of the individual offenders. 2 There are, for 
instance, certain psychopathic personalities Who are able to 
recognize the difference between right and wrong without being 
able to will the right) These are not only socially sick people, 
they are psychically ill as well and need special treatment and 
care. Too often the law fails to recognize this. Since 1843 when 
the "right-and-wrong test" was established at the McNaughten trial 
in England, lawyers have had to prove that the accused "was 
labouring under such a defect of reason ••• that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong114 in order to establish a defense on the 
ground of insanity. Yet lawyers have discovered repeatedly that 
l. Report on Penal Institutions, Probation and Parole, Washington, 
D.C.: u.s. Gov. Printing Office, 1931; p. 113. 
2. "It is a truism that our whole system of law, and especially of 
criminal law, is infected with principles which are wholly op-
posed to morality •••• its emphasis is far too much upon the 
abstract and universal significance of law ••• and too little 
upon individual circumstances affecting particular cases.n 
Brunner, DI, 478. Cf. Parry, GAL, 19-20. 
3. Martin, BDW, 259. 
4. Quoted by Glueck, CCSP, 142. 
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11the capacity of lalow:ing right from wrong can be ••• functionmg 
perfectly even though a defendant is otherwise demonstrably of 
disordered mind 11 • 1 Thus the law may condemn a man to death even 
though he was not actually responsible for his criminal deed. 2 
Another, and far more frequent, instance of the law·1 s dis-
regard for the rights of the individual is the legal use of a 
person as an exa:mple to deter others from similar crimes. 'Wherever 
deterrence is the sole aim of a law, it is bound to be less than 
. 
just to the individual involved} According to Temple the state is 
1 
actually "acting :i.mmorally11 whenever it thus treats the offender as 
a means to the gpod of others instead of as an end in himself.4 
The most frequent disregard for the rights of the individual 
occurs, however, whenever the la1-r simply punishes the offender with 
no attempt to redeem him. "While professing to give him his 'duet 
as a wrong-doer 11 , the retributive punishment prescribed by la11 fails 
to give him "his 'due 1 as a human being 11 .5 In order to modify this 
almost universal condition, several theologians are currently at-
tempting to make the la1·r an instrument of redemption rather than of 
mere retribution. They are trying to find patterns of judgment 
which will serve to integrate a man as a human being instead of 
1. Glueck, CCSP, 149. 
2. Several instances of this are cited in Dr. Louis H. Cohen's 
study of Murder, l!adness ~ and the Laws (New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1952. 
3. Quick, CAJ, 12-13. 
4. Temple, EPA, 25. 
5. Robinson, CJ, 227. Robinson gpes on to say that in thus dis-
regarding "the deepest right of the individual, Lthe laiJ 
does violence to the rights of all." 
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1 
simply disqualifying him morally a:pd ci vicalJ.y as a wrong-doer. 
In his "theology of law" Samuel stu.mpf claims that in order for the 
law to become "more than a regime of coercive order11 it must be 
made to 11appro:x:i.mate the nature of the purposiveness in which man 
is clothed". 2 La"Wlll8.kers must begmp to recognize the fact that 
fear of punishment is not the sole motive of conduct, or the best, 
and must take into account the altruistic, sacrificial possibilities 
of men.3 In line w.i..th this suggestion William Ernest Hocking makes 
a distinction between the actual self and the real self (i.e., be-
tween the self that is and the self that may be) and claims that all 
truly just lawmaking must be based on the latter. Only la1'rs which 
recognize "the tendency of human nature to remake itself on the basis 
of expectation 11 , and actually provide the necessary good eJq:>ecta-
tion, do justice to the living and changeable, and thus to the in-
determinate possibilities in every man.4 One further contribution 
to a theology of law is that of Van Oyen. Basing his discussion on 
the Biblical concept of covenant, he claims that the primary 
purpose of criminal law should be to "fashion and restore communion11 
between the criminal and his community. It will be suggested later 
that the self can find itself only in communion with other selves,5 
and Van Oyen believes that lat'llD.akers must take this vi tal fact of 
human experience into account if they are to do the criminal, and 
1. Van Qren, Art.(l950), 360. 
2. Stumpf, Art.(l950), 56. 
3. Cf. Glueck, CCSP, $0. 
4. Hocking, PLR, 64-71. Cf. Mannheim, CJSR, 22$. 
5. See below, p.[78f. 
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his comnnmity, real justice.1 Such laws have yet to be passed, 
but meanwhile Christians cannot rest content with the present 
criminal laws which recognize human freedom but give it no op-
portunity to develop for good. 
The interesting incongruity in penal practice is that while 
criminal law affirms freedom in theory and denies it in practice, 
imprisonment denies it in theory and practice both, and yet prison 
officials make every attempt to recondition the inmates for social 
living -- every attempt, that is, save the one thing needful. 
(2). Denial of Freedom in Imprisonment 
If the Biblical teaching can be translated into penological 
terms it would seem that the only way to make a criminal ttgo 
straight 11 is to nurture his sense of responsibility, and that is 
accomplished not by conditioning him to make automatic choices 
through the force of habit but only b;y; enabling him to make real 
choices of his own free will. Even in the best institutions penal 
life and discipline actually operate against this. They not on]y 
fail to enlist a man's v1ill in his redemption, they also serve to 
deaden, and even worse, to corrupt that will. 
1 
When a prisoner is aware of the strong emphasis on determinism 
in the treatment program of the New Penology it is difficult for 
him to acquire a real determination abo~t his own rehabilitation.2 
1. Van Oyen, Art.(l950), 356-362. 
2. According to Dr. McCleery convicts are altogether too 
anxious to acdept 11scientific 11 denial of their personal 
responsibility. It makes it easier for them to lay the 
blame elsewhere. TSJ, 58. 
If he feels hopelessly bound to his past. because he believes that 
he is merely "the synthetic product of the mistakes of chance111 it 
is impossible for him to exert himself to improve his lot for the 
future. 2 Clinical psychologists have discovered that healing can 
come to a person only as he accepts responsibility for his present 
predicament and begins to take an active part in its solution) 
Warden Lawes (who does not belong to the positive school of penol-
ogists) has discovered this to be true of convicts as well. Most 
prisons, however, tend to deaden this sense of responsibility by a 
life of such routine obedience that ever,r expression of freedom is 
denied. Consequently "penal officials desirous of rehabilitating 
their charges must make evecy attempt to counteract the evils of 
penal life". 4 
Prison is a most unnatural habitat for man and a most unlikely 
Place for him to learn to live in society. The inmate leads an 
infantile existence. He is denied the pol'fer of choice even in the 
smallest matters. In a."pro gram that even contains compulsory "play" 
he is told when to get up and 'When to go to bed, what to wear, when 
to change his clothes and to bathe, when to eat and 'When to work. 5 
Prison life thus provides a complete system of ;rigid discipline, 
1. Coogan, Art.(l956), 53. 
2. Allport, nm, 71. 
3. Sherrill, GAR, 54. 11The practical importance of effecting 
changes lll human character is what makes responsibility 
important •••• A humah being is held accountable in order that 
he mey learn; in order that he may learn not theoretica.JJ.y 
and academically, but in such a 1.-my as to modify ••• his prior 
self. 11 Dewey and Tufts, .'Erft, 337. Cf. Urban, FOE, 405. 
4. Lawes, Art.(l940), 58-59, 65. 
5. Dienstein, AYG, 127, 130-131. 
154 
externally applied, for men who need training in self-discipline 
more than almost anything else. Denying a man freedom is no way 
to teach him to use freedom, nor is denying him the possibility of 
~ 
temptation the "\'ray to make him proof against temptation. The 
result of such treatment is to make a man even less capable of 
coping "With the problems of real life than he was to begin 1-d.th. 2 
Prison life with its 11 systematic extirpation of initiative and 
responsibility11 tends to recreate men after its 01m image) Many 
inmates become 11stir simple11 after months and years of such 
deadening roubine. Their vitality is sapped; their sensibilities 
are deadened; their initiative is destroyed -- they have become 
incapable of freedom.4 It is not unusual for a man to commit a 
crime :i.Jmnediately after his release in order that he 1-d.ll be re-
turned to prison, simply because he can no longer stand to be free. 5 
To break the "Will of a prisoner in this way is actually to connnit 
a worse crime than that of the prisoner who simply broke the law. 6 
For those whose wills cannot so easily be broken life in 
prison often has a corrupting effect. The tension, suspicion, fear, 
and hatred in prison are corrosiye. They tend to make anti-social 
persons more anti-social. :t-ioreover, they fo9ter the very things 
1. Oppenheimer, ROP, 253. Hoyles points out that it is foreign 
to the Biblical concept of salvation to make willful rebel-
lion impossible by taldng a1my all freedom. The very basis 
of all morality is that virtue is impossible apart from temp-
tation. Men need. a certain freedom to prepare for freedom. 
Hoyles, TYD, 220-221. 
2. Hassler, DSC, 124-125. 
3. Dienste:in, AYG, 127. 
4. Barnes and Teeters, NRC, 440. 
5. Dienstein, AYG, 131. 
6. Robinson, CJ, 229. 
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which make men criminal: physical and moral degeneration, sex 
perversion, frustration, aggression, insurrection.1 A convict is 
a 11second-class citizenn with no rights of his O'Wll but only 
2 11priv:ileges 11 i.Jhich can be taken a-way. This creates a vicious set 
of values. Men secure re-wards by betraying their fello"trrs. The 
11good prisoner" is the clever hypocrite, the 11rat 11 , whose position 
depends on his "in11 with the administration and his ability to 
coerce his colleagues) The cumulative effect of life in prison 
is described by an :imnate at Jackson, Michigan, one of the ''best 11 
prisons in the country: 
This is a vicious place. It is devoid of love, built 
on hate and punishment. Hate begets hate. "Where 
does it end? Many good men go to prison, but very 
few come out. F-.cison brutalizes a man, brutalizes 
and humiliates him. You have a number and you are 
not allowed to forget it. You are looked on like the 
teeth in a gear wheel. The.y don't look for the best 
in you -- they look for the worst. You go to the 
shower naked like animals, it's coarse ••• there is no 
privacy. You cease to be looked upon as a human 
being •••• It is intellectual and moral brutality •••• 
Here there is no hope, nothing •••• Here all you hear 
is lock up, lock up, lock up, day after day, year 
after year in this cold grey world. You lose touch 
1rr.i.th the decent men, no one ever ·says tpleaset or 
'thank you'.4 
It is no wonder that such a life fails to be redemptive. 5 
1. Dienstein, AYG, 136-137. 
2. Hassler, DSC, 104. 
3. John L. Gillin, Taming the Crim:inal~(Neitr York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1931) p. 296. 
4. Quoted by Martin, Bmv, 281-282. Of. Hassler, DSC, 105-112. 
5. Not only does imprisonment fail to be redemptive, it can 
even lead to self-mutilation as it did in the case of 41 
convicts in Rock Quar-.cy- Prison in Georgia who recently 
broke their legs in protest against the conditions of their 
imprisonment. 
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It was mentioned earlier in this chapter that some penologists 
are persuaded that the practice of :imprisonment should be abOlished 
altogether. However the majority believe that it can be retained 
but with modifications i-IDich w.i.ll make it more suitable for 
rehabilitation. Dr. Glueck, for instance, thinks that moral force 
should be relied on in prison administration with as little use of 
physical force as possible. 110rganized persuasion11 must take the 
place of "coercive restraint 11 in a program which seeks to develop 
"upright and industrious freemen" instead of 11orderly and obedient 
prisoners 11 • To be truly reformative the program must gain the will 
of the convict. His self-respect should be cultivated, along with 
every impulse and aspiration for good. Dr. Glueck concludes his 
discussion w.i.th these words: 11Brute force may make good prisoners; 
moral training alone wiP- make good citizens 11 • 1 
Early in this century Thomas Mott Osborne, who was warden of 
Sing Sing Prison from 1914-1916, sought to translate his Christian 
principles into prison practice. Convinced that the usual repres-
sive discipline of prison life crushes "the individuality and 
dignity of the human being upon which reformation must be built" he 
introduced among his convicts self-government under the honor s,ystem. 
His e.:xperiment was short-lived but it pointed the way for the de-
velopment of the 11open prison" where conditions are more nearly like 
1. Glueck, CCSP, 542-543. 
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those which prevail :i.rl. the free IDrld.1 The principle behind the 
"open prison11 is that most persons are connnitted to penal institu-
tions because they have a defective sense of social responsibility. 
In order to overcome this defect life in prison should be as nearly 
as possible lil-ce life on the outside and constructive contact with 
persons on the outside should be as close as possible. 2 Some of 
the most progressive penologists even advocate penal connnunities 
where convicts could live in homes with their own families. 3 
Probation and patole are less costly devices to achieve the 
same end. 4 Under the provisions of probation or parole all or part 
of a sentence is served in'the free world where the convict con-
tinues to live vdth his family and work for his own living, but 
under supervision. Although there are still too few trained proba-
tion and parole officers, although their case loads are still too 
heavy for them to be able to afford the n~cessary individual treat-
ment for each of their charges, and although politics still plays 
too large a part in the administration of the programs, both proba-
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 691-694; Hoyles, RIP, 54-55& The 
sort of man Osborne was can be determined by his spending 
a '!.'leek in Auburn prison as a voluntary prisoner so that he 
could discover what reforms were needed. He deliberately 
broke a rule in order to be sent for "a taste of the dark" 
and later wrote about his experience in a chapter entitled 
11A Night in Hell 11 in his book Within Prison Walls, (New York: 
Appleton and Co., 1930.) 
2. Hoyles, RIP, 86-87. 
3. Wilson, MSC, 14$-149. 
4. The Wessel Connnittee in Massachusetts recently estimated 
that the cost of probation is $92 per person a year as com-
pared with from $1556 to $1712 per person for a year ilr 
prison. The Christian Science Monitor, Boston, July 13, 
1956, p. 1 • 
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tion and parole are steps in the right direction from the Christian 
point of view. In each case the convict is helped to develop 
initiative, self-esteem, and a sense of responsibility.1 Increasing 
freedom is his re1~rd-for an increasing ability to use that freedom 
constructively.2 It is quite possible that probation and parole 
"constitute a practical solution to the problem of how to e:xpress 
the Christian attitude of forgiveness along the lines of positive 
action11 • 3 
Thus, in the light of his Biblical understanding, a Christian 
affirms that human freedom is an essential part of human nature and 
must be accepted as such in his philosophy of penal justice. Never-
theless, with his growing knowledge of the social sciences he cannot 
deny the obvious influence of sociological and psychological factors 
in the development of crime. Therefore, while he claims that a 
criminal is a responsible human being, and consequently truly guilty, 
the Christian recognizes that no criminal stands alone in his guilt. 
3. A Concept of the Corporate Na:ture of Guilt 
Reinhold Niebuhr claims that 11if one were to follow the words 
of Jesus, 'Let him who is without sin cast the first stoner,4 with-
out qualification, no criminal would ever be arrested". Why? 
Because 11every society which punishes its anti-social members is 
more responsible for their anti-social conduct than it realizes.rr5 
' . 
1. Sen, FPP, 110, 123-124. 
2. Cantor, CCCJ, 333. 
3. Boyles, TYD, 196. 
4. John S:7. 
5. Niebuhr, ICE, 229. 
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Crime is in large part the responsibility of society as a i'l"hole, 
for crime does not occur in a vacuum, but always ·in a social con-
text •1 Much crime is a by-product of political and social con-
flict.2 Perhaps even more is a by-product of economic and cultural 
standards. White collar crime, for example, flourishes in a 
competitive economy and in a culture 11that reveres success based 
almost exclusively on money and material consumption11 .3 Con-
temporary culture tends to foster the very crime it seeks to punish. 
Crime, then, is not only an individual act, "it is also, especially 
in its most serious and constant forms, a social fact Which 
indicates something lacking and unbalanced in the structure of the 
society Where it has originatedu.4 
In his study of The Criminal and His Victim Hans von Heutig 
maintains that, in spite of the fact that the law assumes that the 
perpetrator is always the guilty one in a crime and the victim is 
innocent, the victim is often actually as guilty as th~ perpetrator. 5 
i 
... r ..,, • 
In the long process leading up to the unlawful act 11there is a 
definite mutuality of some sort ±n which credit and debit are not 
~ . 
infrequently indistinguishable". 6 Von Heutig suggests that the 
reason for this mutual guilt is 11the large amount of latent dis-
honesty in law-abiding ~nkind 11 .7 The business man hoping to make 
1. Martin, BDW, 257. 
2. Vold, Art.(l953), 699. 
3. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 22 •. 
4. Del Vecchio, JUS, 187-188. Penal institutions are a rich 
source of information as to what ails our conunon life. Preston, 
Art.(l950), 223. 
5. 11In a sense the victim shapes and moulds the criminal. u von 
Heutig, CHV, 419. 
6. von Heutig, Art.(l953), 77. 
7. von Heutig, CHV, 389. 
an easy dollar, the housewife seeking a romantic thrill, the drunk 
on a dark street -- all are "self-indulgent, self-perpetuating 
victims"· 1 Card sharks, confidence men, and shady operators of 
·every sort could not flourish without patrons. 2 Nor could organized 
crime flourish so devastatingly without the cooperation of society 
in general and public officials in particular.3 It is easy for the 
criminal to feel that his victim 11asked for it; it served him right II 
and to have no moral compunction about what he has done.4 In the 
human community, as in the animal kingdom, it is the weak specimen 
who is the most likely victim, and in the human community this in-
cludes moral weakness as well as physical.5 This is not to suggest 
that the criminal is not morally responsible for his misdeeds, but 
simply to acknow·ledge that in a great many cases the victim himself 
•. 
is also morally responsible.6 
As a matter of fact it is often difficult to determine just who 
the victim is in criminal action. 11Society is victimized by the 
criminal, but long before that the criminal has been developed into 
what he has become as a victim of society. 117 The great majority of 
1. von Heutig, CHV, 387, 447. 
2. Cf. Macintosh, Art.(J.940), 58. 
3. 110rganized crime cannot exist without the aid of public of-
ficials. 11 Thomas E. Dewey, quoted by Macintosh, Art.(1940), 60. 
4. von Heutig, CHV, 388. 
5. von Heutig, CHV, 40h. 
6. As long ago as 1870 the National Prison Congress meeting in 
Cincinnati arraigged 11society itself as in no slight degree 
accountable for the invasion of its rights and the warfare 
upon its interests practiced by the criminal classes. 11 From 
Proceedings, quoted by Glueck, CCSP, 544. 
7. Macintosh, Art. (1940), 57. Criminals ttare always to a 
greater or less extent, men sinned against as w·ell as sinning. 11 
Quick, CAJ, 10, 11. 
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juvenile delinquents, for instance, come from underprivileged areas 
and broken homes; they are to a very large extent victims of their 
environment. Their e:xperience has actually made evil seem good to 
1 
them. It is not only their physical environment which is at fault 
but their psychological envirornnent as well. In his study of 
delinquent behavior Dr. Lowrey discovered that the most important 
factors causing delinquency are those 't'l'hich lead tp "increased 
hostility, egocentricity, and lack of consideration for others 11 and 
that such factors depend primar~ on the effects of earlY distorted 
relationships in the familY. 2 Such relationships began when the 
individual himself -was too young to help himself. Dr. Sherrill 
agrees that delinquent behavior is the reaction of young persons 
who have been emotionally th-warted in their 11clynamic relationshipsu. 3 
He has found that most deliqquents have never had any relationships 
with persons they can 11fundamentally and thoroughlY trust". When 
they were udouble-crossedll by those closest to them they reacted by 
11double-crossing11 everyone else.4 Criminologists and penologists 
are armre of all this, but Christians are aware of an even deeper 
conmru.nity of human guilt. 
1. Wilson, COP, 327. 
2. Lowrey, Art. (1944) , Sl8. 11In actual fact, many of the _causes 
of delinquency stem from one missing element •••• love.u Gore, 
Art. (1955), 36. 
3. Sherrill, GAR, 130-134. 
4. Sherrill, GAR, SS-89. 
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i. The Theological Basis of a Concept of 
the Corporate Nature of Guilt 
The orthodox doctr:ine of original sin is not to be found in 
the Bible; it is a product of post-Biblical theology based on a 
1i teral :interpretation of a mythical passage in the book of Genesis 
and a symbolical passage in Paul's letter to the Romans. 1 However 
the Biblical authors had a great deal to say about originating sin~ 
the evil imagination of the heart which causes men to worship and 
2 
serve the creature rather than the Creator. They knew that God 
could not make man :in His image w.ithout runn:ing the risk that he 
would try to be God for himself. What the myth of 11the fallu seems 
to be say:ing is that every man (Adam) faces the :?aJUe temptation to 
ttpla;y God11 ~ and that every.man succumbs to it. 'What Paul added to 
this was the concept "every man but One''; Jesus the Christ alone 
knew what it meant to be totally dependent on God. 
Schleiermacher and Ritschl were the first post-Biblical 
theologians to challenge the orthodox doctrine of original sin w.ith 
the more Biblical concept of a community of guilt. "Original sinn~ 
said Schleiermacher~ 11is best represented as the cor~orate act and 
the corporate guilt of the human race. rr3 It is "the sinfulness ••• 
prior to all action" wlj.ich "operates in every individual through 
the sin and sinfulness of others 11 • It is 11in each the work of all~ 
and in all the work of each; and only in this corporate character ••• 
1. Genesis~ ch. 3 and Romans 5 :15f. 
2. Genesis 5:6 and Romans 1:25. 
3. Schleiermacher, CF~ 285. 
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. 1 
can ~t be properly and fully understood 11 • This universal sinful-
ness which precedes every actual sin is not derived 11from the first 
sin of the first parents n; rather it is identical 11with 'What in 
them like1dse preceded the first sin11 : a lack of absolute dependence 
on God. 2 
Ritschl's doctrine was essentially the same as Schleier.macher 1s, 
but he used the phrase 11kingdom of sin11 to express everything which 
the notion of original sin was meant to embrace.~ In this kingdom 
of sin all men are united with one another "by means of the count-
less interrelations of sinful conduct tt. 4 Each man shares the guilt 
of th~s kingdom of sin not only because his selfish actions produce 
sin in others but also because the power of "common sin11 blunts his 
moral vigilance and dulls his judgment. 5 For both Schleiermacher 
and Ritschl sin has its origin partly within the individual himself, 
and partly beyond the individual in the communit,y of 'Which he is a 
part.6 
Two contemporary theologians who follow this liberal version 
of original sin are Sir Walter Moberly in England and Dr. L. Harold 
DeWolf in this country. Sir Walter contends that no individual 
starts his life free from a certain bias towards wrong choices. 
Behind his ldlful sin, and predisposing it "there is a collective 
1. Schleier.macher, CF, 287-288. 
2. Schleier.macher, CF, 299. 
3. Ritschl, CDJR, 344. 
4. Ritschl, CDJR, 383-384. 
5. Ritschl, CDJR, 335, 338. 
6. Schleier.macher, CF, 279. 
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influence which makes for evil". 1 Thus, Sir Walter continues, 
11the individual is caught in a corporate entanglement which is com-
munal and even racial". Yet, in spite of the inevitability of sin, 
Sir Walter would agree with Reinhold Niebuhr that the individual 
~ 
must accept his responsibility for sin2 and Dr. DeWolf would concur. 
"We need to repent of the sins of others", DeWolf claims, 
because we share their economic advantages and social loyalties.3 
Even by his inescapable participation in the economic order a man 
becomes "however unwillingly, a partner in its injustice and its 
idealization of greed". Life in society itself involves men in the 
"many sinful practices" which have become crystallized into the 
institutions of that society. 4 DeWolf is aware of the many ways 
in which "the sins of his neighbors and forebears put their markrt 
not only upon the delinquent, but upon any child. He is aware that 
the child's natural imitation of his elders may lead him directly 
to sinful practices. Finally he is aware that "social sanctions 
which place a premium on conformity" not only press an individual 
11to accept materialistic standards of sensuous self-Lndulgenceu, but 
. 
also "to acquiesce in grossly unjust racial and class discrimina-
tions 11 .5 All this, according to DeWolf, is involved in the concept 
of original sin which suggests both a community of sin and a "deep, 
powerful current of sin 11 moving through history like 11a treacherous 
1. Moberly, RES, 37. Cf. DeWolf: "All human beings suffer tempta-
tions to sin and disabilities in resistance to it which result 
from the sins of past generations.n TID, 199. 
2. Niebuhr, NDM, I, 251-264. 
3. DeWolf, TLC, 200. 
4. DeWolf, TLC, 194. 
5. DeWolf, TLC, 193. 
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muddy flood.,, a current which began with the f:irst sin that was 
. t . 1 committed and which has been gather2ng momen um ever s~nce. 
Thus the :implications of the doctrine of original sin in its 
more liberal version suggest not only an 11 Adam11 in every hunmn soul, 
but also the vast human cooperation in the workings of sin. Con-
sequently, the criminal's temptation, his moral failure, and his 
guilt, are to a large extent the temptation, moral failure, and 
guilt of everyone. It is this very fact which tempts the public 
2 
to treat the criminal as a scapegoat for its own sin. This is 
precisely what it has no right to do. 
ii. Relevance to Penal Practice 
The relevance of this to penal practice is two-fold. Society 
has no cause to feel self-righteous about, and no right to exact 
retribution for, crimes for which it is at least partiallyrespons-
ible. Moreover, society nmst bear part of the cost of the cr:ime for 
which it shares the guilt. 
It is the self-righteousness of the society inflicting punish-
ment, even more than the punishment itself, which embitters 
prisoners.3 They are aware, far more keenly than the average 
citizen, of the corruption in the judicial process,4 of the political 
graft in high places,5 of the injustice of the criminal law and the 
1. DeWolf, TIC, 198. 
2. See above, p. llf. Cf. Cherbomrl.er, HOH, 132. 
3. Hassler, DSC, 97. 
4. Coe, Art.(l944), 180. 
5. Pound, CJA, 65. 
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questionable tactics of law,vers professing to support it.1 They 
realize that "cr:i.minals are a matter of luckn2 (and capital, since 
most of the "big operators u do not get caught); that onJ.y a small 
proportion of those committing crimes are apprehended, that still 
fewer of these are tried, and that fewer still are convicted.3 They 
know that their misdeeds are, :in fact, indissolubly bound up with 
the morality of the culture of which they are a part.4 It is small 
wonder that :in so many cases the convict does not repent but rather 
rebels aga:inst a system which he considers superior, not :in moral 
force, but only in physical.5 
It is this mutual involvement which makes retribution so 
questionable. Every man :in prison represents a failure not only 
of himself but of society as well. 6 For whose crime is he being 
punished? If everyone had lived as he should this particular crime 
might never have occurred.7 The trouble is that everyone has not 
lived as he should. 
The ovenrhelm:ing guilt, for which ovenrhelming 
repentance is required, attaches to our over-
whelming neglect to know how and how far we our-
selves are implicated in the causation of current 
personal and social evils. 8 
1. 11It is staggering to realize that almost the entire legal 
profession is employed.,-not in supporting the law or serving 
the victim, but in finding ways of evasion. u Lindner, SliVM, 381. 
2. Wilson, COP, 33. 
3. Hassler, DSC, 181. 
4. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 20. 
5. Oppenheimer, ROP, 251. 
6. Martin, BDW, 281. 
7. Hoyles, TYD, 237-238. 
8. Coe, Art. (1944), 180. 11No one individual in no one group is 
responsible for any of our shortcomings. It is the collective 
fault of all of us, of our collective ignorance or indif-
ference to our social institutions. 11 Dienstein, AYG, x. 
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Because society shares the criminal's responsibility for his crime 
Dr. John C. Bennett believes that society must forego capital 
punishment. This mutual responsibility "is sufficient to cause 
l fSocieti/ to draw the line this side of the death penalty11 • One 
other reason for questioning retribution is that society cannot 
give an evil-doer his due without at the same time giving his in-
nocent family and friends what is not their due. 111\.ny scheme of 
justice based exclusively on individual merit and demerit is 
wrecked on the fact of spiritual solidarity. 112 
Corporate guilt implies corporate responsibility and lithe 
idea of corporate responsibilit;r is perhaps best understood in 
terms of economicsu.3 While the criminal must pay the priee of 
personal rehabilitation, the public should bear the cost of re-
constructing the society which spawned him. Contemporary penologists 
recognize this in their concept of preventative justice, but no 
program of preventative justice can be effectively carried out until 
every member of society recognizes his share of the guilt and ac-
cepts his burden of redemption. For the redemptive process is not 
an individual affair; it can ta:ke place only within connnunity. 
4. A Concept of the Redemptive Community 
One of the saddest commentaries on the church of the past few 
decades is that it was clinical psychology which brought the con-
1. Bennett, Art.(l956), 50. 
2. Moberly, RES, 35. 
3. Hoyles, TYD, 23$; Cherbonnier, HOH, 138-139. 
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cept of redemptive relationship, once so powerfully a part of the 
1 
Christian tradition, back into contemporary thought. It was 
clinical ps,rchology which rediscovered for modern man the healing 
powers of relationship.2 
Once psychologists became aware how many of the ills of modern 
society are derived from broken or un1~olesome relationships they 
came to believe that the only way to heal those ills was through 
restorative relationships.3 So they developed a process of treat-
ment which, as Sherrill points out, is very like the process of 
redemption described in the Nevr Testament. In spite of the fact 
that many clinical ps,rchologists know very little about the New 
Testament history of redemption, some of the best of them embody 
a spirit closely akin to the spirit of agape love; that is, an ac-
cepting and liberating concern for the one who is in need. 4 
The process of therapy is essentially simple and altogether 
personal.5 It begins vdth a relationship between two persons.6 
The deeper that relationship becomes, the more the patient is able 
1. 11It appears to be due chiefly to clinical psychology that 
the concept of relationship has come to hold a place of such 
crucial importance in peychiatry, social work, education, 
and criminology, in so far as these fields have felt the 
influence of this psychology. 11 Sherrill, GAR, 49. Cf'. 
Pfister, CAF, 26. 
2. Jung, MMSS, 260, 278-279. 
3. Appel, Art.(l944), ll57; Sherrill, GAR, 55, 102. 
relationship in which one can be oneself without 
rejection or exploitation, is like an oasis in a 
countless people. 11 Roberts, PCVM, 37. 
11A human 
fear of 
desert fol" 
4. Jung, l~SS, 270-271; Roberts, PCVM, 158-159; Sherrill, GAR, 98. 
5. The following description is based on Sherrill, GAR, 141-156. 
6. 11In proportion as one is ill in his emotions, he has need of 
another person ••• who will enter into a healing relationship 
with jji{Jj/ .u Sherrill, GAR, 56. 
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to share with the therapist. There comes a time 11fhen the therapist 
"descends into helln with the patient as the patient 11lays open 
the place where the hurt is most grievous 11 and relives that part of 
his experience which has baffled and defeated him. The therapist's 
response to his patient's experience is one of complete acceptance. 
Oncy as the therapist genuinely accepts the patient as he is, is 
there legitimate ground for hope that the patient can emerge into 
't'lhat, as yet, he is' not. 1 Then the patient, who finds himself ac-
cepted as he has never been accepted before, responds to the 
therapist "with a warm and strong feeling unlike any he has lmown 
2 beforerr. As he lives vdth the therapist r s acceptance and his own 
grateful response, the patient gradually begins to feel something 
akin to re-birth. He is able once again, or perhaps for the first 
time, to accept responsibility and make decisions for himself, and 
he is increasingly able to comprehend his experience in rational 
terms -- to know himself as he is already lmown by the therapist. 
The tragic element in the whole· process is that in a so-called 
Christian culture one has to pay for the privilege of being ac-
cepted, one has to pay for the sort of redemptive relationship of-
fered freely by Christ. This has come to pass because the church, 
as the body of Ghrist, has not undertaken fully enough his ministry 
of reconciliation. 
1. Sherrill, GAR, 1..47. "Often the profoundest form of faith comes 
to a man onJ.y when, in spite of the fact that he has given up 
on himself, ffiomeoniJ does not give up on him. 11 Roberts, 
PCVM, 80. 
2. Sherrill, GAR, 150. 
i. The Theological Basis of a Concept of 
the Redemptive Community 
The acceptance of the therapist in psychiatric treatment cor-
responds to initial justification in the process of redemption 
described in the New Testament. Justification is possible only 
through the forgiveness of Gbd. As it was stated in Chapter One, 
and earlier in this chapter, such forgiveness does not mean good-
natured indulgence; it does not fall short of justice but goes 
beyond it, bearing the necessary cost of wrong-doing, but bearing 
1 it for the sake of, and in relationship with, the wrong-doer. Now 
it is time to consider human forgiveness, for it is ~ means of this 
that redemptive community is established among men. 
(1). Divine and Human Forgiveness 
Speaking of the divine forgiveness embodied in justification 
Ritschl made it clear that what matters to God is not the broken 
moral law so much as the broken personal relationship. Thus God 
abolishes through His forgiveness that barrier of moral indigna-
tion which would stand between Him and the sinner and obstruct the 
divine-human relationship within which alone the sinner can be 
redeemed. 2 The same can be said of human forgiveness; it is an 
active process in the mind of the wronged by which he abolishes 
any moral hindrance to fellowship with the wrongdoer} More than 
this, it is an outgoing effort to gain the other, not overlooking 
1. Moberly, RES, 57, 58; Williams, FOS, 95. 
2. See above, p. 32. 
3. Mackintosh, CEF, 28. 
171 
forgiveness is to nourish sin - bitterness, resentment, and 
revenge in the heart of the wronged and persistence in evil on the 
part of the wrongdoer.1 He knows that forgiveness 
is the one wa:y in which tb.e power of sin in the 
world can be absorbed, neutralized, and brought 
to nothing. At the human stage of evolution, where 
there are creatures who have become persons, they 
have a power of spiritual alchemy whereby they can 
literally and actuallY transform sin's evil product 
into the means of increasing the world's output of 
goodness and love.2 
Thus, through the grace of God, man participates in the grace of 
God, and God's forgiveness finds expression in man's forgiveness 
of man.3 "Whenever .Lfhe sinne£7 finds .himself in ~ circle of love 
where he is 'completely known and all forgiven', something of the 
mercy of God is revealed to him and he catches a glimpse of the 
very perfection which has eluded him. 114 Human forgiveness, then, 
is not motivated by anything worthy in the wrongdoer any more than 
divine forgiveness is. All forgiveness has the character o~ "in 
spite of" and "in order that". It is reunion in spite of 
hostility; it is acceptance of the unacceptable in order that he 
ma,y become acceptable.5 
In his study of The Christian Experience of Forgiveness Dr. 
Mackintosh claims that forgiveness is the new element in the 
Christian faith. T. E. Jessop agrees that no other religion is 
committed by its very "terms of reference" to "cultivate the 
1. De Jong, DHF, 267; Hodgson, DOA, 63. 
2. Hodgson, DOA, 64. 
3. Moberly, AAP, 63. "Human forgiveness is at once a gift of 
God and an act of man. 11 De Jong, DHF, 224. 
4. ~iebuhr, Reinhold.· Reflections .Q!l the End of ~ Era, 
~ewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934}:P. 2B4. 
5. Tillich, TNB, 7-10. 
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forgiv:ing spirit as a centr~1 and constructive force of both 
individual and social life 11 • 1 What are those nterrns of reference"? 
They are to be found in the Christian experience of koinonia. 
(2). Koinonia: the Redemptive Community 
Love in the New Testament sense (agape) is not a feeling but a 
concern; it is not a desire to gain something for oneself, but a 
2 
longing to share something with others. For this reason the con-
cept of Christian community is expressed more truly by the Greek 
word koinonia (participation, communion, fellowship) than by 
ekklesia (an assembly, convocation, gathering), the other Greek word 
used for church in the New Testament. The early church was a 
"sharing fellowship in which men and women of all classes vlfere drawn 
together by the spirit of Godtt and that spirit is the spirit of 
agape love.3 There were no barriers of age, sex, or social status 
in that most inclusive fellowship; the only·requisite for participa-
tion in the koinonia was response to that spirit. 
The most profound understanding of the function of the Christian 
church is to be found in Paul's analogy of the church as the body of 
Christ, the body in which and through which his spirit can find con-
tinuing expression on earth.4 Members of this boqy are not simply 
names in a roll book but "living membersn -- arms, hands, feet --
who can bear his spirit to all mankind. They are those who have been 
1. Mackintosh, CEF, 21 and Jessop, LAL, B2. 
2. Dodd, Art.(l952), 551. 
3. DeWolf, TLC, 301. 
4. I Corinthians 12:4-26; Romans 12:4-5; Ephesians 4:15-16. 
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reconciled to God in Christ and who long to be ministers of recon-
ciliation to others,1 to share the infinite riches of God's grace 
~dth the least of these, their brethren.2 
Such is the nature of the Christian community wherever two or 
three are gathered in Christ•s name to serve one another in love 
at how·ever great a cost in labor, self-denial, or suffering) liTo 
be reconciled to God in Christ is not to be separated from our 
human brethren, but to be so profoundzy joined to them that their 
necessities become our intimate responsibility. n4 Yet there has 
been much in the history of Christianity which has belied this, 
where the church has been more concerned to keep itself unspotted 
Ez the world than to serve as ministers of reconciliation ig the 
world. The practice of excommunication which grew up as the church 
became a self-conscious institution is an example of this. Ac-
cording to Calvin there are three reasons for excommunication from 
the Christian fellowship: the honor of God ( 11that those 1vho lead 
scandalous ••• lives :ma;r not, to the dishonour of God, be number.ed 
among Christians"), the protection of morality ( 11that the good may 
not be corrupted ••• by constant association with the wicked"), and 
) 
the hope that the erring brothers might repent ( 11that the stroke of 
the rod may arouse to a confession of their guilt 11 ).5 The practice 
of excommunication fails to take seriouszy the healing possibilities 
f ' 
of the redemptive community. It is another example of Christian 
1. II Corinthians 5:17-20. 
2. Ephesians 1:7; Matthew 25:40. 
3. Dodd, Art.(l952), 556. 
4. Miller, ROM, 126. 
5. Calvin, ICR, IV, xii, 5. 
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thought being effected by penal practice and it has had fateful 
consequences for the history of the church. It has made Christians 
exclusive, exclusive of ~those who are perhaps in greatest need. 
For Calvin to claim that "forgiveness of sins ••• can only be 
obtained by ••• members of the church u1 and then to excommunicate 
those most in need of forgiveness is a far cry from the spirit of 
the One whose body the church is meant to be. The Christian life 
must ever be delivered from "the intolerable pretensions of saints 
who have forgotten they are sinners 11 • 2 
In contrast to this Calvinistic strain in the history of 
Christianity is the Ritschlian strain which concentrates on the 
redemptive possibilities of Christian .community. According to 
Ritschl a man attairls his goal of divine sonship 11as a result of 
the incalculable and mysterious interaction between ~hi~? own 
freedom and the determining influences of fellowship". 3 Ritschl 
thought of the redemptive· community in terms of the Kingdrnn of God 
and he found the closest analogy for this Kingdom in the family, 
that most :intimate and mutual of human relationships where forgive-
ness is freely offered and joys and sorrows are fully shared.4 
The Ritschlian strain is carried into contemporary theology 
1. Calvin, ICR, IV, i, 20. 
2. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 125-126. 
3. Ritschl, CDJR, 577. Vincent Taylor claims that the principal 
merit of Ritschl's teaching is his "emphasis upon the life of 
the Christian community as the home of reconciliation". 
FAR, 120. 
4. Ritschl, CDJR, 95. "The generosity of the Gospel is not a 
mere widening of the incidence of duty; what it universalizes 
is the family relationship." Jessop, LAL, 85-86. 
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by Dr. DeWolf 'Who claims that the primary purpose of the church 
11is the cultivation and expression of the sacred koinonia itself't1 
For him there is no exclusiveness whatsoever. Christian love, in 
fact, 11is different in the desire to extend this koinonia to anyone 
and everyonell. DeWolf suggests that even ttthe most unattractive 
and unlikeJ.yn persons give an opportunity llfor the -wonderful in-
elusiveness ••• of the divine love to express itself through us 1-r.i.th 
special clarity and power 11 • Such love endures all things and never 
ends because it is sustained by God's own spirit.2 
Dr. Brurmer is another contemporary theologian with a 
profoundly fruitful concept of Christian community. According to 
Brunner true corrnnunity is not a convenient association of individual 
persons but a divine order of creation based on the fact that men 
are both equal and unequal at the hand of God} ''Men are equal in 
relation to God, and therefore in their dignity11 , but they are 
unequal 11in their individuality, and therefore in their function in 
the created -world". 4 In true conununity unequal individuals are 
bound together both by their need for mutual completion and by their 
mutual respect for equal dignity. 5 By his very creation, therefore, 
man is predestined for felloi'iShip. 6 No man is sufficient unto him-
1. De1rfolf, TLC, 324. 
2. DeWolf, TLC, 301-302. 
3. Brunner, CAC, I, 111. 
4. Brunner, CAC, I, 119; JSO, 45. 
5. Brurmer, JSO, S3; CAC, I, 120. 
6. Augustine also believed that men are predestined for fellow-
ship, but for a different reason. He affirmed that God 
created men from one parent 11that all men might be derived 
from one, and that they might thus be admonished to preserve 
the unity am0ng their 'Whole multitude'~ 11City of God II, lli, 
27, in BWSA, II. 
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self; each needs the other for his completion. This is the God-
given basis of redemptive community. 
In the Women's Reformatory at Framingham, Massachusetts, Dr. 
Miriam Van Waters puts Brunner's concept of redemptive community 
into actual practice: 
We try to create a structure in which the offender 
is a participating member ••• we try to form a group 
where each member has a necessary part to pl~. 
It is not a service of experts who operate from the 
top dom to inmates who are confined for the 
purpose of rehabilitation. It is not a relation-
ship of superior to inferior. But, just as Paul 
s~s diversities of gifts operate together organ-
ically as in one body, so in an institution based 
on the Christian outlook the excellence and skill 
of each individual is recognized and blended with 
the abilities of others, so that a company of faith-
ful people is founded. To one is given the gift of 
imagination, to another the power of compassion. 
Some have the real gift of suffering. Some have 
more knowledge of sin •••• Some have the gift of 
laughter, some of tears. If there is a common goal 
- rehabilitation - all may work to promote the 
brotherhood, the Kingdom of God on earth.l 
ii. Relevance to Penal·Practice 
Just as Christianity is aware of a community of guilt, so it 
knows no true redemption outs~d:e the bonds of community. The will 
I 
is never enlisted in isolation, but only in life-shaping relation-
ships with other human beings. Prisons have not failed to restore 
men to society only because the,y have lacked facilities for 
medical and psychological treatment, but because they have lacked 
genuine, redemptive community. Christianity would 
1. Van Waters, Art.(l950), 195-196. 
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have an immeasurable contribution to make to penal justice if it 
could bring, not only the concept, but the vital fact of koinonia 
to bear on the whole criminal problem. Where redemptive communities 
hav.e been tried in penal practice they have proved significantly 
successful, but they have too seldom been tried. 
(1). Examples of Redemptive Community in Penal Practice 
. 
Not all, or even most, of the experiments in redemptive com-
munity have been consciously motivated by Christian principles as 
Dr. Van Waters 1 work in Framingham is. Perhaps those which are not 
thus consciously motivated offer examples of the working of the 
"hidden Christ", where the historical revelation has not been known, 
but where the spirit is nevertheless present.l Or perhaps Christ 
himself simply made concrete something that had been at work smce 
the dawn of human history. Speaking of the redemptive communities 
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:formed by group counselmg, :for instance, Dr. Fenton says that "although 
group counseling is new as a technique ••• it utilizes resources as 
old as human life itself, the constructive influences of the relation-
ships of human beings tm'la!'d each other". 2 The success of group 
counseling in the rehabilitation of prisoners has been noted above. 3 
From what Dr. Van Waters says it is evident that a redemptive 
1. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 109, note 6. "For .Lthe spirit of Chrisy is 
found in unexpected places. Again and again it is anonymous. 
It is at work in persons who do not knmq the name of the thing 
that moves them. Yet it does move them." s. c. Carpenter, 
Christianity (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 
1953), p. 7. . 
2. Fenton, Art.(l956), 26. 
3. See Above, p. 133f. 
connnunity is one in which an individual is accepted~ he is, and 
~ 
'What he is is used to contribute to the life of the group. There:i,n 
lies the opportunity for personal growth. SUch communities differ 
from clubs or other gatherings of like-minded individuals because 
they are not founded on mutual interest, but on mutual need. The 
persons involved 11bear one another's burdens 111 because they re-
2 
cognize that they are in very truth 11members of one another 11 • More-
over each shares with the others what he has discovered of real 
worth in his own personal experience. In his moving account of the 
possibilities of human relationship under God, Martin Buber suggests 
that real connnunity 11is being no longer side by side but 1.dth one 
anothern. It is "life lived to1.va.rds one another 11 .3 
Alc9holics Anonymous offers such redemptive community to its 
members.4 vfuere there are A.A. groups in prison the ex-alcoholic 
is better off than the ord:inary inmate. Here there is riot only very 
real conrrnunity in prison but connnunity that extends b,eyond the 
prison walls as '!.'lell. The exchange of inmate publications, tape 
recordings, and personal correspondence is allowed ~r.ith other 
prison group~, and there is considerable sharing of experience and 
helpful testimony. Even more important, however, is the fellowship 
with A.A. members on the outside who visit the men in prison and 
get to know them prior to their Telease. Then 'When the inmate is 
1. Galatians 6:2. 
2. Ephesians 4:25. 
3. Buber, BMM, 31. 
4. The General Service Headquarters for all of Alcoholics Anony-
mous reports that after twelve years of experience in prisons, 
235 prison groups (including over 10,000 men) are presently 
registered with the organization. Anon~, Art.(l954), 17. 
released he already has a friend in an A.A. group on the outside 
to which he can go to share-in a fellowship which he needs especial-
lY during a period when loneliness and feelings of social inferior-
ity might otherwise tempt him back to drinking.1 
A third example of redemptive communities are the Borstal 
Schools in the United Kingdom. 2 The most significant thing about 
these schools, and the aclmowledged reason for their success, is the 
11familY life 11 which is possible in the small living units 1.mere 
carefully chosen staff members are encouraged to get to know their 
charges int:iJnately by sharing their everyday life with them. Members 
of the staff and their families all participate in the community life 
along with the young inmates, and their good example and obvious 
personal concern for the inmates play a very real part in the process 
of rehabilitation.3 A private project called Q Canq:>, simiJ..ar to the 
Borstal system but for somewhat older offenders, ~ms tried in England 
from 1936 to 1940. .Although it had to be abandoned during the war, 
it was highly successful during the few years of its operation. 
Barnes and Teeters describe the camp as na therapeutic institution" 
and say that "its most significant feature was the mutual partner-
sh:i.:p it emphasized". There 1-ms 11shared responsibility bet't'reen staff 
and members 11 and, even mo~e significant, there was affection between 
them, "perhaps the most important factor in emotional adjustment". 4 
1. Anonymous, Art.(l954), 18-19. 
2 • Mentioned above. See p. q~ • 
3. Fr,y, AOL, 142; Iyengar, Art.(1954), 26. 
4. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 553-554. 
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The final example of redemptive relationship is the community 
"Which can e:xist between an ideal probation or parole officer and 
his charges. IIWhat is wanted in either case is that the delinquent 
should be under the salutary influence of constructive friendship. 111 
Probation and parole are not meant to be mere supervision, and when 
they are merely that, the chances of rehabilitation are far less 
good than when there is genuine personal relationship between the 
officer and the men in his charge. It is far easier for an officer 
simply to observe and report, but the healing possibilities of 
relationship come into play only as he accepts personal responsibility 
for his charges, entering into their problems and interests, and 
making known to them his very real concern for their successful ad-
justment back into society. Such a relationship may be as creative 
as it is costly if Buber is right that it is only 11through the Thou 
a man becomes In. 2 
In all the reading done for this study these few examples of 
redemptive communities in penal practice were all that could he 
found. There are undoubtedly others, but, even so, the number is 
still far too small compared with the need. 
(2). Continuing Need for Redemptive Community 
in Penal Practice 
In studies of juvenile delinquency it has been discovered that 
children are driven into delinquent gangs by their need to belong 
1. Sen, FPP, 125. 
2. Buber, IAT, 2S. 
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to a group -which will accept and respect them. 11Theirs is a mis-
guided attempt at a healthy reaction to the essentiallY unhealthy 
situation society puts them in. nl In a study of older convicts it 
-v.ms found that one of the primal"Y causes of crime was 11a lack of 
ties with the connnunity 11 and that the best deterrent to crime would 
be "satisfactory social relationships II. 2 Yet the usual methods of 
punishment serve to detach the criminal even further from his com-
munity, to excormnunicate him from society, so that he becomes even 
more anti-social than he was to begin with) 
The aim of all treatment of offenders should be successful 
restoration of the criminal to the community fromwhich he has 
separated himself by his crime. Where redemptive fellowship has 
been tried in penal practice it has been discovered that this is by 
far the best 1-m.y to attain this aim. Sir Walter Moberly suggests 
) 
that the Christian 1 s primary effort for convicts should be uto pro-
vide an environment in 'Which God t s voice ma;y be easily heard"· To 
achieve this 11he will try to bring the outcast mto a circle of 
Christian fello"i<rship in -which t charity' {agape loviJ is the main-
spring of action n. 4 Yet the ~all redemptive communities used in 
treatment will lose their effectiveness in proportion to the lack 
of concern for prisoners on the part of the larger community out-
1. Dr. Frederic Wertham, qQoted by Bowen, Art.(1954), 42-43. 
2. McCleery, TSJ, 28, 29. 
3. Robinson, CJ, 230-231. Dr. Lindner suggests that 1-Then 
punishment dissociates a man so completely from his com-
munity that the sanctions and penalties of the community 
no longer have any validity for him, the meaning of the 
punishment itself is lost. SWM, 391-392. 
4. Moberly, RES, 62. 
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side the prison walls. 
To quicken such concern in the larger community a philosophy of 
penal justice is needed which will take into account not only the 
need of the criminal for rehabilitation but also the need of society 
to protect itself against crime. In the following chapter an attempt 
will be made to suggest such a philosophy based on the relevant 
insights of Christian theology. 
1. U.All the provisions of religious observances in prison w.Lll 
prove barren without the identification of Christian people 
'With the prisoner .u Hoyles, RIP, 109. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Tentative Formulation of 
a Christian Philosophy of Penal Justice 
It was stated in the introduction to this study that the 
four most generally accepted reasons for the imposition of punish-
ment are protection of society, deterrence from further crime, 
rehabilitation of the criminal, and ret~ibution. In the course of 
the study it has been suggested that retribution is perhaps the only 
one of these four aims that is being accomplished by punishment as 
it is currently practiced in most prisons. Yet even here it is 
doubtful whether, in the final analysis, it is a just retribution 
which is being accomplished, or simply revenge.i 
Although fear of punishment does deter many persons from 
socially undesirable practices, it does not seem to have such a 
deterrent effect on those who commit crimes of violence. 2 Moreover, 
the incidence of recidivism suggests that present-day punishment 
too often fails to deter the criminal himself from further crime 
because it has failed to rehabilitate him) One may 11pa;v his debt 
to society11 by serving a prison sentence and still remain essentially 
' 
unchanged at the core of his character.4 More often, and more 
dangerous, however, is the fact that imprisonment may actually 
1. See below, p. 1.'1Zr. 
2. Barnes and Teeters, NHO, 33S; Cantor, CCCJ, 259; Fr,r, Art. 
(1954), 25; Glueck, CCSP, 26; Martin, BDW, 267. Statistics 
indicate that severity of punishment does not keep people 
from committing the severely punished crimes. Rusche and 
Kirchheimer, PSS, 207; Cantor, CCCJ, 257; Coe, Art.(l944), 179. 
3. See above, p. 11. · 
4. "Punishment fails because no punishment can reach the thing 
inside a man that caused him to commit a crime in the first 
place. 11 Mart:in, BDW, 267. 
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change a man for the worse, as has already been suggested above. 
~he psychologist Robert Lindner ?laims that 
there is no honest criminologist or worker in any 
of the allied fi'elds of study who can state that 
our punitive apparatus does anything but brutalize, 
stigmatize, and discourage reformation in the vast 
majority o~ persons entrusted to it.2 
Small wonder that 11it has become almost axiomatic to say that a man 
becomes a criminal not by his first offense, but by his first 
imprisonment") Since puni~hment as it is currently practiced too 
often fails either to deter or to reform, it is obvious that it 
. . 
cannot accomplish its final aim of protection·of society. For this 
reason penologists and criminologists ar~ in substantial agreement 
that punishment as it is currently practiced is not an adequate 
~s*er to the problem of crime.4 
Yet to claim that ~he current penal system is inadequate is 
not to assert that there should be ~ penal system. A society 
cannot function without laws, laws are ineffective without sanctions, 
1. See above, p. 153f. Cf. Oppenheimer, ROP, 251. A good case 
in point is cited by Dr. von Heutig: 11That John Dillinger 
became Public Enemy No. 1 was partly the fault of an incom-
petent parole board. He had committed a robber,y under the 
influE?nce of .an older accomplice. This was his first crime and 
he was only 19 years of age. The older confederate was re-
leased after two years, Dillinger not until he had served 
eignt -- only two years before the expiration of his maximum 
sentence. \<J"e are told that up to that time be did not show any 
sign of strong criminal propensities. He became unmanageable 
out of violent resentment and the feeling of having been 
treated unjustly." CHV, 446. 
2. Lindner, SWM, 3B6. 
3. Wilson, MSC, 175. 
4. A theologian and a moral philosopher fully agree with the 
criminologists and penologists at this point. See Brunner, 
DI, 477-47B, and Ewing, MOP, 125 •. 
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and s~nctions require punishment for law-breakers.1 The aim of a 
Christian philosophy of penal justice is not to abolish the penal 
system, but to suggest ways in which it could become more ad~quate 
and, therefore, more truly Christian. The danger of churchmen 
rightly protesting the vindictive demands of penal practice is that 
"they often show a sentimental concern for the individual wrong-
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doer" which overlooks "the grave and complicated legal responsibilities 
for maintaining social order and a reasonable security for the 
masses of the citizenry11 • 2 
It was not without reason·that early in the first century of 
its existence Christianity had combined the figures of the blind-
folded goddess and the man on the cross in its concept of social 
justice. When Paul counseled the Roman Christians to "be subject to 
the governing authorities 113 -- i.e., those represented by the god-
dess -- he was not for getting the man on the cross, for he continued 
his exhortation: "• •• love is the fulfilling of the law11 • 4., He was 
simply asserting the necessity of preserving a just order so that 
love would be able to fulfill the law. In human societies the sword 
1. Ewing, MOP, 47. 
2. DeWolf, mimeographed proposal for Penal Justice: a Research 
Project in Theological Ethics with A~sistance from Law, 
Criminology, and Social Ethics, 1~54, p~ 6. 
Daniel Jenkins cl~s _that "declining f9-ith often brings with 
it both a loss of moral robustness and oversensitivity to 
one's o1m and other people's feelings. A perverse form of 
this sensitivity is the attitude that combines great anxiety 
for the well-being of criminals and relative indifference~o 
that of their victims". Believing in 'God (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster PressJ 1956) pp. 71-72. 
3. Romans 13:1-7. 
4. Romans 13: B-10. 
of the goddess~ which represents the power of the government to 
enforce its decrees, is altogether necessar,y, and that s~rord·may 
indicate punishment. 
When certain criminologists claim that 11the concept of punish-
ment must be completely dissipated" in order to develop "a 
scientific philosophy of penal treatment compatible w.ith the 
advances made by social and medical sciences in the past quarter 
centur,y11 , 1 they are considering wrongdoing a disease rather than a 
crime and are totallY disregarding the essential theological concept 
of hwnan guilt and responsibility. In answer to such a claim Dr. 
Albert C. Knudson declares that 
to universalize this vie1.; would be to deny freedom 
altogether and undermine moral responsibility. It 
would logically make the cure of wrongdo:ing a matter 
of hygiene and medic:ine rather than the concern of 
religious and moral education and discipline. It 
would lead to physicians taking the place of ••• 
judges and to the substitution of hospitals for 
prisons.2 
It cannot be denied that such a treatment of crime may be called 
for in certain cases where mental derangement or physical illness 
is responsible for criminal activity, but it is by no means ap-
p;opriate :in ever;V case. To tr,y to make it so is to weaken the 
social fabric by condoning crime instead of condemning it~3 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 817. 
2. Knudson, PCE, ?20. 
3. 11The community cannot vrlnk at and ignore its members 1 evil 
deeds without becoming a partner to them. That is why it 
must punish ••• 11 Hodgson, DOA, 66. 
11 
••• it is easy to see that the neglect to punish w.ill have 
conseq).lences that' are morally harmful. It will tend to make 
some people think that lawlessness does not matter, it 1·r.i.ll 
render the laws and governments despicable in the eyes of 
many, and the inoral judgments of those who represent and rule 
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Punishment of the responsible wrongdoer is the way society pro-
claims itself protector of the right. 
1. The Necessity of Punishment 
In any discussion of penal justice three points of view must 
be considered: that of society, that of the victim, and that of 
the criminal. From the point of view of each of these, punishment 
of the wrongdoer is necessary though not for the same reasons. 
It has just been affirmed that society needs punishment of the 
wrongdoer to vindicate its own order, an order which punishment it-
self helps to maintain. It also needs punishment of the wrongdoer 
in self-defense, to protect itself by deterring further crime. The 
victim, on the other hand, needs restitution for the loss incurred 
by the crime. A just punishment, from his point of view, would 
need to include such compensation. Finally, the wrongdoer himself 
needs the just punishment of the state not only to protect him from 
the unlimited vengeance of his fellows, but also to bring him to 
the penitence necessary for any true reformation. Each of these 
needs will be discussed more fully below·, but first it must be de-
termined whether the punishment necessary to fulfill them should be 
retributive. 
i. Limitations of Retributive Punishment 
Throughout this stuqy it has been contended that retribution 
the State, being not carried out in action will cease to be 
taken seriously at all. 11 Evdng, MOP, 95; cf., 101. 
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is not a legitimate aim of punishment, even though it is the most 
popular. However, it must be aclmowledged that not all theologians 
"WOuld agree with this contention. Dr. :&nil Brunner, for instance, 
whose insights have proved so valuable in this "WOrk, claims that 
the primary concern of punishment should be to "restore the balance", 
the just order of society, which has been disturbed by the criminal 
act. To accomplish this he makes expiation (i.e., restoration by 
retribution) rather than reformation or deterrence the true aim of 
punishment. He considers the improvement of the criminal or the 
security of society to be merely "utilitarian" aims in punishment; 
only expiation is 11religious 11 • 1 11 The injurer is made equal to the 
injured by the infliction of an equivalent injury, and thus the 
social equilibrium is restored. 112 In order to give 11satisfaction" 
to the community, the penalty imposed on the criminal by society 
must correspond exactly to the injury. "Retribution ,Liiiust by 
carried out in strictest detachment, as it were with the precision 
of a mathematical instrument, in favor of the communityn.3 Like 
his spiritual forebear, Calvin, Dr. Brunner claims that nthe human 
judge is merely a representative of God114 whose primary duty it is 
to see that nthe just judgment of God, by which a man reaps 'What he 
1. Brunner, DI~ 476. 11By its very nature, just.ice is proportion, 
like for like •••• reform or improvement can never be the 
determining principle of punishment. The sole and exclusive 
principle of punishment is and remains atonement, that is, 
the restoration of order by symbolic restitution. 11 JSO, 224. 
2. Brunner, JSO, 222. 
3. Brunner, JSO, 222. 
4. Brunner, JSO, 223, 
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has sown11 is carried out :in human affairs. The judgers sentence 
is essentiaJJ.y "a process of restoration /J-n which7 the most ancient 
rule of crim:inal law ••• an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, 
has profound mean:ing 11 .1 If one asks 1'1hether this is truly a 
Christian answer to the question of penal justice Brunner ~rould 
reply that 11the Christian Faith conta:ins this idea of expiation at 
its heart; it is the task of dogmaticfs to show the superficiality 
of the arguments on which its rejection is based".2 
It should be noted that there is noth:ing vindictive about the 
expiation Brunner advocates. Because he recognizes in society a 
community of guilt, he contends that such expiation must be thought 
of in communal as well as individual terms. "In every crime the 
first and the chief criminal is -- society. u3 Therefore, soc~ety 
as well as the criminal must 11pay the price11 of the crime. 'While 
the criminal "must offer expiation by submitting to ••• forcible 
education 11 , society must compensate Ufor what has been left undone 
for the man who has become guilty". 4 
Brunner is not alone among theologians in his advocacy of non-
v:indictive retribution as the primary aim of punishment. Knudson 
claims that punishment 11sinks to a nonmoral level" where 11retribu-
tion on the part of the punisher and expiation on the part of the 
punished ••• are la~kingn. 5 DePauley also affirms that 11the 
retributive element is the pivot of the theory of punishment .in 
1. Brunner, JSO, 221. 
2. Brunner, DI, 475. 
3. Brunner, DI, 476. 
4. Brunner, DI, 477. 
5. Knudson, PCE, 220-221. 
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Christian ethics11 • 1 However, two questions must ultimately be 
faced by those who support retributive punishment: is it possible 
to measure retribution justly, and does retribution per ~ ac-
complish the true end of punishment -- i.e., the reformation of the 
wrongdoer? 
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Actually it is not the crime that is punished, but the criminal. 2 
One might conceivably formulate an objective measurement of the 
seriousness of crimes, but who can determine the extent of guilt?3 
No one but God Himself can know fully the wrongdoer's responsibility 
for his act and thus the extent of his punishable guilt. Brunner 
asks that 11retributionffi,i7'carried out ••• with the precision of a 
mathematical instrum.ent11 ,4 but what sort of mathematical precision 
is possible when one is dealing with human beings rather than with 
impersonal commodities?5 ·No two individuals will be equally 
responsible (and, therefore, equally guilty) for the same act, nor 
will any two individuals be equally affected by the same punishment. 6 
Consequently, Dr. A. C. Ewing asks: 110ught the State to aim at re-
·' 
tributive justice, if the overwhelming probability is that each time 
it tries to inflict it it will do serious retributive injustice?"? 
1. dePauley, PHD, 139. 
2. Moberly, AAP, 7. Oppenheimer points out (ROP, 291) that in 
actual sentencing practice this fact is not clearly recognized 
since "the dangerousness of the act from the social point of 
view ••• supplies the measure of legal punishment, whilst the 
dangerousness of the actor ••• determines the judicial sentence." 
This is one of the primary sources of ambiguity in the penal system. 
3. Ewing, MOP, 28. 
4. See above, p. 190. 
5. Ewing, MOP, 44. 
6. Ewing, MOP, 3B. 
7. Ewing, MOP, 40. 
Even more questionable, however, is whether retributive 
punishment can achieve the true aim of punishment if that a:im is 
the defeat of evil. 
Righteous indignation, if it is to be righteous, 
must be based on the aversion to moral evil, but 
it would seem that a genuine aversion to moral 
evil ought to lead one rather to destroy it by 
reforming the sinner than to avenge it by retri-
butive punishment.l 
Moberly points out that the suffering of penalty must become the 
suffering of penance if true reformation is to be effected.2 Yet 
punishment, whose sole aim is retribution, tends to turn the atten-
tion of the wrongdoer from the wrong he has done to the pain he 
suffers.3 In actual practice retributive ppnishment seems far more 
often to embitter wrongdoers than to reform them. 4 
Therefore, because retributive punishment cannot be exactly 
administered by the state and may lead to bitterness rather than 
reformation on the part of the 1'1!'0ngdoer, and consequently does not 
defeat evil, it is less than just. For this reason it will be sug-
gested belo't.Y that the needs which punishment must fulfill can be 
better met by non-retributive punishment. 
ii. Possibilities of Non-retributive Punishment 
Where punishment leads only to pa:in, and to no positive results, 
the imposition of punishment cannot be justified, for it simply adds 
to the evil already-"brought into e:x:i.stence by the punishable 
1. Ewing, MOP, 34-35, 
2. Moberly, AAP, 24. 
and cf. lll. 
See below, P .19'ff. 
3. Ewing, MOP, $5. 
4. See above, p. til.(. Of. Oppenheimer, ROP, 251. 
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act. H01•rever, it was suggested earlier in this chapter that punish-
ment of the wrongdoer can lead to positive results by fulfilling 
certain basic needs of society, of the victim, and of the wrongdoer 
himself. It is time now to consider in more detail what these needs 
are and whether non-retributive punishment can satisfy them. 
(1). For Society 
According to Leonard Hodgson the ultimate aim of punishment in-
flicted by the state is to preserve rights, both the right of the 
individual to his freedom and the right of society to vindicate its 
2 
standards when the individual freely chooses to violate them. 
In order to have a good life, and growth in freedom, 
man needs two things from the community to which he 
belongs: respect for his freedom so long as he be-
haves himself, and maintenance of the goodness which 
he betrays by misbehaviour.3 
Both these things are possible through the fact of punishment which 
means a dissociation of the community from the evil acts freely done 
by its members.4 
Hodgson implies, though he does not specifically mentio~, the 
two other needs of the state which non-retributive punishment can 
fulfill: self-defense against the wrongdoer5 and moral education of 
the community. 6 He: implies self-defense against the wrongdoer in 
1. Ewing, MOP, 26. 
2. Hodgson, DOA, 59. 
3. Hodgson; DOA, 66. 
4. Hodgson, DOA, 57. 
5. "The root of punishment is thus the necessity for self-defense •• •" 
Ewing, MOP, _4$. 
6. "The State 1s right to punish crime ••• provides the social medium 
in which moral development is alone possible. 11 dePauley, PHD, 
193. 
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his affirmation of the right of society to 11disown11 him while his 
freely chosen course of action constitutes a threat to life and 
property. He implies moral education of the connnunity in his af-
firmation of the right of the individual nto direct his share of the 
connnon life in accordance with his own decisions 11 • 1 
It is this latter possibility of non-retributive punishment 
which is stressed by both Oppenheimer arid Ewing. Both these men 
claim that the penal code has been in the past, and can be in the 
future, a most valuable instrument in the moral education of the 
connnunity. 2 Since the purpose of punishment in this case 11is to 
make both the offender and others realize the badness of the act 
punished" ,3 the amount of punishment should be determined by the 
moral condemnation of the community rather than the pain to be suf-
fered by the 1vrongdoer. 11Thus in a more enlightened and milder 
society the same degree of condemnation may be implied by a punish-
ment that is far smaller. n4 
There is, of course, always the danger that punishment of unjust 
acts will lead certain members of society to avoid those acts, not 
because these persons have been educated to a higher degree of 
righteousness, but simply because they fear the punishment involved. 5 
1. Hodgson, DOA, 57. 
2. 11The legislator, then, has it in his po1-rer, by branding certain 
acts as crimes, to modify, in the course of a few generations, 
the moral sentiments of the connnunity •••• 11 Oppenheimer, ROP, 
294. 11The mere living in a society where certain acts are sub-
jected to severe penal condemnation must ••• develop the habit of 
regarding these acts as ••• tout of the question for respectable 
people 1 • 11 Ewing, MOP, 97. 
3. Ewing, MOP, 106. 
4. Ewing, MOP, 107. 
5. Ewing, MOP, 86. 
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In any case, the educative element in punishment would seem to lie 
chiefly in its deterrent character, especially in its effectiveness 
in deterring others from connnitting further crime •1 In this con-
I 
nection it must be noted that certainty ~f apprehension and convic-
tion has a far more deterrent effect on potential wrongdoers than 
severity of punishment. 2 
It is admitted by Ewing that punishment for the sake of moral 
education may have to sacrifice the criminal to society. Imprison-
ment, for instance, may have an adverse effect on the man being 
punished, but a salutary deterrent effect on the rest of the com-
munity. 3 Ewing justifies this by suggesting that 
the other members of society are at any rate more 
numerous than the criminals and not less deserving 
of consideration. To refuse society the protec-
tion afforded by deterrence is to wrong the in-
nocent for the sake of the guilty.4 
If it were possible to devise punishments which -would not sacrifice 
the criminal or society, certainly these would be more in accord 
with a Christian philosophy of penal justice.5 At least one such 
punishment will be suggested im what follows. 
1. DeWolf, Art. (19 53), 198; :&ring, MOP, 115. 
2. Ewing, MOP, 5$-,q.9; Oppenhe:imer, ROP, 287-288. 
~ 3 ... Ewing,. MOP,. 122. 
4. Ewing., MOP, 51 •. Cf. Moberly, AAP, 20: 11 ••• human justice ••• 
must think primarily of the effect of its actions, not on 
the criminal, but on other men." 
5. Oppenheimer claims (ROP, 25). that 11at the present time we 
have practically only two forms of punishment at our disposal, 
death and imprisonment; and it must be confessed that both 
are eminently unsuitable for the accomplishment of the re-
formatory taskn -- or, as has been seen in the case of im-
prisonment, for the protection of society either. 
196 
(2). For the Victim 
What the victim needs most is restitution, some reparation 
for the loss incurred by the crime. IdeallY punishment of the 
wrongdoer should include such restitution for the victim. Actually, 
in contemporary penal practice, it does not. All crimes are con-
sidered crimes against the state, and it is to the state, rather 
than to the victim, that the criminal must pay the price of his 
transgression. 
This has not al~mys been the case. Restitution to the victim 
was a part of ancient penal practice, and as late as 1900 it was 
being advocated a~ the sixth International Penal and Penitentiary 
Congress at Brussels.1 Here there was "universal agreement 11• that 
restitution is "more restraining than imprisornn.ent 11 and that, it 
should be used in place of imprisornn.ent for all but recidivists and 
dangerous criminals. 2 Yet since that time it is rarely mentioned8 
in spite of the fact that it would, rtin many respects, be more 
sensible than present day practice 11 • 4 Ewing claims that in their 
failure to enforce restitution legislators 11have neglected the need 
of compensating the victim of the crime to a most surprising and 
deplorable e.."'Ctentn. 5 
1. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 822. 
2. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 823. , 
3. Of all the books read for this stuqy, only the two mentioned 
here deal with restitution as a possible means' of punishment. 
4. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, .822. 
5. :&-ling, MOP, 72. 
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Ewing goes on to suggest that in any truly just penal practice 
the vi.ct:lln should be compensated by the offender who would work for 
the sake of the one he has 1-JI'Onged as punishment for his "'n'Ongdoing •1 
The court could stipulate the amount of damage to be paid. Restitu-
tion could be made in installments and collected by the state on 
behalf o£ the victim.2 
There is much to commend this type of punishment, espec~ally in 
cases of theft, destruction of property, or bodily injur.y. It would 
benefit the one who has actually suffered loss through the crime, 
it would be more economical for the state than :i.mprisomn.ent is, and 
it should not embitter the v-~rongdoer •. Even he would have to admit 
the justice of restoring to the victim what is rightfully his. It 
will be seen below that this last point is of special importance if 
punishment is to have a favorable, rather than an adverse, effect 
on the wrongdoer himself. 
(3). For the Wrongdoer 
The first need which the 1-JI'ongdoer has for just punishment by 
the state is a practical one: the protection it affords him from 
illegal expressions of popular indignation which might prove dis-
astrous. 3 As Ewing points out, punishment not only helps stop crime; 
it also helps stop lawless replies to crime.n 
His second need -- the need to be made repentant -- is more 
1. Ewing, MOP, 72. 
2. Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 822-823. 
3. ~ring, MOP, 35, n.l. 
4. Ewing, MOP, 71. 
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personal, and, if the punishment is to be ultimately effective, this 
need must be fulfilled. As Moberly makes very clear, the ultimate 
success of punishment 11turns upon the reception of punishment by the 
1 
person punishedn. 
If his punishment really effects its proper ob-
ject -- its only proper object, so far as the 
prisoner personally is concerned -- it does so 
not by the quantum of pain endured by him, but 
by the extent to "Which that pain is in him taken 2 
up into the change of self "Which we call penitence. 
Without the penitence 1.fuich comes when one realizes the grav.ity o.f 
his offense and accepts full responsibility .for it, there can be no 
reformation, and the punishment, so far as the wrongdoer himself is 
concerned, will have been in vain. 3 
How then can the 1v.rongdoer be helped to realize.the gravity of 
his offense and to accept full responsibility .for it? Certainly 
not by any form o.f punishment which w.i.ll degrade him, since 11dis-
grace and loss of self-respect ••• are serious obstacles in the path 
o.f reform". 4 Ewing suggests that 11the .formal and impressive con-
demnat±.on o.f society :inv0lved :in punishmentn5 may help the wrongdoer 
realize the gr~v.ity of his offense. However, that is only the first 
step. He must mov-e--•from a recogniti0n of the gravity of his offense 
to a s:incere desire to overdome it. The transitional step 'trlll be 
taken as he acc-epts responsibility .for his wrongdoing. 
1. Moberly, AP;P, 13; 
2. Moberly, AAP, ll. 
3. 11Reformation o.f a criminal, in the widest sense of the ter.m, 
means such a change in his mental habitus that he will not 
offend again. 11 Oppenheimer, ROP, 240. 
4. Ewing, MOP, 86. 
5. Et-rl.ng, MOP, 8.3 • 
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This is Where those contemporar.y penologists Who assert that 
no one deserves to be punished are being most unrealistic (as well 
as most untheological!) for by this assertion they deny not only 
personal responsibility, but also personal freedom. When one denies 
a man his freedom he denies him his chance of moral regeneration.l 
This is why Hodgson affirms that punishment of the wrongdoer must 
not "inhibit but ••• set for~·rard, his growth in freedom11 ; 2 and it is 
What dePauley has in mind when he claims that the end of punishment 
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is not to thwart the wrongdoer, but rather to bring him "to himself" .3 
Punishment cannot cancel the guilt of the wrongdoer, but if it can 
translate his guilt into penitence and his penitence into reforma-
tion, it will have accomplished for him its true end.4 
Thus it must be concluded that both those who claim that punish-
ment should be retributive and those who claim there should be no 
punishment at all are wrong if what is contended here is true: that 
non-retributive punishment fulfills fundamental needs of society, 
of the victim, and of the wrongdoer himself. One further q~estion 
must be considered. Are the needs of society for punishment of the 
wrongdoer incompatible with those of the victim and of the wrongdoer 
himself? Or could some system be devised which would fulfill all 
these needs at once? 
Actually such a system alreaqy exists among certain Bantu tribes 
l. See above, p. l39f. 
2. Hodgson, DOA, 80. 
3. dePauley, PHD, 146. 
4. Moberly, AAP, 36. 
in central and southern Africa.1 Here the chief tries 11criminal11 
cases on behalf of the tribe.2 Before he has made his decision he 
brings the victim and the i'I!'Ongdoer together in an attempt to 
determine with their help a settlement which will be considered just 
by both parties. In most cases the settlement will include restitu-
tion paid by the offender to the aggrieved, and, if it is to be a 
satisfactory settlement, the amount 12aid must sean adequate to the 
aggrieved and not unjustly burdensome to the offender. It is possil;>le 
that, even after considerable work on it by the judge, such a 
satisfactor.y settlement of the case cannot be reached. In these 
cases the judge will simply suggest the best possible solution under 
the circumstances and this will almost invariably be accepted by both 
parties as the best he can do. Yet it must be noted that even in 
such cases the various needs for punishment "Will all have been ful-
filled. Society will have vindicated its order and educated the rest 
of the conmrunity by expressing its moral indignation against the 
wrongdoer. The victim will have been compensated for his loss in-
curred by the crime. The "WrOngdoer "Will have been protected against 
the private vengeance of the victim, and, by his very acceptance of 
the settlement as just will have indicated a change of heart toi'lard 
his o-vm wrongdoing. lv.Ioreover, once he has paid the prescribed amount 
of restitution to the victim, the offender "Will be accepted i'rl.thout 
further onus as a full-fledged member of society and the breach in 
1. The following information was taken from a personal report by 
L...H. DeWolf, dated October 27, 19.56. 
2. He is, apparently, a counterpa:I."ii of the tribal judges of ancient 
Israel. 
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the community will have been fully healed. 
ObviouslY it is easier to achieve such a satisfactory solution 
to criminal action in the small closely-knit unit of a· primitive 
tribe than it would be in the complexities of a more advanced culture. 
Nevertheless, one can see in this example of primitive justice 
certain ends worth working for, ends without which no system of 
penal practice will be fully just. 
One final step must be taken. 'What is to make this a Christian 
philosophy of penal justice? All that has been said so far would 
apply equallY 'tvell to secular attempts to achieve penal justice. 
What is the peculiarly Christian el~ent still needed? It is for-
giveness. The theological resource of forgiveness and its relevance 
to penal practice have alreaqy been considered in the previous 
chapter. What remains to be done here is to ex.amine the place of 
forgiveness in punishment and the ways such forgiveness can be im-
plemented in Christian action. 
2. The Place of Forgiveness 
Facing the man on the cross who is asking forgiveness for those 
who nailed him there, the Christian can find no words to sey- but 
lllord, forgive me! 11 Is not this the ultimate source of Christian 
forgiveness: the heart that is broken by the recognition of its om 
sin and unworthiness and then that is healed by the recognition of 
the infinite love of God? In the light of this John c. Bennett 
asserts that even when the Christian is lldi vided by conflict11 from 
another human being, he remembers that that person stands with him 
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before a God who loves them both.~ Sir Walter MOberly confirms 
I 
this assertion in terms of penal justice by claiming that the 
Christian's attitude toward the offender 
is never fundamentally hostile. Even when his 
indignation is most fierce, he will remember that 
he is not dealing with an enemy but With an 
err:ing brother. The whole transaction is within 
the family.2 
Instead of treating the duty of punishment as a license to hit back 
in the spirit of revenge the Christian who forgives will seek to 
find ways of administering punishment which will express his active 
: 
good will and love.3 
In this final section the place of forgiveness in a Christian 
philosophy of penal justice will be considered, theoretically first 
and then practically. 
i. Forgiveness in Theor,r 
The great assurance that the Christian receives from the cross 
is that his sin has failed to affect the goodness of God "by making 
Him either a partner ~ LPiil evil deed or embittered and revenge-
ful as a result of it11 .4 This is the essence of his own forgiveness 
of his fellowmen, for in his forgiveness he becomes neither a 
partner in their evil deeds nor revengeful because of them. Yet 
there is more. For just as the cross was costly to God, so forgive-
1. Bennett, CAC, 30. 
2. Moberly, RES, 42-43. 
3. Hodgson, DOA, 66. Jessop points out (LAL, 185) that love is 
the only human response that can look at evil uncensoriously 
even while seeking to remove it. 
4. Hodgson, DOA, 67. 
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ness is costly to man. 
Earlier in this study it was suggested that there is all the 
difference in the world bet"t-1een good-natured indulgence and costly 
forgiveness. 1 Good-natured indulgence makes no moral distinctions 
because it recognizes no real moral order. Forgiveness does re-
cognize a moral order and is• ai'Jare that one cannot break that moral 
order 'Without someone coming to grief. Wrongdoing is costly. How 
then does forgiveness differ from just judgment which also recognizes 
a moral order and the fact that a price must be paid for transgress-
ing it? Only in this way. When one judges 'justly he says: You 
I 
have done 1-Jrong and you must pay the price. 'When he forgives he 
says: We will pay it together. Forgiveness is not simply not 
punishing; it "cannot be defined as remission of penalty". 2 Perhaps 
it can best be defined as sharing of penalty.3 This is wny forgive-
ness is costly, but why it may also be creative. Good-natured 
indulgence s:imply pampers a person as he is • Just judgment may em-
bitter him. What about forgiveness? If it is accepted (and there 
is no guarantee that it 1rlll be) it may eventually 'Win the -vr.rongdoer 
back to the society which he has violated. 
What does it mean to 11share the penalty of wrongdoing"? One 
cannot stand with the accused before the judge; he cannot go to 
prison 'With the condemned. Or can he? Some o£ the ways in which 
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a Christian might "share the penalty of wrongdoing" are suggested below. 
1. See above, p. ~'l~ • 
2. Moberly, AAP, 51. 
3. 11 ••• in view of its duty to punish, the connn.unity can only 
fulfill its duty to forgive by voluntarily undertaldng to 
share in the punishment itself. n Hodgson, DOA, 66. 
ii. Forgiveness in Action 
There are maQY immediate ways in which a Christian can express 
his forgiveness of crime by his concern for the criminal. He could 
become professional~ involved in the penal system as a prison 
warden, a prison chaplain, a probation of£icer.l He could become 
a regular prison visitor. He could become a foster parent to a 
delinquent child. This is at present a very real possibility under 
the provisions of the new Federal Youth Corrections Act. One of 
the most admirable features of this Act is that it permits volunteer 
sponsors to take the young offenders into their homes two years be-
fore the end of their commitment time. There is no doubt that in 
this way 11many ppivate citizens can make a real contribution to the 
lives of youngsters who previously had no one to whom they could turn 
for capable help or counsel11 • 2 
For those who are not able to become so fully active in the 
field of penal justice there are other, less immediate, ways to 
express forgiveness. They lie in three general areas. One could 
express his forgiveness before punishment by working for the preven-
tion of crime. He could express forgiveness during punishment by 
working to secure greater justice for convicted persons. He could 
1. Thomas Mott Osborne was one of very few Christian prison super-
intendents performing such work as a professed Christian voca-
tion, and Miriam Van Waters is another, and each of these 
persons introduced into their respective institutions more 
imaginative forms of penal justice based on their understanding 
of the Christian faith. 
2. Brownell, Art.(l953), 9. 11An important gap in the program of 
curative treatment would be closed if more citizens were 
willing to accept foster-parenthood as a Christian vocation." 
Hoyles, TYD, 202. 
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express forgiveness after punishment by working to achiev~ better 
treatment of ex-convicts. The work in each of these areas 'Will be 
considered below. 
(1). Before Punishment 
Most criminologists agree that by far the· most fruitful area 
for work in the field of penal justice is the prevention of crime. 
Dr. Pound suggests that the development of preventative criminal 
justice 11is destined to be as epoch-making for jurisprudence as the 
development of preventative medicine has been for medical science11 • 1 
To get rid of the causes of crime and to help children enter on the 
right track before they have entered upon criminal careers are far 
sounder ways to deal 'With the criminal problem than to allow destruct-
ive criminality to continue, and so much less expensive; yet even 
those most sympathetic 'With the church admit that it has done almost 
nothing to prevent crime. Dr·. Van Waters claims that 
religion does not flow from the'church into the com-
munity in which the young delinquent moves, hence the 
church has no authoritative voice in those social 
standards which are ••• most powerfullY in conflict 
with the moral code.2 
It is spiritual dynamic which is lacking. Ministers have failed to 
reach the minds and hearts of those children who 'Will become 
delinquent. Social activities in the church do not f'ulfip- the real 
need, which is for authentic spiritual leadership. In spite of the 
you~h programs of the cburch Uit is evident that the lives of the 
1. Pound, CJA, 35. 
2. Van Waters, YIC, 141. 
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young del:inquents have been left singularly untouched by religion". 
Sociological studies bear this out. In a study of church membership 
and conunitment to prisons Dr. John R. Miner discovered that 11there 
is little evidence that the churches play axry major role :in the pre-
vention of crime11 • 2 In Dr. Frederic M. Thrasher r s study of 1313 
gangs in Chicago he found that one of the four conditions -vrhich make 
for delinquency is 11the failure of present-day religion to penetrate 
in axry real way ·f:ihe e:x;perience of the gang boy11 • 3 
Granted that the church has not yet made a significant contribu-
tion in this area, what could it begin to do now to work for the 
prevention of crime? To begin with it could move into del:inquent 
areas more readily, places where only Pentecostal sects and the 
Salvation Army are -vtorking now. 4 A strik:ing example of such a move 
is the East Harlem Protestant Parish :in New York City which -was begun 
in 194B by a group of interdenominational m:inisters and members of 
the co:mmunity who were trying to bring the church to the neighbor-
. 
hood people in a 1vay which would be relevant to their daiJ~ lives. 
These 11pavement pastors 11 set up store-front churches which are open 
day and night for services oi 1~rship, for personal counseling, for 
legal advice and economic help, for programs of education and recrea-
tion, and for anything else that becomes necessar.r in this diversified 
1. Van Waters, YIC, 140. Cf. Elliott, CMS, 52. 
2. Miner, J. R., 11 Church Membership and Conunitment to Prisons", in 
Hnnn Biology-, Vol. III, Sept. 1931, 429-436. ~ 
3. Thrasher, GAN, 492. 
4. 110ne of the most alarming present trends :in American Protestantism 
is the tendency to withdraw. our churches from the rooming-house 
areas of our cities, 1vhere these needs are most acute, and to 
concentrate :in the more prosperous and stable suburbs. 11 DeW"olf_, 
Art. (1953), 194. 
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ministry. Social problems are manifold in the twenty-eight block 
area where 40,000 persons of several races are crowded together to 
live and -work. It is a breeding place for crime. Yet in less than 
a decade the church has brought about impressive improvements in 
housing, sanitation, racial relationships, educational and recrea-
tional facilities, and community morale. The very fact that people 
who do not have to be there are there, and that they are there to 
- -
help and not to exploit, has made a marked impression on those w.ith 
whom they -work. Moreover the church has led the fight against the 
use of narcotics, has sponsored summer camps and year-round retreats 
for adults as well as children, and has .made medical care and health 
education available to those Who need it. It has proved that there 
is a qynamic in the Christian faith that can transform society and 
turn even the weak members into champions of social justice.1 
.An especially important part of the program in East Harlem, so 
far as crime p~evention is concerned, is the play-group for pre-
school children 1-.rhose mothers must be away from home all day working. 
Criminologists suggest thGt the most promising place to begin crime 
prevention is 1\Tith pre-school and primary school children "Who are old 
enough to become infected by the unhealthy influences of their sur-
roundings, but young enough to respond easilY to treatment.2 
One does not have to go to East Harlem to work for crime pre-
vention. Evecy connnunity has its own delinquent areas and its own 
1. From a pamphlet describing the work in East Harlem distributed 
by the East Harlem Protestant Parish, 247 East 104th street, 
New York City 29, New York. 
2. Scudder, Art.(l954), 33; Glueck, CCSP, 51, 138-139. 
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forms of corruption which the church can help to remove •1 Every 
community has young people who need help 2n resisting temptation, 
more constructive ways to occupy their leisure time, and acceptance 
into a closely-knit group, and these are needs which the church can 
help to fulfill. 2 Every con:nnunity has its adults desiring marriage 
counseling and preparation for parenthood, and its broken homes and 
distorted family life which the church can help to heal.3 Crime 
prevention can (and must) begin at home. Whether the home church 
be rural or urban, rich or poor, white or colored, there are quite 
literally endless possibilities for Christian witness and "t·rork in 
this most important area of penal justice.4 
(2). During Punishment 
A second w~ Christians could express forgiveness for the 
criminal would be to work to secure greater justice for convicted 
persons. The entire penal system is fraught with inconsistencies 
and injustices which concerted Christian action could help remove. 
Cr:im:i.nal law· is a serious example of this. 5 It was created to 
serve rural pioneer communities and is proving dangerously out-dated 
1. liThe more 1inflammables 1 [e.g., poverty, culture conflicts, etc;} 
thp.t can be removed from the environment of childhood and youth, 
the less possibility there is of criminal conflagration. n 
Glueck, CCSP, 22; 3-11; 193-198; 544. 
2. 11Harold Strong, 'Who has spent his life studymg boys who go 
wrong and is the director of Children's Village at Dobbs Ferry, 
New York, thinks a child 1 s desire to belong to a group is one 
of the keys to the solution of juvenile delinquency. 11 Bowen, 
Art.(l954), 13. ' 
3. Morris, CAC, 39. 
4. DeWolf, Art.(l953), 191-195. 
5. DeWolf, Art.(l953), 197-198. 
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and inadequate in the present situation.1 It is actuaJJ.y "more 
likely to entrap chicken thieves than professional cr:im:inals "· 2 
Furthermore it is inconsistent. Lawmakers cannot decide 'Whether 
the purpose of the law is to make the punishment fit the crime or 
to make the penal treatment fit the criminal, and cuiTent criminal 
legislation reflects this indecision.3 Moreover, each state 
formulates its OW11 laws, so that something which is considered a 
criminal offense in one state is not so considered in another.4 
Punishment for similar crimes also varies marked]y from state to 
state.5 These inconsistencies and conflicts in penal la1~ must be 
resolved if any effective program of crime pr~vention and control 
is to be established. 6 FinaJJ.y, criminal law is unjust, not only 
in the ways mentioned earlier in this study,? but also in its 
tendency to favor the professional criminal. There are at least 
fifteen legal avenues of escape through the 11paths and by-paths" of 
criminal procedure, so that in general only the less experienced 
lawbreakers are convicted.8 It is obvious that informed Christian 
action is needed in this area. Church groups could study the in-
adequacies, inconsistencies, and injustices embodied in the laws of 
1. Mannheim., GJSR, 1; Pound, GJA, 197-198. 
2. ~~art in, BDW, 166; Glueck, CCSP, 164. 
3. Mannheim., CJSR, 2; Pound, CJA, 75. 
4. 11\Vb.ether what you are doing is a crime.may depend solely on 
geography • 11 ].~artin, BDW, 166. 
5. From. notes taken in Dr. F. Killiants course on The Criminal Law 
in Relation to the Correctional Treatment of Offenders, Boston 
UniversH.y, Second Semester, 1953. 
6. This is th~ thesis of Mabel Elliott's Conflicting Penal Theories 
in Statutory Criminal Lawj (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1931). 
7. See above, p.11Bf. 
8. Glueck, CCSP, 68-69. 
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their states, and then work to correct them through the Christian 
use of political action.1 
A second place Christian political action is needed is in the 
effort to free the correctional system from political abuse. 
Political appointments of inadequately trained prison personnel, 
and the instability of prison administrations due to political 
2ll' 
changes every few years are primary factors in the failure of prison 
reform. 2 Political pressure on a judge may force him to make a 
llpopular11 but unjust decision.3 Political involvement of police 
systems ia the chief source of their corruption.4 For these reasons 
"freedom from politics is the sine qua .!.!9B of success in correctional 
work •••• Unless we can win our ~J.ray free from politics, the cor-
rectional field has no future 11 .5 
Christian political action is also needed to abolish county 
jails,6 to improve prison practices, 7 and to promote the use of 
probation. John B. Martin points out hmv much prisoners need a lobby 
8 
to help protect their rights. Then ·he goes on to say that while 
tlh.is wou~d be a suitable project for some good-government group like 
the League of Women Voters, such groups are not ordinarily interested 
1. A helpful guide for such action may be found in Jerry Voorhis 1 
The Christian in Politics, (New York: .Association Press, 1951} ... 
2. Glueck, CCSP, 541. 
3. Campbell, Art.(l954), 7. 
4; Barnes and Teeters, NHC, 245-247. 
56 MacCormick, Art.(l951), 422; Pound, CJA, 198; Wallach, Art. (1955), 12. 
6. Elliott, m~s, 498-499; Glueck, CCSP, 49-50. 
7. Tmiard rehabilitation rather than retribution. See Fox, Art. 
(1956)' 20. 
8. Martin, BDW, 277. 
in prisoners. Here, then, would be an excellent ;,Tay for a group of 
committed Christians to express their concern for penal justice. 
The first thing for which they could work is a solution to the pro-
blem of idleness among prisoners which is still the most serious 
problem with which prison administrators have to cope.1 lack of 
suitable work is deadly for prison morale and a great hindrance to 
any program for rehabilitation, yet under the present system it is 
almost impossible to find appropriate work for all inmates. The best 
solution would seem to be the e::&tension of the state-use system which 
permits prisoners to manufacture goods for use in other state institu-
tions. Yet lobbies from private industry oppose all bills brought 
before the state legislatures proposing such a oolution. A lobby 
working on behalf of the prisoners could make the general public more 
aware of the values at stake. 
(3) •. After Punishment 
t 
A third way a Christian might ~~ress his forgiveness of 
criminals would be to work to achieve better treatment of ex-
convicts. Of all the persons caught up in the penal system, the ex-
convict fares the 1vorl3t. Almost without exception he is met with 
suspicion and considered an outcast by the society which has sup-
. 2 
posedly exacted from him due retribution for his crime. Societyts 
treatment of the ex-convict embodies the spirit of unlimited 
vengeance, for it continues to punish him even after he has "served 
1. Bennett, Art.(l956), 18. 
2. von Heutig, CHV, 448. 
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his time" and thus balanced the scales of justice. Not only does 
the ex-corlvict suffer the loss of his civic status in the com-
munity by being forbidden by la1-r to vote or to hold office, but 
also he is often denied ordinary opportunities for employment by 
the community, so that he must return to a life of crime in order 
to support himself.1 Such treatment is as damaging as it is unjust 
-- damaging to the ex-convict, but damaging to the community as 
well, for by its refusal to accept a person who has served·a 
prison term the community is actually fostering recidivism. 
Once again the church shares the blame. With very fe1-r excep-
tions, instead of sponsoring ex-convicts by finding them places to 
live and work, it 11has generally failed to l'relcome the cr:iminal 
back into its fellowship or to accept him as a God-forgiven 
individual". 2 In this area above all the church, as the community 
of the forgiven; should open its door and its heart and serve as 
an example to the rest of the community.3 
If the Gospel with its fellowship of reconciliation and its 
redemption of the lost be true, the church and individual Christians 
have no alternative but to bear witness to this truth by their full 
acceptance of the ex-convict as a brother and an equal under God. 
Yet even this is not enough if the Gospel be true. They must 11gp 
out to meet him" by visiting him in prison before his release to 
welcome him in advance and help him make plans for the future. No 
man is finally redeemed unti~he is fully accepted. Such unequivocal 
1. Radin, LAY, 72; Lawes, Art.(l940), 69. 
2. Sheppard, Art.(l949), 429. 
3. DeWolf, Art.(l953), 197. 
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acceptance of the ex-convict may be the greatest possible contribu-
tion the Christian can make toward the establishment of true penal 
justice. As Laurence Housman once said, 
we shall never get rid of the criminal till we 
cease to separate ourselves from him, till we make 
his interest our interest, till we share, willing-
ly and consciously, the responsibility of the 
society which has produced him.l 
such is the nature of Christian forgiveness. 
Here, then, are the components of a Christian philo~ophy of 
penal justice. In order to be .just it must include punishment of 
the wrongdoer, but that punishment must be such as to fulfill not 
only fundamental and legitimate needs of society and the victim 
but of the wrongdoer as well. In order to be Christian it must 
include forgiveness, and that forgiveness must express itself in 
active, self-giving concern for the wrongdoer. No man-made penal 
system can ever fully embody either the justice or mercy of God.2 
Yet in all humility the Christian will take these as his goals and 
will not finally be satisfied with anything less. 
·-
"'1"1-. -:QU~o"';"t-e"""d-.by Robiilson, CJ, 158. 
2. de""Pauley, PHD, 192; Moberly, AAP, 9. 
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SUI~Y AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the Christian 
attitude toward penal justice as exemplified in the history of 
theology and in the works of certain contemporary theologians in an 
effort to discover the necessary components of a Christian philo-
sophy of penal justice. It was undertaken because there has been 
so little systematic theological consideration of penal justice in 
spite of the fact that the redemption o~ the lost is a primary con-
cern of the New Testament. 
Because it is an introductory study an attempt has been made 
to survey the whole field in perspective rather than to examine any 
part of it in adequate detail. For this reason it is suggestive 
rather than conclusive at every point and the necessity of further 
study is not on.:cy acknowledged but sincerely urged. The pr:i.ma.ry 
aim of this present study has been to point up areas in which further 
investigation is called for. 
Although the study was made in the field of systematic theo-
logy, penological and psychological insights have been explored 
wherever they have seemed relevant. The attempt has been made in 
every case to indicate how these insights either contradict or sup-
plement the insights of Christian theology. 
1. Summary 
The presuppositions of the study were examined in Chapter One. 
It was suggested to begin with that the figure of the blindfolded 
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goddess with her scales and sword and the figure of the man on the 
cross represent the two concepts of justice which are embodied in 
a Christian culture: the Graeco-Roman and the Biblical. The first, 
expressed most definitively by Aristotle, is basically retributive, 
concerned above all to readjust the moral order violated by wrong-
doing. The second, culminating in the life and teaching of Jesus, 
is basically redemptive, concerned above all to reclaim the heart 
of the wrongdoer. Legal thought has concentrated on the first and 
left the second to the consideration of the theologians. Some theo-
logians have been content with such a division of labor and the 
separation of the divine and human realms it implies. However, it 
is the contention of this study that the two realms are not separated 
in the plan and purpose of God and that they must not be separated 
in the affairs of men. It is precisely because they have not yet 
been effectively interrelated in the field of penal justice that the 
correctional system has been so far from successful. The work of 
justice is to make men just, to increase personal righteousness in 
the world. This cannot be done by impersonal retribution but only 
by personal redemption. The most progressive penologists acl(nowledge 
this but most of them do not accept the theological presuppositions 
of redemption. Nor do they have the whole-hearted support of theo-
logy itself. For in several respects Christian theology has been 
more concerned with balancing the scales of justice than with fol-
lowing the example of the man on the cross. 
In Chapter Two some of the ways in which legal thought has thus 
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influenced Christian theology are discussed. This influence has 
been evident especially in the doctrine of eternal damnation and in 
the objective theories of the atonement proposed by Anselm and 
Grot ius. In these instances the character of God as Sovereign Lord 
and Righteous Judge is emphasized with the implication that He is 
more concerned to maintain His glory or to vindicate His order than 
He is to win the heart of the wrong-doer. 
Yet the fact that penal justice has had an adverse effect on 
Christian theology is only part of the picture. It is ~lso true 
that Christian theology has had a favorable effect on penal justice. 
In Chapter Three some of the ways in Which Christian theology has 
motivated Christian concern for the redemptive treatment of the 
wrongdoer in the history of penal practice are considered. It was 
religious leaders 1iLth their insistence on the dignity of human 
personality, the redemptive power of love, and the futility of 
vindictive punishment who substituted :imprisonment for capital and 
corporal punishments, Who established penitentiaries for adttlt of-
fenders and reformatories for young ones, Who suggested probation in 
place of impriso1~ent,. and Who first ministered to the needs of the 
ex-convicts. In all these ways certain Christians played a decisive 
part in the penal reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The Christian conscience is not now so sensitive to the plight 
of the condenined man as it once was. As the :improvements begun by 
Christians were taken over by the state or other secular agencies, 
Christians ceased to play a determining role in penal practice. The 
only official Protestant Christian connection with penal justice 
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today is the prison chaplain. 
Prison chaplains also played an important part in the history 
of penal reform. They were the first to employ ma.nY of the practices 
now accepted by contemporary penology: individual treatment of 
prisoners, educational and recreational programs, and social case 
work. In the contemporary prison the chaplain's principal task is 
to serve as spiritual counselor and leader of worship for the in-
mates. In order to be fully effective, however, his ministry cannot 
stop with the prisoners themselves. It must extend to the prison 
personnel as well, helping them temper their justice with kindness 
and develop redemptive programs for the prisoners in place of 
retributive punishment. The chaplain has still a larger ministry 
of reconciliation to fulfill beyond the prison walls. He.must reach 
those on the outside who are prejudiced against prisoners, ivho are 
blind to the evils in society which have produced them, and ivho will 
refuse to accept them back into society after they have served their 
prison terms. For ultimately it is the public itself -- those on 
the outside -- who must solve the problems of penal justice. It is 
their apathy or their vindictiveness which :impedes creative reforms 
in penal practice. Part of that public is Christian, some only 
nominally, but some with real ·conviction. Even those with convic-
tion need guidance in this field. 'What resources does Christian 
theology have to offer to help those who will, formulate a more 
Christian philosophy of penal justice? 
In Chapter Four these resources are presented and elaborated, 
and their relevance to penal practice is shown. The first such 
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resource is the Biblical concept of the redemptive purpose of God. 
Through His merciful justice, His justifying mercy, and His redeem-
ing grace God has been working through histor.r to establish His 
righteous covenant with ~en, to establish among men His ~ingdom of 
love. This purpose of God, which does not desire the destruction 
of the sinner but rather that he should turn from his wicked way 
and live, should motivate the Christian concerned with penal justice 
to work f?r redemptive treatment of offenders in place of retributive 
punishment and to insist that no person is beyond redemption in the 
providence of God. To achieve the first of these goals the Christian 
will advocate that the principles already being employed by the 
Federal government with young offenders be extended to state institu-
tions and to the treatment of older offenders as well. To manifest 
his belief that no one is be,yond redemption the Christian will not 
accept capital punishment or life imprisonment (except as the upper 
limit of an indeter.minate sentence) as a valid penal practice. 
The second theological resource for a Christian philosophy of 
penal justice is the Biblical insistence on the freedom of man, a 
freedom which makes possible not onlY his sin through rebellion 
against God but also his redemption through repentance unto Him. 
A number of contemporary penologists would agree with the Christian 
that the only effective penal practice is ~ehabilitation of, rather 
than retribution toward, offenders, but their premises for this 
conclusion and the treatment they suggest deny the freedom of will 
which Christians claim to be an essential part of human nature. 
These penologists contend that criminals are conditioned into crime 
by psychological and social £orces beyond their control and that 
they must be conditioned out of it by a training that will change 
their criminal habits. The Christian knows that ~treatment which 
operates on the habit lev~ alone, and thus fails to enlist the will 
itself in a man's redemption, cannot succeed. Therefore he must 
vrork to change criminal laws which affirm human freedom in theory 
but deny it in practice, and to introduce programs of rehabilitation 
which will develop the prisoner's initiative and his sense of 
responsibility and which will reward w.i..th increased freedom his in-
creasing ability to use freedom constructively. 
The third theological resource for a Christian phil0sopby of 
penal justice is the Biblical understanding of the corporate nature 
of guilt. In the light of this understanding it w.i..ll be seen that 
the criminal ~ responsible for his criminal behavior but the society 
which produced him shares that responsibility. For this reason no 
member of that society has cause to feel self-righteous about, or 
right to exact retribution for, crimes for -which he is at least 
partially responsible. Moreover, eyery member of that society must 
bear part of the cost of the crime by reconstructing the society from 
which the crim.lllal came and to which he will one day return~ 
Just as there is ~ community of guilt, so there must be a com-
munity of redemption. This is the £ourth theological resource for a 
Christian philosophy of penal justice, the Biblical conviction that 
the human will is never enlisted in isolation but only in life-
shaping relationships with other human beings under God. It was in 
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the koinonia of agape, a fellOi"lShip created and sustained by the 
Holy Spirit, that the first Christians experienced their redemption, 
and the primary purpose of the Christian church was to e..."Ctend this 
connnunity to all m.an.J.q.nd. Such redemptive co:rmnunities are not un-
knmm in penal practice. The Holy Spirit of agape love can: be 
present even there. Where they have been established th,ey have 
been significantly successful in the work of redemption. How·ever, 
~ 
these isolated instances are not enough to fill the great need for 
redemption among prisoners, and the Christian can make his most 
' 
distinctive contribution to penal justice through his efforts to 
exl:iend the koinonia of agape to all offenders. 
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In the fifth, and final, chapter the attempt. is made to fo:rmulate 
a Christian philosophy of penal justice by considering firs~ the need 
for punishment and then the need for forgiveness in penal practice. 
In this chapter it is suggested that in any discussion of penal 
practice three points of view must be taken into account: that of 
society, that of the victim, and that of the criminal. From the 
point of view of each of these; punishment of the wrongdoer is neces-
sary, though not for "!ihe same reasons. Society needs punishment of 
the wrongdoer to vindicate its own order, an order .which punishment 
itself helps to maintain." It also needs punishment of the wrongdoer 
in self-defense, to protect itself by deterring further crime. The 
victim, on the other. hand, needs restitution for the loss incurred 
by the crime. A just punishment, from his point of view, 1-rould need 
to include such compensation. Finally, the wrongdoer himself needs 
the just punishment ef the state not only to protect him from the 
unlimited vengeance of his fellows, but also to stimulate in him 
the penitence necessary for any true reformation. 
It is contended that, because it cannot be exactly administered 
by the state and may lead to bitterness rather than to reformation 
on the part of the wrongdoer, retributive punishment cannot fulfill 
these needs. Therefore, the possibilities of such non-retributive 
punishments as moral education and restitution are considered. 
Finally it is asked whether the needs of society for punishment of 
the wrongdoer are incompatible with those of the victim and the 
wrongdoer himself, or whether some system could be devised which 
would fulfill all these needs at once. The example of one primitive 
society where these needs are actually being fulfilled simultaneously 
in the penal practice is cited. 
In conclusion it is suggested that a Christian philosophy of 
penal justice must include the characteristic Christian element of 
forgiveness. For a Christian who forgives will not treat the duty 
of punishment as a license to hit back in the spirit of revenge but 
rather will seek to find ways of administering punishment which will 
e:xpress his active good will arid love. There are many ways he can 
do this by working to prevent further crime, to secure greater 
justice for convicted persons, and to achieve better treatment of 
ex-convicts. 
Thus there are two primary components of a Christian philosophy 
of penal justice. In order to be ,iust it must include punishment 
of the wrongdoer, but that punishment must be such as to fulfill not 
only fundamental and legitimate needs of society and the victim but 
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of the vn-ongdoer as well. In order to be Christian it must include 
forgiveness, and that forgiveness must express itself in active, 
self-giving concern for.the wrongdoer. 
2. Conclusions 
Although any conclusions in an introductory study such as this 
has been must be held tentatively pending further study, the fol-
lowing facts seem to.be evident concerning a Christian philosophy 
of penal justice: 
1. Christian theology itself has fostered much of the self-righteous 
vindictiveness which has characterized the public's attitude 
toward the criminal. 
2. Therefore a Christian philosophy of penal justice must guard 
against the temptation of every man to talce revenge on the 
criminal as the objectification 'of the sin of his own soul by 
a,cknowledging that all men are involved in the guilt of· the 
criminal by their participatio~·in the societywpich produced 
him. 
3. It must affirm that the function of the state is to promote 
justice and not to preserve the status quo which is in many cases 
the chief source of injustice and criminal behavior. 
4. It must be based on an understanding of God1 s ;redemptive purpose 
for mankind and the realization that only action taken in li:ae 
1v.ith that purpose will ultimately succeed. 
5. For this reason'it cannot accept the traditional forms of 
penal practice -- death or mere confinement -- since neither 
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of these is suitable to the purpose of redemption. Neither can 
it accept that contemporary concept of treatment which denies 
the freedom of the human will and its own responsible role in 
its redemption. 
6. It must recognize that God's way of dealing with erring human 
beings has been to establish redemptive community with them 
through the historic covenants, and that it is the nature of 
such community to accept men as they are in the knowledge that 
they can become what they are meant to be only as they are en-
couraged to use what they are now for the common good. 
7. It must satisfy the fundamental and legitimate needs of society, 
the victim, and the wrongdoer himself for punishment of crime by 
non-retributive means. Society needs punishment of the wrong-
doer to vindicate its own order, to defend itself against wrong, 
and to protect itself from further crime. The victim needs 
restitution for the loss incurred by the crime. The wrongdoer 
himself needs the just punishment of the state to protect him 
from private vengeance and to stimulate him to repent. The 
best penal system will be that which comes closest to fulfilling 
all these needs simultaneously. 
S. A Christian philosophy of penal justice must express Christian 
forgiveness of the criminal in its willingness to share the 
costliness of crime by taking steps to prevent further crime and 
to improve the present penal system. 
9. Finally, while such a philosophy will be based on the Christianls 
understanding of the revelation in the Bible, it must not be 
224 
closed to healing insights from psychology or penology or any 
other field of knowledge and human experience, realizing that 
it is man and not God who has set up distinctions between the 
secular and the sacred, and that God uses all things in His 
redemptive encounter with mankind. 
10. For further definition of a Christian philosophy of penal 
justice certain problems indicated in this present study must 
be subjected to careful research, as for example 
i. The effect that certain Christian traditions have had on 
the development of criminal law: - -- --
What influence did medieval ecclesiastical law have on 
Anglo-American penal tradition? How did Puritanism 
influence the development of criminal law in the United 
States? How can contemporary criminal law be made an 
instrument of redemption instead of mere retribution? 
ii. !ill:, part which the church has played in the prevention 
of crime and in the rehabilitation of convicted persons: 
How has the church failed to prevent the crimes of 
currentlY convicted persons? How has the church helped 
to rehabilitate currently convicted persons? 
iii. Questions which have been raised & & Christian examina-
tion of current penal practices: 
How far could techniques used with juvenile delinquents 
be extended for use with adult offenders? How could 
restitution to the victim by the offender be made a 
vital part of correctional work? What current prison 
practices need to be changed in order to foster the 
development of moral responsibility on the part of the 
prisoners? How could practices which create redemptive 
community (such as group counseling) be used more ef-
fectively tqith incarcerated offenders? Do probation 
and parole offer more Christian answers to the problem 
of punishment? 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to examine the Christian attitude 
toward penal justice as exemplified in the history of theology and in 
the works of certain contemporary theologians, in an effort to discover 
the necessary components of a Christian philosophy of penal justice. 
Although the redemption of the lost is a primary concern of the New 
Testament, there has been surprisingly little systematic consideration 
of this problem in Christian theology. This work is meant to be only a 
preliminary study of this critical area of theological and social concern. 
It is suggestive rather than conclusive, pointing up places in which 
further investigation, preferably of an interdisciplinary nature, is 
needed. 
The method is both historical and analytical. In Chapter One the 
presuppositions of such a study are examined: the nature of justice in 
general and of penal justice in particular, and the necessary relation 
between justice and love in a Christian society. In Chapter Two some of 
the effects of legalistic thinking on the history of Christian theology 
are shown. In Chapter Three a comparable study is made showing some effects 
of Christian thought on the history of penal practice. Chapter Four is 
devoted ~o an examination of the theological resources for formulating a 
Christian philosophy of penal justice. The theological basis of these 
resources· is discussed as well as their relevance to penal practice. The 
practical aspects of the problem are considered in Chapter Five where the 
attempt is made to formulate an approach to a Christian philosophy of 
penal justice. 
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Although, in an introductory study such as this, any conclusions 
must be held tentatively pending further study, the following facts seem 
to be evident: 
1. Christian theology itself has fostered much of the self-righteous 
vindictiveness ~~ich has characterized the public's attitude toward 
the criminal. 
2. Therefore, a Chr:Estian philosophy o£ penal justice must guard against 
the temptation of every man to take revenge on the criminal as the 
objectification of the siil. of his own soul by aclmowledging that all 
men are involved in the guilt of the criminal through their 
participation in the society which produced him. 
3. It must affirm that the function of the state is to promote justice 
and not to preserve the status quo rmich is in· many cases the chief 
~ourde of injustice and criminal behavior. 
4. It must be~ased on an understanding of God1 s redemptive purpose .for 
mankind and the realization that only action taken in accordance with 
that purpose will ultimately succeed. 
5. For this reason it _a.annot' accept the traditional forms of penal 
practice -- death or mere confinement -- since neither of these is 
suitable to the purpose of redemption. Neither can it accept that 
contemporary concept of treatment Which denies_the freedom of the 
human will and its ovm responsible role in its redemption. 
6. It must recognize that God's way of dealing with erring human beings 
gas been to establish redemptive community with them through historic 
covenants, and that it is the nature of such community to accept men 
as they are in the lmowledge that they can become what they are meant 
to be only as they are encouraged to use what they are now for the 
connnon good. 
7. It must satisfy the fundamental and legitiniate needs of society, of 
the victim, and of the wrongdoer himself for punishment of crime by 
non-retributive means. 
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8. It must express Christian forgiveness of the criminal in its willing-
ness to share the costliness of crime by taking steps to prevent 
further crime and to improve the present-penal system. 
9. For further definition of a Christian philosophy of penal justice, 
certain problems indicated in this present study must be subjected 
to careful research. 
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